

第六届全国中学生学术辩论与演讲联赛总决赛

NSDA China Nats Evidence Packet

Resolved: A just government ought to provide a universal basic income for its citizens

By Richard Shmikler & Cale Halley

NSDA China

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# China National’s 2018 NSDA Topic Packet: Universal Basic Income

#### Resolved: A just government ought to provide a Universal Basic Income (UBI) for its citizens.

## Definitions

#### Universal Basic Income

While there is some divergence about what constitutes a universal basic income, the general idea is that all individuals should receive a base, unconditional income that allows them to meet basic needs. The Basic Income Earth Networks provides a good clarification of the key tenants of the UBI[[1]](#footnote-1):

**A basic income is a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without a means-test or work requirement.**

That is, basic income has the following five characteristics:

1**. Periodic**: it is paid at regular intervals (for example every month), not as a one-off grant.

2. **Cash payment**: it is paid in an appropriate medium of exchange, allowing those who receive it to decide what they spend it on. It is not, therefore, paid either in kind (such as food or services) or in vouchers dedicated to a specific use.

3. **Individual**: it is paid on an individual basis—and not, for instance, to households.

4. **Universal**: it is paid to all, without means test.

5. **Unconditional**: it is paid without a requirement to work or to demonstrate willingness-to-work.

#### Just Government

This part of the resolution restricts the debate to hypothetical “good” governments. Therefore, we are not talking about what current existing governments will or won’t do to promote their current interests, but rather we are discussing what a good, or **just government*,*** should do. This can also set the basis for your framework debate – you can talk about what exactly a **just government** entails, for instance maximizing good for its citizens, ensuring fairness, social cooperation, or variations on the social contract. Defining “**just**” in terms of Aristotle, “**justice**”, or “giving each their due[[2]](#footnote-2)”, means you can discuss notions of dessert and ensuring governments provide what citizens deserve.

#### Ought

While we see this word in almost every topic, this word is still extremely important.

Generally we define ‘ought’ as ‘moral obligation[[3]](#footnote-3)’ (Merriam Webster Dictionary), but it could also be interpreted as a binding legal obligation, or perhaps as a mandate from the UN. Because *ought* is a prescription, meaning its telling us *what to do*, the debate is not about what is currently the case, what countries currently will or won’t do, but rather what they *should* or *ought* to do. Here is another great place to generate a framework, since questions of prescriptivism, or what we *should* or *ought* to do are questions of ethics, the guiding principles and values to our actions. rhaps as a mandate from the UN. dessert and ensuring governments provide what citizens "eserve. variations on the social cont

#### Provide?

Notice that this word specifies that it is the government in charge of redistributing cash. But it does not say *how*. Will the income be in the form of a check that one could cash at a bank? Will the income be a form of negative tax? How long will the income be provided? Where will the money come from?

It also failed to specify to whom will receive the income. Would it only be given to individuals above a certain age, or would young children receive one as well? Would immigrants have access to a Universal Basic Income, or would it only be given to citizens?

This will generally be confirmed by the UBI definition your team chooses, but it is still an interesting point to think about.

## Topic Summary

The core of the topic for the pro (affirmative) centers around the simple argument that **UBI decreases poverty**. Seeing as how large numbers of people are living in poverty without the ability to access basic living necessities like food and shelter, a UBI is necessary to ensure that people can **survive**. By supplying these things, UBI will also allow people to spend more time **improving** themselves, developing skills, or focusing on starting new businesses. By reducing poverty and benefiting everyone individually, UBI will **benefit the overall economy** as well. On the more philosophical end, UBI helps ensure the proper relationship between employer and employee. By giving a living income to all people, it recognizes the humanity of people and the value they have independent of their ability to work. This is crucial for recognizing the dignity of differently-abled people, and in allowing people to maintain their dignity by refusing degrading or dangerous low-paying jobs that were previously necessary for survival. While many of the affirmative arguments focus on the issue of labor freedom or the freedom to refuse work, most of these are impacts that occur because of people moving out of poverty. Most pro arguments will focus on these issues.

The con is a little more varied. First, there is the obvious issue of funding. UBI is extremely expensive, and a lot of the topic literature focuses on this. Second is the question of whether or not this is the best policy to decrease poverty, and a lot of the literature is offering alternative options to better solve the issue. These include options such as a living wage, minimum wage, Negative Income Tax, universal employment, etc. While these are varied, I think that it is unclear if the negative should be allowed to defend alternatives, as there are good arguments that, given the short time to research and also debate the topic, we should focus primarily on a philosophical debate on the topic. These leads me to what I believe to be the core of the topic; Libertarianism. This is the con argument that UBI falls outside the government’s roles and obligations, since the government is meant to provide defense and policy force, not vast and extensive welfare programs. It centers around the idea that taxing the rich to redistribute to the poor is a form of theft by the state, violating rights to property. Lastly, there are arguments that go the other direction, that UBI is not going far enough in combatting poverty and the abusive ‘system’. These arguments, often framed as ‘bio-power’ or ‘capitalism kritiks’ will argue that UBI falls short of solving the problem of poverty, and is only a short term fix, when really, we need to get rid of the system of capitalism all-together.

To better understand the topic as a whole, I offer a few economic concepts. It will be impossible to debate this topic successfully without at least a small understanding of economics and some terminology or ideas used in the literature. Here is a description of many of the main issues on the topic. With each explanation, I will explain the core concepts, provide you an outline of the argument, some suggestions on how you might use it in your cases, hint at some responses, and finally, provide some evidence examples for the argument itself.

# Arguments for the Pro (UBI GOOD)

## Poverty Reduction

This is the most basic argument for UBI. Poverty is a huge issue for a ton of reasons/impacts. Poverty means people die from lack of basic needs. Poverty means people must accept poor working conditions and jobs because no job means no survival. Poverty is not only a form of abuse itself, it allows exploitation. UBI counters this by simply giving poor people money – so that they can buy basic necessitates, and refuse to take bad jobs. Winning this will give you access to many, many other impacts.

#### Basic income eliminates poverty

Timothy Roscoe Carter 2014 (Basic Income Earth Network, The One Minute Case for a Basic Income , http://basicincome.org/bien/pdf/montreal2014/BIEN2014\_Carter.pdf)

The one minute human rights case for a basic income: Poverty is not a natural tragedy like cancer or earthquakes. Poverty is a human caused tragedy like slavery or government oppression. Slavery is caused by societal recognition of humans as property. Government oppression is caused by governments punishing people for their beliefs or characteristics, and without due process of law. Poverty is caused by property laws that deny some people access to necessities. These types of tragedies can be ended by recognizing that humans have the right not to be subjected to tortuous conditions imposed by other humans. Humans have a right not to live in slavery. Humans have a right to be free of government oppression. And humans have a right not to live in poverty. A basic income is not a strategy for dealing with poverty; it is the elimination of poverty. The campaign for a basic income is a campaign for the abolition of poverty. It is the abolitionist movement of the 21st century.

## Stimulate Economy (Purchasing Power)

This discusses the amount of money that people have to spend in the economy. When we talk about reducing poverty, we are not merely talking about making it so people have more money, we are trying to make it so people have the ability to buy (or purchase) more things, such as food, housing, medicine, education, or luxury goods. The question here is where will the increased money from UBI go? Will people spend the money and stimulate the economy? More money in means more money circulating and the economy is ‘stimulating’. Or will people save the money? This is a crucial aspect of the UBI debate.

#### UBI stimulates the economy by increasing individual spending and aggregate demand – that leads to economic growth

Nikiforos 17 et al. Michalis Nikiforos, Marshall Steinbaum, Gennaro Zezza, [Michalis Nikiforos is a Levy Institute research scholar working in the State of the US and World Economies program.] ”Modeling the Macroeconomic Effects of a Universal Basic Income,” Roo-sevelt Institute. rooseveltinstitute.org/modeling-macroeconomic-effects-ubi/08.29.17.

How would a massive federal spending program like a universal basic income (UBI) affect the macroeconomy? We use the Levy Institute macroeconometric model to estimate the impact of three versions of such an unconditional cash assistance program over an eight-year time horizon. Overall, we find that the economy can not only withstand large increases in federal spending, but could also grow thanks to the stimulative effects of cash transfers on the economy. We examin[ing] three versions of unconditional cash transfers: $1,000 a month to all adults, $500 a month to all adults, and a $250 a month child allowance. For each of the three versions, we model the macroeconomic ef-fects of these transfers using two different financing plans - increasing the federal debt, or fully funding the increased spending with increased taxes on households - and com-pare the effects to the Levy model’s baseline growth rate forecast. Our findings include the following: • For all three designs, enacting a UBI and paying for it by increasing the federal debt would grow the economy. Under the smallest spending scenario, $250 per month for each child, GDP is 0.79% larger than under the baseline forecast after eight years. The model finds that the largest cash program - $1,000 for all adults annually - expands the economy by 12.56% over the baseline after eight years. After eight years of enactment, the stimulative effects of the program dissipate and GDP growth returns to the baseline forecast, but the level of output remains permanently higher. • When paying for the policy by increasing taxes on households, the Levy model forecasts no effect on the economy. In effect, it gives to households with one hand what it is takes away with the other. • However, when the model is adapted to include distributional effects, the economy grows, even in the tax-financed scenarios. This occurs because the distributional model incorporates the idea that an extra dollar in the hands of lower in-come households leads to higher spending. In other words, the households that pay more in taxes than they receive in cash assistance have a low propensity to consume, and those that receive more in assistance than they pay in taxes have a high propen sity to consume. Thus, even when the policy is tax- rather than debt-financed, there is an increase in output, employment, prices, and wages. Levy’s Keynesian model incor-porates a series of assumptions based on rigorous empirical studies of the micro and macro effects of unconditional cash transfers, taxation and government net spending and borrowing (see Marinescu (2017), Mason (2017), Coibion et al (2017), and Konczal and Steinbaum (2016)). Fundamentally, the larger the size of the UBI, the larger the increase in aggregate demand and thus the larger the resulting economy is. The indi-vidual macroeconomic indicators are (qualitatively) what one would predict given an increase in aggregate demand: in addition to the increase in output, employment, la-bor force participation, prices, and wages all go up as well . Even in a deficit-financed policy, an increase in the government’s liabilities is mitigated by the increase in aggre-gate demand. Specifically, the Levy model assumes that the economy is not currently operating near potential output (Mason 2017) and makes two related microeconomic assumptions: (1) unconditional cash transfers do not reduce household labor supply; and (2) increasing government revenue by increasing taxes levied on households does not change household behavior. Other macroeconomic models would make different, likely less optimistic forecasts, because they would disagree with these assumptions. Estimating the macroeconomic effects of UBI is a critical component of any policy eval-uation, as what would appear to be a zero-sum transfer in static terms (where money is transferred from some households to others) turns out to be positive sum in the macro simulation, thanks to the increase in aggregate demand and therefore in the size of the economy

Another question here is **Wage Offset** – if we provide UBI, will it have a meaningful effect on purchasing power, or will employers just account for it and lower the wages they pay employees.

## Job Freedom

Many argue that UBI will provide more job opportunities to people. When people are barely scraping by and living paycheck to paycheck, they are less likely to take risks which could entail losing their jobs. They don’t invest in new ideas of businesses, as they can’t provide for a family and also spend time trying to learn a new skill or start a new business. UBI would provide people enough of a cushion, or living ability, to allow them to take risks, which encourages more companies starting, offering more jobs, and a more skilled and productive workforce. Less time focused on meeting basic needs would also mean better healthcare, education, and productivity, as people can spend time improving themselves and their community, as opposed to working for survival.

#### UBI means freedom to pursue what one wants

David Calnitsky and Jonathan P. Latner 2017 (University of Manitoba and Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Basic Income in a Small Town: Understanding the Elusive Effects on Work , http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~dcalnits/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Calnitsky\_Latner\_Social\_Problems\_BI\_in\_a\_small\_town.pdf)

According to a leading proponent, Philippe Van Parijs, **the objective of basic income is to** **transform** the **deprivations linked to non-employment and poor**ly **remunerated employment into real freedom** (1995). **Real freedom requires** that individuals have **not just the abstract** liberal **right** to freedom, **but** the **financial resources to make freedom a lived reality**. Furthermore, **by securing individuals power to say no** (Widerquist 2013), **basic income** **reduces the vulnerability of poor and working people to exploitative relations in labor markets**.

#### UBI increases bargaining power of workers

Bohmer 17, Peter. [Peter Bohmer is a faculty member in Political Economy at the Ever-green State College in Olympia, WA. He has been an activist since 1967 in movements for fundamental social change.] 11-23-2017, ”The Human Right to Not Be Poor: A Proposal for a Radical, Not a Neoliberal Universal Basic Income,” counterpunch.org, https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/12/01/the-human-right-to-not-be-poor-a-proposal-for-a-radical-not-a-neoliberal-universal-basic-income/, accessed 2-11-2018

In the United States, wages are largely determined by the bargaining power of workers to improve their wages. Right now the bargaining power has been decreasing with the decline of unions, firms threatening to move offshore, and technical change, and this program while being insufficient would increase the bargaining power of workers because they would have the UBI as a minimum. Let’s say you’re facing a minimum wage job where you’re really treated badly, you would have this UBI as a fall back income. You wouldn’t have to take the first job you are offered. You could say you’ll only work if working conditions improve or if I get offered a better wage; so it would improve the bargaining power of workers. We need stronger labor union laws to make it easier to organize but this is one part of a strategy of improving the dignity of work and people’s wages and working conditions.

## Labor Flexibility

#### Similar to the previous argument about job freedom, this argument focuses on how UBI will allow labor as a force to be more flexible. This argument focuses less on the individual and their ability to find meaningful work or avoid abusive work, and more on their ability to be productive within an ever-changing labor market. This is because a market where employers must attract workers with better wages and working conditions means that the entire labor force improves and becomes more productive. Also, when low-skilled jobs in poor conditions become vacated because people are not willing to work them, they will be automated, which is a benefit to everyone, since the people who would otherwise have them are receiving a basic income to support them, and are working on other skills or self-improvements

#### UBI benefits the economy by increasing labors flexibility and workers productivity, while mitigating the harms of bureaucracy and automation

Scott Santens 3/21/2017 (􏰁This is Why Experts Think All People Should Have a Universal Basic Income􏰂, https://futurism.com/why-experts-think-all-people-should-have-universal-basic- income/)

Simply put, a basic income improves the market for labor by making it optional. The transformation from a coercive market to a free market means that employers must attract employees with better pay and more flexible hours. It also means a more productive work force that potentially obviates the need for market-distorting minimum wage laws. Friction might even be reduced, so that people can move more easily from job to job, or from job to education/retraining to job, or even from job to entrepreneur, all thanks to more individual liquidity and the elimination of counter-productive bureaucracy and conditions. Perhaps best of all, the automation of low-demand jobs becomes further incentivized through the rising of wages. The work that people refuse to do for less than a machine would cost to do it becomes a job for machines. And thanks to those replaced workers having a basic income, they arent just left standing in the cold in the job markets ongoing game of musical chairs. They are instead better enabled to find new work, paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time, that works best for them. 1

## Human Value

Similar to the argument earlier about how UBI reduces poverty, only this argument is more focused on the philosophical front than any statistical modeling. The argument is highly supported by philosophers in minority literature as well as modern deontological (intrinsic worth/rights based) authors. The argument is that a UBI would decrease people’s dependency on their jobs, which has many positive benefits. First, from the employee’s side, people are no longer required to take poor and abusive jobs to survive. This better respects their dignity as humans. Additionally, minorities can refuse to work for racist, homophobic, sexist, or otherwise abusive bosses out of necessity. From the employer’s perspective, since workers can easily quite their jobs, workers have increased bargaining power, and thus employers or bosses must respect their workers more to ensure they continue working. This produces the most moral labor relationships, the argument goes.

#### UBI gives people the freedom of self-realization and the ability to decide how they want to live

Van Parijs 13, Philippe. [Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics] ”The Universal Basic Income: Why Utopian Thinking Matters, and How Sociologists Can Contribute to It” Politics & Society. 2013. P 174.

An unconditional basic income is similar to this scheme in being also a cash transfer irreducible to social insurance: it is not restricted to those who paid contributions in the past in order to benefit from solidarity now. But it is also crucially different from this because it is paid (1) irrespective of who one lives with, (2) irrespective of how much income one earns, and (3) irrespective of whether one is willing to work. Crazy idea? No. Great idea. Or at least an idea that must be extremely appealing to anyone com-mitted, as I am, to both freedom and equality. Committed to freedom, understood not as a sheer right or purely formal freedom but as an effective possibility or real freedom. Committed to equality in the sense that this real freedom must not be the preserve of the wealthy but be distributed, if not equally— which may be counterproductive—at least in such a way that those with least real freedom should have as much of it as pos-sible. Note that contrary to the More-Vives scheme, an unconditional basic income is not exclusively nor ultimately about the distribution of income or consumption power. It is about the power to decide what sort of life one wants to live. It is about the power to say no to the dictates of a boss, a bureaucrat, or a spouse. And it is about the power to say yes to activities that are poorly paid or not paid at all, but are nonetheless attrac-tive either in themselves or because of the training and the contacts they provide. The expectation is that spreading more evenly this bargaining power, the power to say yes and to say no, will not only make our societies more equal, but also systematically im-prove the quality of work—and thereby the quality of life—through the very operation of the capitalist labor market once subjected to different structural constraints. Even though everyone would be getting, as a right, some unearned income, the introduction of a basic income would not ipso facto make a capitalist society classless: in more than one sense, class cleavages would still exist. Yet the introduction and gradual increase of unconditional basic income arguably constitutes a capitalist road to Marx’s realm of freedom, to a world free of drudgery, the ideal that Marx shared with those he dismissed as “utopian socialists.”

# Arguments for the Con (UBI BAD)

## Funding

Perhaps the biggest Con argument on the topic will relate to funding. This is the question of how we will afford UBI. Obviously if the government needed to pay for the essentials for all citizens, this would cost a lot of money. So where does it come from?

**Monetary expansion** – basically, ‘print more money’ – and give it away to all of the people who qualify for UBI. This might be a good way to avoid certain taxation debates, but if your opponent is ready for the inflation debate, you will probably lose. You should be prepared for this.

**Deficit Spending** – Just dip further into the governments piggy bank – further the national debt – I would do some research here on the effects of national debt, and the amount of debt most core nations are already in.

**Consolidate Welfare Programs** – This is a popular one. It says that there is massive funding for welfare programs already, programs that could/would be ended if we used UBI. This includes food stamps, unemployment, disability pay, housing stipends, etc. But is that enough? Further research on specific UBI policies should help you here.

**Negative Income Tax** – relatively similar to most progressive taxes, but more radical. It involves taxing the rich and giving it to the poor. In some of the literature, this is seen as a way to fund UBI, while in other articles, it is seen as an alternative to UBI. Your definition of UBI and the way it is set up in the framework will be huge on this issue, and I recommend you thoroughly think through these debates when thinking about your funding mechanism.

**Other Taxation Strategies** – there are a myriad of other taxation policies to fund UBI offered in the literature. These include carbon taxes used to fund UBI, taxes on legalized drug trades, increased income tax to cover UBI, etc. Finding an advocate in the literature for your specific funding is a good idea.

#### UBI is extremely expensive and consolidating other programs doesn’t solve.

Harvey 6 (Philip, Rutgers University, “The Relative Cost of a Universal Basic Income and a Negative Income Tax”, BASIC INCOME STUDIES An International Journal of Basic Income Research, Vol. 1, Issue 2, December 2006, pp. 12-13)

Based on these figures, I estimate that total cash benefits received by persons aged 18 and above under the NIT I have modeled would have equaled $839.9 billion in 2002. NIT benefit payments to persons under the age of 18 would have totaled another $253.3 billion, so the total cost of the program would have been just over $1.09 trillion. As ex-plained above, the UBI that Clark modeled for 2002 would have achieved exactly the same redistributive effect – but with a budgeted cost approximately double that of its NIT equivalent. Based on the figures set forth in Table A3, the cost of a UBI system that included seniors on the same basis as other persons would have totaled $1.96 tril-lion in 2002 compared to the $1.09 trillion budget of its NIT equivalent. This does not take into account reductions in other transfer benefits made possible by the implemen-tation of a BIG in the form of either an NIT or a UBI. Clark has estimated these savings at $267.3 billion in 2002. As suggested above, I believe Clark’s selection of proposed transfer-program cuts is problematic, but his figures still can be used to estimate the approximate savings governments would have enjoyed if his proposed UBI or an equiv-alent NIT had been in place in 2002. Subtracting these savings from the budgeted cost of Clark’s proposed UBI and the equivalent NIT I have modeled would have resulted in the same reduction in the additional tax burden required to fund either one. The net additional cost of Clark’s proposed UBI after this adjustment would have been $1.69 trillion (instead of $1.96 trillion). The additional cost of the NIT would have been $826 billion (instead of $1.09 trillion). These figures show that a UBI and an equivalent NIT both would be very costly to implement, but the NIT strategy would be far less costly. On the other hand, remember that the marginal rate at which other income received by program participants would be exactly the same under both systems, so a plausible claim can be made that

Final thought: Do I need to discuss funding? Well, if you want to discuss advantages from particular UBI policies, it is probably important to talk about where the funding for UBI comes from, otherwise it is unfair for the negative to show why UBi has drawbacks – without discussion of funding its just free money. But perhaps since the resolution is talking about what a theoretical *Just government ought to do*, and a short debate is not enough time to discuss the complexities of UBI funding in depth, the debate is more suited to a philosophical debate that talks about the obligations of governments. This argument, or arguments preempting (arguing against) this should be in your framework.

## Libertarianism

This, I would argue, is the core negative argument on the topic. Even before people began writing about UBI specifically, philosophers were arguing about the role of governments, and arguing that governments obligations are extremely limited. This argument can take many forms and justifications but one basic justification is as follows. The state is formed via an agreement between citizens for protection, i.e. the social contract. Citizens come together to avoid a war of all against all, and the state is to act as a basic way of providing protection both between citizens and from others, either outside countries or foreigners. Because the government is created for the explicit purposes of providing protection, their right to claim taxes and fund itself extends solely to the purposes of building an army and police force (and perhaps enforcing contracts, like a Justice System). Anything outside of that purpose, such as UBI, is thus immoral.

Lets put it another way…

A person has the right to self-ownership, meaning you own your own life and what you do with it. What you do with it means how you spend your time, so the fruits of your labor, the wages you make at your job, or the products you produce. Taxation for something you don’t receive is thus immoral theft, since it is violating your right to property by stealing your labor or money and giving it to someone else. Therefore, since UBI puts taxes on the rich to give to the poor, it violates the right to property and therefor the right to self-ownership.

#### UBI is Theft from the People

Huemer 14 (Michael Huemer, professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Huemer received a BA from UC Berkeley in 1992 and a PhD in philosophy from Rutgers University in 1998.) “Is a Basic Income Permissible?” CATO Unbound. August 6th, 2014. http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/08/06/michael-huemer/ basic-income-permissible)

The Rectification Argument for a Basic Income History is full of injustice, much of it affecting the distribution of property. Following a suggestion of Robert Nozick’s, Zwolinski elsewhere suggests that, since the chain of causation is difficult to trace in individual cases, and since those who are doing especially badly now are dispropor-tionately likely to have been harmed by that injustice, the state might be justified in redistributing wealth to the poor in general, as a kind of approximation to the rectifica-tion of injustice. Here are a few brief problems with this line of thought: A. We should expect that the effects of injustices tend to wash out over time. Personal choices and in-nate abilities probably have much more to do with a person’s present-day income level than events occurring a century or more in the past. This is one reason for adopting a sort of statute of limitations on reparations for past injustices. B. A basic income would redistribute money from the rich and the middle class to the poor. But those from whom the money is taken are not guilty of any crimes for which they owe compensation. For example, no living person is responsible for slavery; it would therefore be unjust to force anyone to pay compensation for it. C. Zwolinski suggests that despite point (B), the state might owe compensation for past injustices, because the same state continues to exist despite changes in personnel. Analogously, corporations retain debts and other obligations even when the members who incurred those obligations are no longer in the corporation, or even are no longer alive. Shouldn’t a similar principle therefore hold for governments? Very briefly, I think this continuity of obligations is possible for private corporations because new members of a corporation, in voluntarily joining the organi-zation, thereby undertake whatever obligations go along with their accepted role in the corporation. These may include, for example, seeing to the payment of debts incurred by past managers. The same does not hold for the state, because new taxpayers do not voluntarily undertake the obligations of the government; rather, they have the govern-ment’s debts forcibly imposed on them. Admittedly, my view here will appeal more to anarchists than to anyone else, since the inability to collect funds to pay its debts would create serious practical problems for running a government

## Work Ethic

Many opponents of UBI argue about the negative impact it will have on the quality of work performed. If people can receive a UBI, or a wage sufficient to live on without doing work, then what motivation to they have to work in the first place? The decrease in motivation to work would create a massive decline in the work force that could create a recession or crumble the economy. This hurt may be most felt by the lowest paying job in a lot of industries where a large work force is crucial, such as mining, farming, factory jobs, or low-paying service industry jobs, creating massive repercussions for the entire economy. Additionally, since there is always a safety net to fall back on, people will be less concerned with getting fired, which will result in poor work performance.

#### UBI reduces work ethic

Manzi 14 (Jim, Chief Executive Officer of Applied Predictive Technologies (APT), received a B.S. in mathematics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was subsequently awarded a Dean’s Fellowship in statistics to the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania as one of the eight top matriculants to the business school’s doctoral programs, “When the Basic Income Guarantee Meets the Political Process.” CATO Unbound. August 8th, 2014. http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/08/08/ jim-manzi/when-basic-income-guarantee-meets-political-process)

It is fairly extraordinary to claim that the government could guarantee every adult in America an income even if they did zero work of any kind, and that somehow this would not reduce work effort. Zwolinksi should be able to provide strong evidence for such a claim. But we have scientific gold standard evidence that runs exactly the other way. A series of randomized experiments offered a version of Zwolinski’s proposal between 1968 and 1980. These tested a wide variety of program variants among the urban and rural poor, in better and worse macroeconomic periods, and in geographies from New Jersey to Seattle. They consistently found that the tested programs reduce the number of hours worked versus the existing welfare system, and the tested levels of progressivity of implicit tax rates did not get around this problem by encouraging work, as Zwolin-ski’s theoretical argument asserts they should. There was a further series of more than 30 randomized experiments conducted around the time of the welfare debates of the 1990s. These tested many ideas for improving welfare. What emerged from them was a clear picture: work requirements, and only work requirements, could be shown experimentally to get people off welfare and into jobs in a humane fashion. These experiments were an important input into the decision to make work requirements a central tenet of the new welfare regime when the welfare system was converted from AFDC to TANF in 1996. The paper that Zwolinski cites raises three objections to popular interpretations of the first round of experiments, all of which center around the point that we can never know with certainty the impacts any experimental program would have when scaled up. But there is no serious debate that in the dozens of occasions in which it has been put to the test, changing work requirements changes work effort, just as common sense says it should. Zwolinski’s proposal [UBI] would reduce work requirements down two steps from the current policy – from current TANF-level requirements, down through the prior AFDC-level requirements, down to no requirements at all – [which]when each of these steps has been shown to reduce work effort. Human society is complex, but as much as we can make almost any non-trivial prediction of social welfare policy, we can state with confidence that Zwolinski’s proposal [UBI] would lead to fewer work hours in America.

## Biopower/Domination/State-Control-Bad

This argument may seem a little scary and complicated, and the literature and articles surrounding it will often use weird and unfamiliar wording, but the argument is relatively simple. The argument is that the state (meaning government or country in this instance) is evil/ aims to control people. By using UBI, the government can make people dependent on the government for basic survival and needs, which means that government has increased control over its citizens. This can argument can take many forms. If citizens are dependent on the government for basic necessities, then they have no power to fight or rebel against abusive governmental policies, since the government can choose to cut off those basic services that people rely on. This essentially gives the government complete power to abuse its citizens. Another iteration or form of this argument, which is more linked to “capitalism bad”, is that UBI is a ruse-of-solvency, or “Band-Aid solution”. The government and capitalist system requires there be poor and powerless people so that there can be powerful people who control them and benefit from their labor. In order to ensure that people stay complacent and continue to work and support the system is to give them the bare minimum they need to survive so that they are unable to revolt or rebel without risking their survival. UBI does this, since rather than getting rid of the abusive and exploitative system, it merely placates (satisfies) the lowest-paid workers so that they are dependent on the system and government rather than overthrowing it. \*While the second card is far too long to put in a case ‘as-is’ it provides an excellent explanation of the Marxist argument against UBI.

#### A UBI relies on existing power relations to determine the monthly amount and the terms that individuals meet to receive it – that favors dominant power structures, not workers

Zamora 17, Daniel. [Daniel Zamora is a postdoctoral sociologist at the Université Li-bre de Bruxelles and Cambridge University]. ”The Case Against a Basic Income,” Ja-cobin Magazine, 12-28-2017, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/12/universal-basic-income-inequality-work, accessed 2-12-2018

No existing economy can pay for a generous basic income without defunding every-thing else. We would either have to settle for the minimalist version — whose effects would be highly suspect — or we’d have to eliminate all other social expenditures, in effect creating Milton Friedman’s paradise. Faced with these facts, we should ques-tion UBI’s rationality; as Luke Martinelli put it: “an affordable UBI is inadequate, and an adequate UBI is unaffordable.” Until we profoundly transform our economies, we can’t implement a measure that would cost more than 35 percent of GDP in economies where the state already spends around 50 percent of GDP. The power relations needed to establish this level of UBI would constitute an exit from capitalism, pure and simple, rendering depictions of UBI as a “means” of social transformation nonsense. Indeed, many defenses of basic income can be classified as what Raymond Geuss called “nonre-alist political philosophy”: ideas formulated in complete abstraction from the existing world and real people, completely “disjoined from real politics” — like to the Rawlsian model of justice that serves as an important inspiration to figures like Philippe Van Par-ijs. If UBI does take shape, current power relations will favor those who have economic power and want to profit by weakening the existing system of social protection and la-bor market regulations. Who will decide the monthly amount and who will dictate its terms and condition? Who do today’s power relations favor? Certainly not the worker.

#### UBI frames issues in terms of redistribution and ignores class struggle – this legitimizes capitalist modes of analysis and ignores focus on production. The Pro is merely a band-aid solution that ignores the systems that make inequality possible

Booth 17, Adam. [Political activist, Marxist, regular writer for Socialist Ap-peal (http://www.socialist.net ) and http://www.marxist.com] ”Universal ba-sic income: utopian dream or libertarian nightmare?,” In Defence of Marxism, https://www.marxist.com/universal-basic-income-utopian-dream-or-libertarian-nightmare.htm, accessed , 2-10-2017,

The main limit of the call for a progressive UBI, as with all reformist demands, is that it fails to pose the question from a class perspective – that is, to [and] analyse who actually owns and controls the wealth and technology in society, and, most importantly, how they have come to have such control in the first place. The problem with the UBI (and reformist policies in general), in other words, arises from its almost exclusive focus on the issue of distribution, rather than production. As Marx comments in his Critique of the Gotha Programme (a similarly reformist and utopian programme put forward by Marx’s socialist peers, the Lassalleans): “Quite apart from the analysis so far given, it was in general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and put the prin-cipal stress on it.”Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production themselves. The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of production itself. The capitalist mode of production, for example, rests on the fact that the material conditions of production are in the hands of non-workers in the form of property in capital and land, while the masses are only owners of the personal condition of production, of labour power. If the elements of production are so distributed, then the present-day distribution of the means of consumption results automatically. If the material conditions of production are the co-operative property of the workers themselves, then there likewise results a distribution of the means of consumption different from the present one. “Vulgar social-ism (and from it in turn a section of the democrats) has taken over from the bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production and hence the presentation of socialism as turning principally on distri-bution. After the real relation has long been made clear, why retrogress again?” (our emphasis) These words ring even more true today. By focussing on the question of tax-ation and redistribution, the modern leaders of the labour movement actually end up aiming their fire at the wrong people, alienating the middle classes with talk of taxes on incomes and personal property, rather than attacking the super-rich of the capitalist class, whose wealth is tied up in profits and capital – often far beyond the reaches of the state’s tax collectors. The emphasis for socialists, therefore, as Marx stresses, should not be on redistributing the wealth that has already been created in society (through taxation and welfare, etc.), but rather on having collective and democratic control over the means by which new wealth is created – that is, the means of production. If such a rational plan of production was implemented, then questions of taxation, inheritance, redistribution, welfare, and so on, would quickly disappear. For Marxists, the question of inequality, whilst important, is secondary. At root, our criticism of capitalism lies pri-marily not with these symptoms of the senile system, but with its fundamental disease: the laws of capitalism itself; the barriers of private ownership, competition, and produc-tion for profit, which stand in the way of the development of the productive forces – of industry and science, technology and technique, and art and culture. As Leon Trotsky, the great Russian revolutionary and theoretician, commented in his Marxist masterpiece Revolution Betrayed, “The fundamental evil of the capitalist system is not the extrav-agance of the possessing classes, however disgusting that may be in itself, but the fact that in order to guarantee its right to extravagance the bourgeoisie maintains its private ownership of the means of production, thus condemning the economic system to an-archy and decay.” (Leon Trotsky, Revolution Betrayed, chapter 1) Today we see this “fundamental evil” of “anarchy and decay” vividly displayed by the contradiction of enormous cash piles in the hands of the big business alongside historically low levels of investment and stagnant productivity growth; by the absurdity of the potential for mass automation alongside fears of technological unemployment; by the concerns over forced idleness for millions, instead of the realisation of voluntary leisure for all. UBI, for all its attempts to paper over the cracks, does nothing to stop this anarchy of the mar-ket and resolve the crisis of overproduction that has led society to this impasse. Indeed, as Marxists have always emphasised, no amount of reforms can unravel these funda-mental contradictions of capitalism. Only the revolutionary transformation of society can cut through this Gordian knot.

## Alternatives

The final issue I will talk about for the negative is the issue of alternatives. When you do your research on the topic, you will find that a huge bulk of articles on UBI discuss it in terms of other possible policies or alternatives that better solve poverty. Whether or not the con the should be allowed to defend and win off of these positions will be a hot issue in the debate. As a pro-debater, you might want to argue that it is unfair that the con reads an alternative, since there are an infinite number of social welfare programs, and it would be unreasonable to expect you to prepare answers to all of them and research every single one in comparison to them. On the other hand, the con debater may argue that this is a core issue in the topic literature, and that to ignore it would be to ignore the core debate of UBI. Shouldn’t the con debater also be allowed to try to solve poverty and the issues it presents? I will comment here on two of the possible alternatives.

**Living Wage –** a living wage, much like a minimum wage, sets a law about what companies must pay their employees. It ensures that any working citizen will receive enough money to lift themselves out of poverty, but unlike UBI, citizens must work.

#### Living wages solves better than a UBI because they reduce dependency, which is uniquely key to solve the security of jobs.

Harvey 3 (Rachel Harvey, BSFS in Foreign Service, Georgetown University, JD, Univer-sity of Florida College of Law, ”Labor Law: Challenges to the Living Wage Movement: Obstacles in a Path to Economic Justice,” University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 13, 2002-2003)

Increased wages are more favorable to workers than money received through such government benefits as income tax credits and food stamps because they provide workers with independence.123 Workers become less dependent on the government assistance they received through food stamps, public health trusts, and the federal EITC. In an im-pact study of the potential effects of a living wage ordinance on Miami-Dade County, Bruce Nissen notes that across the political spectrum there seems to be agreement that poor people are better off if they are weaned from dependence on government assis-tance. ”They are better in all respects... if they earn their income from their own work efforts.”’124 In addition to these effects, being weaned from government assistance affects workers’ sense of dignity.125 When employees receive higher wages they do a bet-ter job, as reflected in their improved morale, lower rate of absenteeism, lower turnover, and improvement in the quality of applicants.126 With higher wages rather than govern-ment assistance, workers could use their money as they see fit, benefiting from higher spending power and better healthcare in addition to greater credit worthiness and abil-ity to invest in education, homes, cars, etc. 127 Apart from their potential to increase net income in conjunction with tax and benefit programs, living wages have the potential to provide low-wage workers with a greater degree of independence and dignity than a pure system of targeted wage subsidies.

**Negative Income Tax (NIT) –** When you research UBI, you will see this term appear a lot in the literature. A negative income tax is a version of a progressive income tax where rich people are taxed more heavily, and poor people are given massive tax cuts. This way, the government is funded mostly by the the rich, and money is redistributed to the poor in the form of tax breaks. Here the debate becomes messy. Some authors argue that this is a form of UBI, in that this is how UBI will be funded. Seemingly, though, NIT would still not help those who are unemployed, or would at minimum help them much less, since they are not subject to many taxes (such as income taxes) since they receive no paycheck and generate no income. Whether this is pro or con ground, and who should be allowed to claim the benefits of NIT, is up for debate.

#### NIT imposes a lower tax burden while achieving the same poverty-reduction and redistribution effects

Harvey 6, Philip. [Rutgers University]. ”The Relative Cost of a Universal Basic Income and a Negative Income Tax,” Basic Income Studies, December 2006.

We have seen that a UBI and an NIT designed to achieve the same redistributive ef-fect would impose the same marginal rates of taxation on other sources of income, but that the overall tax burden required to fund an NIT would be much smaller than for an equivalent UBI. Unless one is persuaded that the redistributive effect of the two sys-tems is the proper measure of their cost, the NIT alternative plainly enjoys a substantial cost advantage over a UBI. A UBI might have other advantages that would tend to com-pensate for its higher cost, but those advantages would have to be very great to cancel out the cost advantage of an NIT. We also have seen that despite the lower cost of an NIT compared to a comparable UBI, it still would constitute a very expensive way of eradicating poverty. Indeed, the high cost of the NIT modeled in this paper – com-bined with the possibility that it would produce work disincentives undermining its own sustainability – call into question the viability of this type of BIG as a means of eliminating poverty.15 The distinct possibility exists that it could not be sustained at a high enough level to achieve its antipoverty goals. This would not matter, of course, if a UBI or equivalent NIT constituted the only means of eliminating poverty. In that case it would be reasonable to disregard any misgivings we might have concerning the ulti-mate effectiveness of the strategy. We could proceed in good conscience to promote the most generous BIG the economy could sustainably maintain. If the strategy fell short of its ultimate goal, at least we would have done what we could. But providing a UBI or its NIT equivalent is not the only way of eliminating poverty. The reason a UBI or an equivalent NIT would be so expensive is because most of its benefits would be pro-vided to individuals who were not living in poverty. The reason for this is obvious in the case of a UBI. A benefit large enough to raise the income of the poorest members of society to the poverty threshold would have to be paid to every member of society, the vast majority of whom are not poor. An NIT configured to achieve the same redistribu-tive effect would cost less because back-and-forth payments to individuals would be eliminated, but it would not eliminate back-and-forth payments to family units. Since tax liabilities and benefit eligibility would be determined for each family member in-dividually (consistent with the universality principle underlying the UBI idea), some family members could be liable for substantial net-tax payments while others received NIT benefit checks. Consequently, most of the budget of an NIT configured to achieve the same redistributive effect as a UBI would be used to pay benefits to nonworking members (both children and adults) of nonpoor families.

# Topic Analysis – Will Scott

#### Topic Overview by Enreach Chengdu coach Will Scott

What is a Universal Basic Income and how should we approach this topic?

A general strategic piece of advice before you get into the framework/definition debate:

When you’re making choices in the debate on framework, you ask yourself two questions. First, you should ask yourself if you can win under your opponent’s framework or definition. If you can win under the opponent’s framework you are in a strong position. The key to finding this out is to say “Even if they win their definitions, we still win because…”. If there is no because, you can’t concede this definition, which leads me to point 2:

Second, is this the hill I’m willing to die on? What I mean by this is that, in war, there are times where you have to draw the line that you will not retreat beyond a certain place. You will fight there until you push the enemy back or until you die. There are stories throughout history of commanders “burning the boats” and forcing their troops to fight to the death. In definition/framework debates, there are times where losing a certain definition dooms your case. For example, a con team whose case is based on UBI benefitting the rich being a problem must win that UBI means everyone gets the same check. If you lose that, the pro side can make your case irrelevant by defining UBI as only going to the poor, making your con case irrelevant. The definition of UBI as an equal cash payout to everyone would be a hill worth dying on for the con. If it came to it, you would be ok with the judge voting on whether or not you win that argument. However, if your case is based on all redistribution wealth being bad, there’s no reason to draw the line that UBI gives the wealthy money. Even if they win that only the poor get money, you can still win that the redistribution of wealth to the poor is bad. You can win in the opponent’s framework. This is not the hill to die on. Retreat and draw the line somewhere else.

A Universal Basic Income should provide enough money to access the necessities. While there will be a heavily contested definition debate, I see two key contest points:

1. Must a UBI be a “living wage”?

The evidence packet includes a definition of that basic “means an amount that would enable someone to survive…in the society they live in” (Standing 2017). I would argue (especially on the con) that this means a living wage. MIT’s Living Wage calculator indicates that a living wage is “the hourly rate that an individual must earn to support their family, if they are the sole provider and are working full-time (2080 hours per year)” (http://livingwage.mit.edu/metros/35620). For one adult and 2 children in New York City, that is US$82,665 per year.

On the pro side, I may argue for a lower standard. The IMF definition from the evidence packet indicates that a UBI is “a cash transfer of an equal amount to all individuals in a country”. There is no reason this must be a living wage, but instead a basic wage is sufficient. People should (and if I’m pro, I’m arguing they will) supplement their basic income with a job, even if that job is not a living wage. The point of a UBI is not to provide a living wage, but to supplement work.

2. Must a UBI be distributed to everyone within a country/region?

I think the simple answer to this question is YES. It’s hard to win a definition of “universal” that doesn’t include everyone. Pro teams may not like this, but I find it highly unlikely that most judges (except for technical judges like former debaters and coaches) will buy that you can have a universal basic income that’s not universal. I think this is a poor place to draw the line and say “I am willing to win or lose the debate based on whether or not I win this issue”.

Now let’s look at the two sides:

What are some potential advantages to UBI?

1. People would be encouraged to get back to work

Right now, many people stay in dead-end jobs to make sure they have an income to support themselves and their families. This could create a situation where those who have been unable to take a lower-paying job because it would them in a worse financial situation are encouraged to work. For example, a single parent may choose to not work and take government benefits because they cannot afford childcare. The UBI would make childcare affordable for that parent and make work attainable again.

2. People would be encouraged to pursue education

UBI programs provide a critical safety net to allow people to improve their skills. Let’s imagine a fry cook at the Krusty Krab for a second. He really would like to become a cashier to improve his income, but he can’t afford to take the time to get training. His boss, a very stingy Mr. Krabs, refuses to let him get on the job training or take paid leave to get an education. With a UBI, the fry cook could afford to take two nights a week off to go to school and become better at handling money. This would allow Mr. Squarepants to convince Mr. Krabs that he could do a better job than his lazy coworker, Mr. Tentacles. Mr. Squarepants could then move into a management position, and if Mr. Krabs refused to promote him, he could leave for a management job across the road with Mr. Krabs’ rival. This gives Mr. Squarepants a fair shot at a better job.

3. UBI would encourage entrepreneurship

Opening a small business and growing it into a national or international business is not as easy as having a good idea. You need time, energy, and capital. If you’re working 40+ hours a week to make ends meet, you likely don’t have time for a family or a business. Many good ideas die when people choose a family over their business. By the time they have the financial safety net to take their business idea and give it a shot, someone else has beaten them to it. If they’re lucky, their idea may not have been stolen, but the rising costs of college, childcare, and family obligations make it painful at best to build a business. A UBI would provide entrepreneurs with the financial safety to take risks and bring their ideas to market. That creates economic mobility because people have a fairer chance to pursue their ideas.

4. UBI would redistribute wealth and protect against automation

The most likely way to implement a UBI would be heavy income taxes above a certain level. The free market does a terrible job at distributing necessities to those who need it. It takes jobs from those on the lower end of the work scale. Today in China we are seeing automated stores with no cashiers. Amazon’s Go store works with minimal staff, replacing the cashiers and security with technology. McDonald’s has touch screens that cut back on cashiers. Some restaurants are developing automated cooking, making fry cooks like Mr. Squarepants obsolete. Corporations profit from the loss of low-income workers, but these workers are left with nowhere to go, no transferrable skills, and no income. UBI would tax these corporations at a higher rate to provide the basic income they have taken from the human worker.

What are some of the downfalls of UBI?

1. The market would change with the UBI

Businesses change their pricing based on what the market can afford. For example, if a liter of imported milk can sell for 12RMB and provide the store with a profit, then a store will sell it for that price. However, if a group of very milk-thirsty wealthy Americans moves to town and starts to buy all the milk, the store may raise prices because these wealthy Americans can afford it. Now, a gallon of milk costs 20RMB because the demand has risen. For the people who were buying milk at 12RMB the new 20RMB milk may not be affordable, even if the government gives everyone a 4RMB a week milk basic income. In a similar way, the price of basic goods could rise with the influx of new money into the market.

2. The UBI could discourage work

If you have a basic income, why go to work at all? Why not sit at home and play PUBG or Fortnite? People who have an income to cover their necessities (a basic income) may feel that they do not need to work. This makes it difficult to maintain an economy when the workforce is on their couches instead of working. If the system is truly a UNIVERSAL basic income, work requirements are not allowed (this should be dealt with in the definitions/framework debate- make sure they can’t try to use Finland as “universal”).

3. UBI is an inefficient way to redistribute wealth

Why should Mr. Krabs who lives in a fancy house in an anchor get the same check as the fry cook at the Krusty Krab who lives in a pineapple? The wealthy don’t need a basic income to grow the economy; they already have the incentive of profit driving them. Providing a UBI could take away critical resources for low-wage workers like Mr. Squarepants to move up from a pineapple to a safer home. All joking aside, it’s a problem when the wealthy take the same check as the poor. That money could be used to support those who really need it and for whom a basic income is insufficient.

4. The UBI would have to heavily tax the rich

For a UBI system to work, there are only two options: tax increases or inflation. Tax increases (the much more likely option) would likely hit the rich with higher income taxes. By creating a tax system that disincentivizes earning, businesses would simply stop growing after a certain point. For example, imagine an 85% income tax on all income above $1M. Apple (and Steve Jobs) would have very little incentive to keep growing and innovating if their income was taxed at 85% to fund universal basic income. Instead of Apple continuing to grow into the global force it is today, it would have remained a small business. This would likely have set technological innovation and access to the masses back 10-20 years. This technological access has driven economic development. It has freed workers to work for themselves and on their own time. No longer do drivers have to pay heavy rents to taxi companies; they can instead drive for Uber or Didi when they want to. No longer do you have to open a storefront to sell goods; you can sell your goods on Etsy, Ebay, or Taobao. Customers also benefit. No longer are people at the mercy of unscrupulous taxi drivers who overcharge; their fare is automatically calculated and paid in their ride-hailing app.

# Additional Evidence

### UBI is a Solution to Poverty

#### Basic income eliminates poverty

Timothy Roscoe Carter 2014 (Basic Income Earth Network, “The One Minute Case for a Basic Income”, http://basicincome.org/bien/pdf/montreal2014/BIEN2014\_Carter.pdf)

The one minute human rights case for a basic income: Poverty is not a natural tragedy like cancer or earthquakes. Poverty is a human caused tragedy like slavery or government oppression. Slavery is caused by societal recognition of humans as property. Government oppression is caused by governments punishing people for their beliefs or characteristics, and without due process of law. Poverty is caused by property laws that deny some people access to necessities. These types of tragedies can be ended by recognizing that humans have the right not to be subjected to tortuous conditions imposed by other humans. Humans have a right not to live in slavery. Humans have a right to be free of government oppression. And humans have a right not to live in poverty. A basic income is not a strategy for dealing with poverty; it it the elimination of poverty. The campaign for a basic income is a campaign for the abolition of poverty. It is the abolitionist movement of the 21st century.

#### 16 million Americans live below the poverty line

Andy Stern, 2016, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream, Andrew L. "**Andy**" **Ster** is the former president of the then 2.2.million member Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is now President Emeritus of SEIU, which grew by more than 1.2 million workers during his tenure, p. 2433-5

**Despite all the government assistance programs , nearly 16 million Americans fall below 50 percent of the poverty line , according to the US Census Bureau . That’s the equivalent of a family of four living on $ 34.40 per day , or $ 8.60 per person** . As New York Times columnist Eduardo Porter writes : “ ***No other advanced nation tolerates this depth of deprivation*** . **It amounts to one in twenty Americans — a share that has refused to shrink despite five decades of economic growth** . ” Porter attributes this ignominy to the overhaul of the welfare system in 1996 , which increased benefits for poor people who worked , are married , and have children , and decreased benefits to the lowest - income Americans who didn’t fulfill those criteria . As Porter poignantly writes : “ By believing the poor are not exerting enough effort , we allow ourselves not to care . ” This permits **politicians — and voters** — to **go normally about their business while 16 million Americans** , including most of the children who attend school at the Harlem Children’s Zone , **live on $ 8.60 or less a day .**

### Poverty Impacts

#### Poverty outweighs nuclear war – magnitude and timeframe

Spina 2k (Stephanie Urso, Ph.D. candidate in social/personality psychology at the Graduate School of the City University of New York, Smoke and Mirrors: The Hidden Context of Violence in Schools and Society, p. 201)

This sad fact is not limited to the United States. Globally, 18 million deaths a year are caused by structural violence, compared to 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. That is, approximately every five years, as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating, thermonuclear war or genocide, perpetuated on the weak and the poor every year of every decade, throughout the world.

#### Poverty turns war

MacMillan, former Director of the FAO’s Field Operations Division, 14

(Andrew, Higher Food Prices Can Help to End Hunger, Malnutrition and Food Waste, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2014/06/higher-food-prices-can-help-to-end-hunger-malnutrition-and-food-waste/>)

Any customers who give thought to how and where all the different foods are produced and end up in their shopping trolleys will start to uncover a rather disturbing situation. They will find that in most countries, people working at all levels in the food system – in supermarkets, in meat processing and packing plants, as fruit harvesters or farm labourers, or as waitresses in fast-food restaurants – are among the worst paid of all workers. They will discover that many of the skilled families that run the small-scale farms that produce most of the world’s food live precariously They are exposed to multiple risks caused by fluctuating markets, pests and diseases and extreme weather problems, whether frosts, hailstorms, floods, typhoons or droughts. They will also learn that in most developing countries hunger is heavily concentrated in rural areas, where some 70 percent of the world’s 842 million chronically hungry people live, largely dependent on farming, fishing and forestry. Much urban poverty results from people fleeing rural deprivation. And many of the conflicts that threaten global stability have their origins in areas of extreme poverty. It seems dreadfully wrong that the very people who produce so much of our food should be those who suffer most from deep poverty and food shortages. One reason for this apparently unjust situation is what economists call asymmetrical relationships in the food chain. For instance, supermarkets engage in cut-throat competition for customers by lowering their prices, reducing what they pay to their suppliers who, in turn, cut back on their workers’ pay. Most governments like to keep food prices “affordable”, claiming that it makes food accessible to poor families, thereby preventing hunger and malnutrition. The main policy instruments used by rich and emerging nations include tax-funded subsidies that compensate their farmers for low-priced food sales. They also set low taxes on most foods. The idea that low food prices will reduce the scale of the hunger problem is flawed since the main reason for people being hungry is that they cannot afford the food they need, even when prices are low. Rather than, as now, shielding all consumers from paying a full and fair price for food, it seems to make more sense to let prices rise and increase the food buying power of the poor. As Fair Trade customers have discovered, higher retail prices can be passed back to all those involved in the food production chain, especially farm labourers. They probably offer the best market-driven option for cutting rural poverty and hunger. But to eliminate hunger quickly, income transfers, targeted on poor families and with their value indexed to food prices, are also needed, at least until countries begin to manage their economies more equitably.

#### A UBI would boost growth 12%, even if it was funded by deficit spending

David Morris, September 3, 2017, Universal Basic Income Could Grow the U.S. Economy by an Extra 12.5%, http://fortune.com/2017/09/03/universal-basic-income-economy-study/

A team of economists from the left-leaning Roosevelt Institute conclude in a new research study that implementing a guaranteed income of $1,000 a month for all Americans would accelerate U.S. economic growth by an additional 12.56% over eight years if it were financed by increased federal debt. If the same program were financed by increased redistributive taxes, the growth impact would be smaller, producing an additional 2.62% of GDP growth over 8 years. But the federal deficit would also, according to the model, shrink by 1.39%. In both scenarios, unemployment would also decrease. A universal basic income, or UBI, is a once-fringe policy proposal that has gained increasing public support in the U.S., including from many tech business leaders including Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg. In part, the idea is appealing because it would help insulate workers against labor market shocks likely to be produced by innovations like self-driving cars and artificial intelligence. The Roosevelt Institute’s conclusions about the broader economic impacts of a UBI highlight a well-established phenomenon known as “marginal propensity to consume.” In essence, people in the lowest income brackets are more likely than the wealthy to spend additional income, so a UBI would put a greater proportion of cash into circulation. Somewhat ironically, there’s plenty of evidence of this in the tech world itself, with dominant firms like Apple and Google sitting on giant piles of cash that are contributing relatively little to macroeconomic growth. The Roosevelt Institute is named for Franklin Roosevelt, the U.S. President most known for implementing sweeping redistributive social programs, such as Social Security. It is largely focused on issues of inequality, making it an unsurprising supporter of a UBI.

#### UBI increases purchasing and economic growth

Frances Coppola, October 15, 2017, Forbes, The IMF gives a cautious welcome to UBI, https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/10/15/the-imf-gives-a-cautious-welcome-to-universal-basic-income/2/#6c91e72e98f2

Chapter 1 of the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor discusses ways of reducing income inequality within countries. It considers taxes and transfers together as a framework for redistribution. Crucially, it says, taxes and transfers aimed at reducing inequality should not hamper growth, since growth is important to those at the bottom of the income scale. But it also observes in a footnote that since people at the bottom of the income scale tend to spend more of their income than richer people, raising their income can increase aggregate demand and hence spur growth. Carefully calibrated tax and transfer policies can therefore, by increasing economic growth, benefit everyone.

UBI is one such policy.  The IMF describes it as a "forward-­looking idea for addressing current tax and transfer system weaknesses....particularly

## Freedom

### UBI Promotes Freedom

#### UBI means freedom to pursue what one wants

David Calnitsky and Jonathan P. Latner 2017 (University of Manitoba and Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, “Basic Income in a Small Town: Understanding the Elusive Effects on Work”, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~dcalnits/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Calnitsky\_Latner\_Social\_Problems\_BI\_in\_a\_small\_town.pdf)

According to a leading proponent, Philippe Van Parijs, the objective of basic income is to transform the deprivations linked to non-employment and poorly remunerated employment into “real freedom” (1995). Real freedom requires that individuals have not just the abstract liberal right to freedom, but the financial resources to make freedom a lived reality. Furthermore, by securing individuals’ “power to say no” (Widerquist 2013), basic income reduces the vulnerability of poor and working people to exploitative relations in labor markets.

**Basic income protects human freedom**

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, **p. location 493-4**

**Almost all proponents of basic income claim that it would enhance and give substance to freedom** . This is the second major justification for a basic income . But what is freedom ? By way of introduction , it can be argued that in the twentieth century the political left gave too little attention to the enhancement of individual freedom , while the political right gave freedom a libertarian slant that went against a very important historical tradition , that of ‘ republican ’ freedom . The standard liberal and libertarian version is that liberty involves freedom from constraint ( negative liberty ) and freedom to act ( positive liberty ) . This view is often linked to the political philosophy of utilitarianism , a perspective that has dominated recent political strategies of the centre right and left . Utilitarianism aims to promote the happiness of the majority ( often summed up as ‘ the greatest happiness of the greatest number ’ ) , which has the obvious danger of allowing politicians to care too little about making the minority miserable . 1 Classic liberals , exemplified by T . H . Green opposite , as well as libertarians , have long been united in their opposition to paternalism of all sorts , and above all to what is best described as state paternalism , except regarding children and the mentally frail . But intellectual consistency has not been a virtue of modern politicians , on the left as well as the right . Many have implicitly or explicitly embraced a dangerous hybrid known as ‘ libertarian paternalism ’ , which ‘ steers ’ or ‘ nudges ’ people to ‘ make the right choice ’ . Today it may be a bigger threat to freedom than outright authoritarianism , because it is so invidious and manipulative . The implications are considered later in this chapter . **A basic income can be described as a basic economic right that is a necessary condition for liberal notions of freedom . It is what is known as a basic liberty upon which other basic liberties depend – freedom of speech , freedom of thought , freedom of religion and freedom to associate . But a basic income fits differently into libertarian and republican notions of freedom** . **The Libertarian Perspective Libertarians believe in ‘ a small state** ’ **, on the grounds that the state** , by which they mean government , **infringes on individual liberty** . A pure libertarian shares with the communist and anarchist the desire for the state to ‘ wither away ’ . Government is necessarily intrusive and must collect taxes , which are seen as limiting individual freedom . **Consequently , it may seem strange that many libertarians have come to espouse a basic income provided by government . But they do so with the argument that this is the next best thing to having government withdraw from social policy altogether , *often ruefully admitting that a libertarian ‘ utopia ’ is politically impossible*** *.* Such libertarians include Robert Nozick and Charles Murray on the political right , and Philippe van Parijs , who calls his version ‘ real libertarianism ’ , and Karl Widerquist on the left . 2 Van Parijs ’ view that a basic income would enable people to choose to do what they wished to do has been criticized on the grounds that it does not prioritize essential freedoms , fails to recognize that some have more difficulty than others in converting income into freedom , and promotes freedom without responsibility . 3 **Widerquist’s thesis is that basic income provides ‘ freedom as effective control self - ownership** ’ , the effective power to accept or refuse cooperation with other willing people . Those in the right libertarian tradition who have recently argued in favour of a basic income include Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute and Matt Zwolinski , who draws on the work of the late Nobel Prize - winning economist James Buchanan . 4 But perhaps the most prominent advocate has been Charles Murray , who in 2014 summarized his nominally libertarian argument as follows : The society is too rich to stand aside and say , ‘ We aren’t going to do anything for people in need . ’ I understand that ; I accept that ; I sympathize with it . What I want is a grand compromise between the left and the right . We on the right say , ‘ We will give you huge government , in terms of the amount of money we spend . You give us small government , in terms of the ability of government to mess around with people’s lives . So you have a system whereby every month , a check goes into an electronic bank account for everybody over the age of 21 , which they can use as they see fit . They can get together with other people and then combine their resources . But they live their own lives . We put their lives back in their hands . . . my real goal with all of this is to revive civil society . Here’s what I mean by that . You have a guy who gets a check every month , alright . He is dissolute ; he drinks it up and he’s got 10 days to go before the next check comes in and he’s destitute . He now has to go to friends , relatives , neighbours or the Salvation Army , and say , ‘ I really need to survive . ’ He will get help . But under a guaranteed basic income , he can no longer portray himself as a victim who’s helpless to do anything about it . And you’ve got to set up feedback loops where people say , ‘ Okay , we’re not going to let you starve on the streets . But it’s time for you to get your act together . And don’t tell us that you can’t do it because we know you’ve got another check coming in in a couple of days .

## Entrepreneurship

### UBI Promotes Entrepreneurship

#### UBI encourages employment and entrepreneurship by creating financial stability and increasing job satisfaction

Economics Network at the University of Bristol (“Universal Basic Income: debunking the scaremongering”, http://www.studyingeconomics.ac.uk/universal-basic-income-debunking-the-scaremongering/)

Furthermore, UBI could be seen as encouraging employment as people would no longer have to work jobs that they feel forced to accept in order to pay the bills. Knowing that they have an income to fall back on, more time will be spent searching for meaningful jobs that align with people’s values and ideals. Entrepreneurship is encouraged as those wanting to start their own business rely on personal savings to do so as unemployment benefits are not given to those seeking to start a business. Those previously unable to finance this option will, through UBI, have the financial means to start their own businesses which would otherwise not be possible. For example, there exists a minimum bar to entry relating to business start-ups. If an individual has only a small amount of capital, it makes entrepreneurship near impossible, yet UBI, in offering a constant form of income, negates this. UBI also encourages employment in so far as it adds to an individual’s sense of stability, and making things such as childcare and transport more accessible (Harris, 2016). UBI is thus more likely to incentivize employment than to dis-incentivize it.

#### This benefits the economy by increasing labor’s flexibility and worker’s productivity, while mitigating the harms of bureaucracy and automation

Scott Santens 3/21/2017 (“This is Why Experts Think All People Should Have a Universal Basic Income”, <https://futurism.com/why-experts-think-all-people-should-have-universal-basic-income/)>

Simply put, a basic income improves the market for labor by making it optional. The transformation from a coercive market to a free market means that employers must attract employees with better pay and more flexible hours. It also means a more productive work force that potentially obviates the need for market-distorting minimum wage laws. Friction might even be reduced, so that people can move more easily from job to job, or from job to education/retraining to job, or even from job to entrepreneur, all thanks to more individual liquidity and the elimination of counter-productive bureaucracy and conditions. Perhaps best of all, the automation of low-demand jobs becomes further incentivized through the rising of wages. The work that people refuse to do for less than a machine would cost to do it becomes a job for machines. And thanks to those replaced workers having a basic income, they aren’t just left standing in the cold in the job market’s ongoing game of musical chairs. They are instead better enabled to find new work, paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time, that works best for them. [[4]](#footnote-4)

## Meaningful Work/Education

### UBI Promotes Meaningful Work

#### UBI enables people to engage in meaningful work

NATALIE SHOEMAKER 2017 (“Basic Income Could Be the Safety Net Mistreated Employees Need”, http://bigthink.com/natalie-shoemaker/work-is-changing-basic-income-could-help-it-change-for-the-better)

What is work? Clare Ozich, Executive Director of the Australian Institute of Employment Rights (and co-editor of the Green Agenda), considers how a universal basic income (UBI) policy could change how we evaluate the meaning of work in our society in her essay 'The emancipatory potential of a Universal Basic Income'. Advocates of UBI believe by setting a standard of living through a yearly income for everyone—it would create a floor no one would fall beneath, eliminating poverty. How we implement it successfully is still being tested in countries around the world. (Studies are currently being planned or done in the Netherlands, Finland, and Canada.) But the challenge UBI presents is also a conduit to a larger discussion surrounding the nature of inequality within our society and how we might be able to fix it. Ozich says the nature of work is changing. Automation is reducing employment in factories and threatens to make many workers unemployed in the next 25 years. It’s important for governments across the world to start considering how we transition. One way is to reduce working hours, another is to redefine what we consider work. There’s so much more to a person than the day-job they perform. There’s much work our society benefits from which is often unpaid. “I think the most exciting aspect of the debate on UBI is that it opens up a discussion about how we conceive of work; and what value we place on what forms of work,” Ozich writes. “UBI forces us to think about these questions. One of the critiques of UBI is that it is giving people something for nothing. Is it really? Aren’t there already multiple ways we all contribute to our society all the time outside the narrow concept of paid employment?” Parenthood and child-rearing, as well as volunteer work, and the work and time we put into conservation are all forms of work that help our society in many ways, but we often value employment status—who signs your paycheck—higher than these after-hours projects we partake in.

#### This benefits society by compensating people for intrinsically valuable work such as childcare, education and charity

Matt Orfela 2017 (“Would people work if they didn’t have to?”, https://medium.com/basic-income/would-people-work-if-they-didnt-have-to-ef91cbec600f)

When a minimum income was provided to all citizens in a Canadian experiment, most people stayed in the workforce. But even those who didn’t stay in the “workforce” still worked. The most common demographics for those who opted out of the workforce were mothers who chose to stay at home to raise their children and students who chose to continue higher education. A UBI will enable such intrinsically motivated work, that is currently not valued in out monetary system. Like parenting, studying/research, and volunteer/charity work. This is arguably the most important work there is.

#### This benefits the economy by encouraging investments in education which are critical for the future of society

Josh Beck 2017 (“Universal Basic Income: The Way to Fix Welfare”, Brown Political Review, <http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2017/04/universal-basic-income/)>

A UBI also presents a multitude of social benefits. First, because it would allow people to work significantly fewer hours, parents will have much more opportunity to spend time with their kids and play a more active role in their lives. Even parents working multiple jobs for low pay will now have greater opportunity. A study in the Community Work and Family Journal finds that having a parent work the evening shift has as big of a negative effect on a child’s academic development as has poverty. A UBI allows more parents to work less, meaning more kids doing well in school and being better prepared for our future high-skill economy. Additionally, government programs such as SNAP that provide conditional transfers don’t offer the flexibility afforded by a UBI. One cannot buy education with food stamps.

## Inequality

### UBI Reduces Inequality

#### UBI will reduce income inequality

Frances Coppola, October 15, 2017, Forbes, The IMF gives a cautious welcome to UBI, https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/10/15/the-imf-gives-a-cautious-welcome-to-universal-basic-income/2/#6c91e72e98f2

And now, the IMF has joined the party. In its latest [Fiscal Monitor](http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2017/10/05/fiscal-monitor-october-2017), it says UBI could reduce income inequality and protect people affected by technological change and globalization.

Income inequality **between** countries has fallen significantly, especially in the last decade, but this has been offset by rising inequality **within** countries. The IMF says that 53% of countries have experienced widening income inequality: this includes most advanced countries, where rising inequality is driven by very large rises in the income of the top 1%. Over time, persistent income inequality inevitably causes wealth inequality.

#### UBI will reduce the impact of income and employment shocks

Frances Coppola, October 15, 2017, Forbes, The IMF gives a cautious welcome to UBI, https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/10/15/the-imf-gives-a-cautious-welcome-to-universal-basic-income/2/#6c91e72e98f2

But at the end of its evaluation, the IMF put its finger on the real value of UBI for advanced countries: In an economic environment in which job insecurity is increasing (for example, because of job market disruptions associated with technological progress), expanding available insurance mechanisms may become an important policy objective. A UBI could provide a stable source of income to individuals and households and therefore limit the impact of income and employment shocks.

#### UBI offsets the harm caused by relative differences in tax rates income and capital gains taxes. Raising the rates in capital gains/investment taxes could also fund a UBI

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, p. 470-5

Another reason for tax unfairness is the taxation of different sources of income at different rates , mainly favouring the more affluent . It is surely a matter of social justice that all sources of income should be taxed in a similar manner . In particular , the tax rate on earnings from labour should not be higher than the tax rates on income from property or investments . Yet in practice , **in most societies , taxes on property and profits are much lower than those on earning**s . **A basic income system would help to rectify that discrepancy . Marginal and average rates of income tax on labour would decline , while still leaving room for taxes on unearned income to rise , so equalizing rates for all sources of income . That would also help finance a basic income , making it more affordable** .

### Inequality Means War

#### Inequality exacerbates the conditions for nuke war.

Frederick SOLT 11. Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Iowa. “Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride.” *The Journal of Politics* 73(3): 821-30. Emory Libraries.

One of the oldest theories of nationalism is that states instill the nationalist myth in their citizens to divert their attention from great economic inequality and so forestall pervasive unrest. Because the very concept of nationalism obscures the extent of inequality and is a potent tool for delegitimizing calls for redistribution, it is a perfect diversion, and states should be expected to engage in more nationalist mythmaking when inequality increases. The evidence presented by this study supports this theory: across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread. This result adds considerably to our understanding of nationalism. To date, many scholars have focused on the international environment as the principal source of threats that prompt states to generate nationalism; the importance of the domestic threat posed by economic inequality has been largely overlooked. However, at least in recent years, domestic inequality is a far more important stimulus for the generation of nationalist sentiments than the international context. Given that nuclear weapons—either their own or their allies’—rather than the mass army now serve as the primary defense of many countries against being overrun by their enemies, perhaps this is not surprising: nationalism-inspired mass mobilization is simply no longer as necessary for protection as it once was (see Mearsheimer 1990, 21; Posen 1993, 122–24). Another important implication of the analyses presented above is that growing economic inequality may increase ethnic conflict. States may foment national pride to stem discontent with increasing inequality, but this pride can also lead to more hostility towards immigrants and minorities. Though pride in the nation is distinct from chauvinism and outgroup hostility, it is nevertheless closely related to these phenomena, and recent experimental research has shown that members of majority groups who express high levels of national pride can be nudged into intolerant and xenophobic responses quite easily (Li and Brewer 2004). This finding suggests that, by leading to the creation of more national pride, higher levels of inequality produce environments favorable to those who would inflame ethnic animosities. Another and perhaps even more worrisome implication regards the likelihood of war. Nationalism is frequently suggested as a cause of war, and more national pride has been found to result in a much greater demand for national security even at the expense of civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004, 36–37) as well as preferences for “a more militaristic foreign affairs posture and a more interventionist role in world politics” (Conover and Feldman 1987, 3). To the extent that these preferences influence policymaking, the growth in economic inequality over the last quarter century should be expected to lead to more aggressive foreign policies and more international conflict. If economic inequality prompts states to generate diversionary nationalism as the results presented above suggest, then rising inequality could make for a more dangerous world. The results of this work also contribute to our still limited knowledge of the relationship between economic inequality and democratic politics. In particular, it helps explain the fact that, contrary to median-voter models of redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981), democracies with higher levels of inequality do not consistently respond with more redistribution (e.g., Bénabou 1996). Rather than allowing redistribution to be decided through the democratic process suggested by such models, this work suggests that states often respond to higher levels of inequality with more nationalism. Nationalism then works to divert attention from inequality, so many citizens neither realize the extent of inequality nor demand redistributive policies. By prompting states to promote nationalism, greater economic inequality removes the issue of redistribution from debate and therefore narrows the scope of democratic politics.

### Inequality Destroys Political Stability

#### Rising income inequality and stagnation of income at the bottom triggers nationalism, populism, and political instability

Frances Coppola, October 15, 2017, Forbes, The IMF gives a cautious welcome to UBI, https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/10/15/the-imf-gives-a-cautious-welcome-to-universal-basic-income/2/#6c91e72e98f2

But why do we need to reduce inequality? If everyone’s income is rising, why worry about some incomes rising faster than others? After all, “a rising tide floats all boats”, as the saying goes. Furthermore, since the savings of rich people can be deployed into productive investment, benefiting poorer people through more and better-paid employment, tax and transfer programs that take money from the rich to give to the poor could reduce investment, which over time would hurt the poor instead of helping them. In many countries, fiscal reforms since the 1980s have concentrated on reducing the tax burden of richer people to encourage them to invest productively, thus benefiting poorer people. This is the famous “[trickle-down economics](http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trickledowntheory.asp)” popularized by President Reagan (and dubbed “[voodoo](http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/voodooeconomics.asp)” by the first President Bush) Prosperity in much of the world has improved since the Reagan-era tax cuts. But in recent years, the incomes of low to middle income people in advanced countries [have stagnated](https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/14/up-to-70-per-cent-people-developed-countries-seen-income-stagnate) while those of the top 1% have [continued to rise](http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a12484304/1-percent-income-inequality/). Now, there are deep political crises on both sides of the Atlantic as the anger of those who see themselves as losing out fuels populist movements. Political instability threatens global growth and prosperity, already damaged by a financial crisis from which the world has been slow to recover. No wonder the IMF is concerned about rising inequality.

#### Inequality causes political polarization

International Monetary Fund, November 2017, Fiscal Monitor, Tackling Inequality, <http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2017/10/05/fiscal-monitor-october-2017>

Rising inequality and slow economic growth in many countries have focused attention on policies to support inclusive growth. While some inequality is inevitable in a market- based economic system, excessive inequality can erode social cohesion, lead to political polarization, and ultimately lower economic growth. is *Fiscal Monitor* discusses how scal policies can help achieve redis- tributive objectives. It focuses on three salient policy debates: tax rates at the top of the income distribution, the introduction of a universal basic income, and the role of public spending on education and health.

### Inequality destroys the environment

#### Current educational and socio-economic inequalities make environmental devastation inevitable

Holmberg 15 [Susan Holmberg is the research director and a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute in New York. She holds a Ph.D. in economics from UMass, Amherst, 7-5-2015, "Inequality isn’t just bad for the economy — it’s toxic for the environment," Grist, http://grist.org/politics/inequality-isnt-just-bad-for-the-economy-its-toxic-for-the-environment/]//Rank

The most consistent and profound message threaded throughout Pope Francis’ text is how disproportionately vulnerable the poor are to the escalating effects of climate change. Poor communities are on the front lines, particularly susceptible to induced mega-storms, droughts, flooding, and other conditions that make life even more difficult. Because of their economic instability, impoverished communities are also more easily affected by a storm that in itself is not deadly. In 1998, when Hurricane Mitch hit Honduras, the poor were disproportionately devastated; impoverished households lost 15–20 percent of their assets as a result of the storm, while the rich lost only 3 percent. This is why the environmental justice movement has long spotlighted the role of structural racism in coercing people of color and the poor into living in vulnerable areas and near the most polluted environments (landfills, industrial plants, etc.) and consequently experiencing worse health and quality-of-life outcomes. Yet, to build on the pope and environmental justice movement’s message that economic inequality and environmental quality are linked, it is important to point out that the relationship between the economy and environment goes both ways. We’ve become more aware that environmental damage can be especially bad for poor people and people of color. What is less obvious is that high economic inequality — in the case of the United States, we’re almost at pre-Great Depression levels — is also bad for our environment. Economist James Boyce argues that, because wealth ultimately converts into political power, a society with high levels of wealth and income inequality leaves those at the bottom less able to resist the powerful interests that benefit from pollution. That’s consistent with the environmental justice movement’s message, but Boyce takes it further by arguing, “the total magnitude of environmental harm depends on the extent of inequality. Societies with wider inequalities of wealth and power tend to have more environmental harm.” Boyce provides two compelling pieces of evidence for his argument. The first is his study, with colleagues from the Political Economy Research Institute, comparing industrial air pollution across U.S. metro areas. The authors look at the distribution of air pollution impacts across income levels and racial groups and find that in cities where the gaps in pollution exposure between people of color and whites are larger, there tends to be much more pollution in general. The second study Boyce conducted, with another group of colleagues, looked at environmental quality across the 50 states and asked why it’s better in some states than others. It again turns out that these variations have much to do with differences in wealth and power. “Where income inequalities were greater, where educational inequalities were greater, where the fairness of fiscal policy in terms of both the tax system and access to services like Medicaid was better, you tended to find differences in environmental degradation.” More equal distributions of wealth and power were associated with better environmental outcomes. Boyce’s results are supported by complementary studies. Economist Jungho Baek and his coauthors also find that more equal income distribution in the U.S. results in better environmental quality in both the short and long run. Australian researchers identify similar impacts on the “stability of major systems including the social, terrestrial, water and mineral industry.” We can imagine a variety of mechanisms for how wider disparities in economic inequality would lead to higher “quantities” of environmental degradation. One is how we make environmental policy decisions. The Reagan administration mandated that cost-benefit analysis would be the primary tool for making these decisions, like allowable use of pesticides and levels of resource extraction. The belief was, and still is, that cost-benefit analysis is always the most objective, transparent, and efficient method. But in addition to the fact that cost-benefit analyses are often criticized for being widely inaccurate and politically motivated, benefits are often valued by the willingness to pay for environmental improvements, which is problematic. When surveyed, the rich say they are willing to pay more than the poor for keeping a landfill incinerator out of their communities. Thus, despite the fact that common sense tells us impoverished and disempowered communities would just as much like to live in a clean and safe environment as the more wealthy and powerful, cost-benefit analyses typically say otherwise. The end result is that a cost-benefit survey might recommend a higher level of allowable pollution than if the survey results were based on a more equitable population. Precipitated by the 2008 global financial crisis, we are finally having a lively debate about economic inequality in the U.S., which, after decades of stability, has been rising for the past 30 years or so. Yet our urgent conversation about climate change and environmental quality is siloed from this broader debate. As we confront the realities of our changing climate, we must recognize that environmental devastation is a distinct byproduct of economic inequality. We need to blend these conversations and also understand that the host of policy ideas coming out of the inequality debate could play an important role in solving our current environmental crisis.

#### Income inequality is inextricably linked to environmental degradation – multiple studies prove

Lawrence and Haupt 12 [Carmen Lawrence completed her PhD in experimental psychology at the University of Western Australia in 1983. She then entered State and Federal politics, becoming Premier of Western Australia in 1990 before entering the Federal arena in 1994. Immediately on entering the House of Representatives she was chosen to serve in the Keating Ministry and held the portfolios of Human Services and Health as well as Assisting the Prime Minister for Women's Interests until the government fell in March 1996. She remained in Parliament until 2007 and then returned to academia at her alma mater, 2-13-2012, "Unexpected connections: Income inequality and environmental degradation," No Publication, http://www.shapingtomorrowsworld.org/hauptInequality.html]//Rank

Income inequality has been extensively correlated with health and social problems: life expectancy, obesity, mental health, drug use, educational performance, teenage births and violence to name a few (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Environmental degradation appears to be another side effect of economic inequality and analyses show there is a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental sustainability (Andrich et al., 2010; Baland et al., 2007; Butler, 2002; Dorling, 2010a, 2010b; Holland et al., 2009; Mikkelson et al., 2007): the higher the income inequality the worse the environmental indicators such as waste production, meat and water consumption, biodiversity loss and environmental composite indices (e.g. ecological footprint). While research on the relationship between inequality and various social and environmental indicators is extensive, the pathways and mechanisms underlying these linkages are yet to be established. It may be, as Coburn (2004) has argued, that income inequality is itself the result of the basic social, political and economic characteristics of a given society which also affect the quality of the environment. Characteristics such as the prevailing economic ideologies, cultural values like individualism and materialism, as well as attitudes toward consumption, work and the importance of protecting the environment are all likely to influence national policies which affect both income distribution and environmental quality. Breznau’s (2010) analysis of survey data from five countries showed that those with egalitarian values are the most likely to support government services designed to reduce inequality. Conversely, those who support “economic individualism”[1] and neo-liberal economic policies are the least likely to favour such a role for government (Arikan, 2011). Such attitudes also appear to affect support for pro-environmental behaviours and expenditures. Generally speaking, those who hold pro-market/ individualist worldviews do not endorse pro- environmental values and behaviours; the reverse holds true for people who maintain pro-environmental values (Heath & Gifford, 2006; Steg & Sievers, 2000). Significantly, for understanding the relationship between inequality and environmental degradation, these values appear to be reflected in actual government expenditure; countries which have higher scores on “economic individualism” have lower levels of overall government spending per capita (Arikan, 2011). Arguing from an economic perspective, Magnani (2000) has speculated that income inequality reduces pro-environmental public spending via a ‘relative income effect’ which causes shifts in the preferences of those with below average incomes in favour of greater consumption of private goods instead of public ones. Using data on public expenditure on environmental protection between 1980 and 1992 in 19 OECD countries, she showed that wider income inequalities were associated with lower environmental expenditure. Alternatively, Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) argue that inequality heightens consumerism that makes it harder to contain economic activity within sustainable levels and show evidence from a number of sources on savings, debt, bankruptcy rates, spending on advertising and working hours that indicate that inequality does increase the pressure to consume. According to Wilkinson and Pickett, two mechanisms can be identified by which social inequality leads to greater consumerism: (1) people in more unequal societies are more stressed and anxious, and consumption provides a way for people to escape from those pressures, and (2) the consumption by the rich reduces everyone else’s satisfaction with what they have, by showing it up as inferior, as less than the best; a great deal of what drives consumption is status competition, which, intuitively, is more intense in unequal societies. Boyce et al (2007) have proposed that the unequal distribution of wealth and power within countries leads to greater environmental damage by undermining the collective action required for environmental protection. Likewise, it has been shown that more equal societies are more socially cohesive and have higher levels of trust which foster public-spiritedness (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Similar findings have been reported on the relationship between social capital and environmental outcomes (Dulal et al., 2011), presumably because lack of trust and poorer social capital erode the capacity for collaborative action. It is possible that by inducing lower expenditure on environmental protection, increasing consumerism or reducing collective action, economic inequality may affect nations’ environment performance. To date, there has been a lack of empirical analyses establishing the potential causal links between income inequality and environmental degradation. We are currently undertaking research which we hope will fill in some of these gaps in our understanding.

#### Income inequality exacerbates ecological degradation – most crucial factor in biodiversity loss and resource consumption

Islam 15 [S. Nazrul Islam is a Senior Economic Affairs Officer at the Development Policy Analysis Division of UN DESA , August 2015, "Inequality and Environmental Sustainability," Department of Economic & Social Affairs, http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2015/wp145\_2015.pdf]//Rank

Researchers over time have put forward considerable evidence regarding the negative correlation between income inequality and environmental quality. This correlation has been observed with respect to many dimensions of the environment, including biodiversity. a. Inequality and Bio-diversity Loss Recent evidence shows that greater income inequality is associated with greater loss of bio-diversity. Studies highlighting this relationship include Mikkelson, Gonzalez, and Peterson (2007) and Holland, Peterson, and Gonzalez (2009). The former conducts regressions on the basis of both cross-country data and data across the states of the United States of America (USA). For the crosscountry regressions, the authors take as a dependent variable the ‘number of threatened plant and vertebrate species.’ They measure inequality by ‘Gini ratio of household income’ distribution and control for variations in ‘human population size’ and ‘GDP per capita.’ To account for the ‘stock effect,’ they control for the ‘total number of plant and vertebrate species.’ Based on the results, the authors conclude that “a 1% increase in the Gini ratio is associated with an almost 2% rise in the number of threatened species (Mikkelson, Gonzalez, and Peterson 2007, p. 2).”3 For their cross-state regressions, Mikkelson, Gonzalez, and Peterson (2007) use as a dependent variable “the number of threatened permanent resident species with statistically significant (p < 0.10) declines in abundance from 1966 to 2005.” Income inequality is again measured by the ‘Gini ratio of family income’ distribution. The stock effect is controlled for by including the ‘total number of permanent resident bird species,’ and ‘human population size’ and ‘per capita income’ are included as additional control variables. The authors report results showing a positive association between the number of threatened bird species and the degree of income inequality across the states. Holland, Peterson, and Gonzalez (2009) study the relationship between income inequality and biodiversity loss at a more disaggregated level. They run regressions similar to those in Mikkelson, Gonzalez, and Peterson (2007), but separately for various taxonomic groups of species and for countries at different levels of development.4 Figure 1 presents the scatter of Gini ratio and percentage of species threatened, showing a general positive relationship between the two. Based on their regression results, Holland, Peterson, and Gonzalez (2009) conclude that “greater inequality was associated with a greater proportion of species threatened (p. 1309).” They characterize inequality as a ‘key factor’ that explains variation in the proportion of threatened species across countries (p. 1310).5 Furthermore, they use their regression results to demonstrate the relative importance of inequality—compared with that of other factors— in explaining variations in bio-diversity loss. The outcome of this analysis is presented in Figure 2 that shows the proportions of variations in the percentage of species threatened explained by different factors. As can be seen, inequality ranks second in importance.6 It is well known that, while regressions can capture (partial) correlation, they per se do not establish causality. Furthermore, even if there are grounds to interpret the observed correlations as causality, regressions do not generally reveal the mechanisms through which the causality works. This is particularly true for regressions relying on ad-hoc specifications that do not have theoretical models underpinning them. The studies mentioned above are aware of these limitations. However, Mikkelson, Gonzalez, and Peterson (2007) believe that their regressions prove a ‘direct causal relationship’ between income inequality and diversity loss, because they control for possible common driving variables, i.e. variables that may cause both income inequality and the number of threatened species to increase simultaneously. The authors however agree that more refined analyses are needed to confirm the claimed causality. They also note that future studies are needed to reveal the mechanisms through which the causality works (p. 4). Another example of a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental outcome is observed via the consumption behaviour. For example, Dorling and other researchers examine the relationship of income inequality with personal consumption and generation of waste among affluent countries (see Dorling 2010a, 2010b, 2011 and Dorling, Barford, and Wheeler 2007.)7 Their findings show that rich countries with higher inequality consume more resources and generate more waste per person. Figure 3, 4, and 5 show the relationship between income inequality and per capita consumption of water, fish and meat, and generation of municipal waste, respectively. In these figures, income inequality is measured by the ratio of the income of the top ten per cent of the population to the income of the bottom ten per cent. In each case, it is found that higher level of inequality is generally associated with more resource consumption and more waste generation. For example, the per capita consumption of water increases from 3.2 cubic meter in Japan, where the income of the top ten per cent of the population is 4.5 times greater than that of the bottom ten per cent, to 6.8 cubic meter in the USA where the latter ratio is 16 (Figure 3). Similarly, while Japan’s per capita annual consumption of fish and meat is limited to 43.9 kilogram, the analogous consumption in New Zealand, where the above income inequality ratio is 12.5, is 130.1 kilogram (Figure 4). A similar situation can be seen with regard to waste generation. For example, in Sweden, where the above inequality ratio is 6, the per capita annual waste generated is 513 kg. However, the amount of per capita annual waste generated increases to 728 kg in Switzerland, where the inequality ratio is 9, and it increases further to 1072 kg in Singapore where the inequality ratio is 18 (Figure 5).

#### It’s reverse causal – solving for socio-economic inequality is pre-requisite for comprehensive environmental reform

Islam 15 [S. Nazrul Islam is a Senior Economic Affairs Officer at the Development Policy Analysis Division of UN DESA , August 2015, "Inequality and Environmental Sustainability," Department of Economic & Social Affairs, http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2015/wp145\_2015.pdf]//Rank

This paper synthesizes recent findings about the relationship between economic (and also gender) inequality and the quality of environment, and provides an analytical framework to explain negative correlations between the two. Based on the extant evidence and the proposed analytical framework, the paper argues for the reduction of inequality as a way of protection of the environment. While much attention has been devoted recently to the relationship between inequality and economic growth and social development, the relationship between inequality and environmental outcomes has been less discussed. This paper makes an attempt to fill up the lacunae. Over time significant empirical evidence and theoretical arguments have surfaced regarding how inequality impacts environmental quality. This paper systematizes these evidences and arguments using a comprehensive analytical framework. The paper identifies four inter-related channels through which inequality impacts the environment. They are: household, community, national, and international channels. The household channel works mainly through the consumption behaviour. The rich tends to consume and pollute more than the poor, and hence redistribution of income in favour of the poor households has the potential to be more favourable for the environment. The concrete outcome however depends on several other factors. The community channel works through the role of equality in facilitating collective effort necessary for the protection of common property (environmental) resources. At the national level, the reduction of inequality can create a more level playing field that is conducive to the adoption of more pro-environment policies. At the international level, more equal distribution of economic and political power among countries can make it easier to mobilize the global effort necessary to confront the global environmental problems, including the important problem of climate change. These different channels however are not water-tight separate tunnels. Instead, they overlap and thus can amplify the beneficial impact of reduction of inequality on environmental outcomes. In addition to inequality in income and wealth, gender inequality is another important dimension of inequality that affects environmental quality. Since gender inequality is generally intertwined with inequality in income and wealth, there are synergies between reductions of income and wealth inequality and reductions of gender inequality. An important task is to make use of these synergies for the protection of the environment. It is encouraging that the proposed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) put forward by the Open Working Group of the United Nations General Assembly includes the goal to “reduce inequality within and among countries” (Goal 10). This is a significant advance over the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that did not include reduction of inequality as a goal or target. In view of the links between inequality and environmental outcomes discussed in this paper, the inclusion of the goal to reduce inequality in the global development agenda is very appropriate.

#### Decades of statistical and empirical data prove enhancing income equality is the vital internal link to preventing ecological destruction

Baek 13 [Jungho Baek, Department of Economics, School of Management, University of Alaska Fairbanks, August 20, 2013, "Does income inequality harm the environment?: Empirical evidence from the United States," Elsevier Ltd, http://ac.els-cdn.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/S0301421513007404/1-s2.0-S0301421513007404-main.pdf?\_tid=e6f70ef4-666a-11e7-a7fe-00000aacb35e&amp;acdnat=1499799678\_552c1fda70c5907f1cf8459c86a49e4e]//Rank

Although the recent EKC literature has identified several variables other than income affecting environmental outcomes, less widely recognized variable is income distribution (inequality). Boyce (1994) is the first to argue that income distribution significantly affects society′s demand for environmental quality and hence an induced policy response; thus, the income inequality should be accounted for when estimating the EKC hypothesis (known as the political economy argument). Several empirical studies have since examined the claim. Torras and Boyce (1998), for example, find the importance of income distribution as an explanatory variable in a model; that is, greater equality of incomes results in lower levels of environmental degradation. Heerink et al. (2001), on the other hand, show that redistributing income has a detrimental effect on the environment. One major limitation of these studies is that they all use cross-section or panel data of a group of countries for their empirical analysis. For this reason, despite the wide variations between countries, they assume that an individual country′s experience over time would mirror the pattern revealed by a group of countries at different stages of economic development and hence income distribution at a point in time. No study has adopted country-specific time series data to examine the effect of economic growth on the environment by taking the role of income distribution into account. In this study, therefore, we attempt to expand the existing literature by re-examining the growth-inequality-environment nexus in the context of country-specific time series data. Empirical focus is on assessment of the short- and long-run effects of changes in income per capita and income inequality on changes in CO2 emissions in the U.S. for a given level of energy consumption.1 For this purpose, we employ an autogressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the empirical framework used for this analysis. Section 3 presents our data. In Section 4 the main empirical findings are reported and discussed. Finally Section 5 makes some concluding remarks. In the empirical model used here we modify a theoretical framework developed by Torras and Boyce (1998) and Heerink et al. (2001) to represent the long-run relationship between CO2 emissions and its major determinants in a linear logarithmic form as follows: lnðCO2Þt ¼ β0 þ β1lnYt þ β2lnGt þ β3lnEt þ ut ð1Þ where ðCO2Þt is the per capita CO2 emissions; Yt is the per capita real income; Gt is the measure of income distribution; Et is the energy consumption; and ut is error term. It should be pointed out that, following previous studies, other variables such as foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade openness are also included in the model to capture their impacts on the environment, but are excluded from the final model because of coefficient insignificance. With respect to the signs of the coefficients in Eq. (1), β1 is expected to be negative (positive), if CO2 emissions decline (rise) with higher income level. If a more equal distribution of income causes less pollution emissions, the sign of β2 is expected to be positive. Finally, if energy consumption leads to an increase in CO2 emissions through greater economic activity, the sign of β3 is expected to be positive. To implement the bounds testing procedure, following Pesaran et al. (2001), it is necessary to reformulate Eq. (1) as a conditional autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model as follows: ΔlnðCO2Þt ¼ β′0 þ ∑ p k ¼ 1 β′1ΔlnðCO2Þtk þ ∑ p k ¼ 0 β′2ΔlnYtk þ ∑ p k ¼ 0 β′3ΔlnGtk þ ∑ p k ¼ 0 β′4ΔEtk þ λ1lnðCO2Þt1 þλ2lnYt1 þ λ3lnGt1 þ λ4Et1 þ ηt ð2Þ Recall that the objective of this paper is to examine both the short- and long-run relationships between CO2 emissions and its major determinants. Eq. (2) is very well suited to deal with this purpose. In Eq. (2), for example, the long-run (cointegration) relationship is represented by the coefficients of λs, whereas the short-run dynamics is determined by the coefficients of the summation signs (Σ). Hence, Eq. (2) is called an error-correction representation of ARDL model. The first step of the ARDL approach is to test the existence of the long-run relationship among the variables. For this, the null hypothesis of no cointegration (H0 : λ1 ¼ λ2 ¼ λ3 ¼ λ4 ¼ 0) is tested using an F-test. The computed F-statistic is then compared with two sets of critical values – upper and lower critical values - provided by Pesaran et al. (2001). If the computed F-statistic lies above (below) the upper (lower) critical value, the null hypothesis can (cannot) be rejected, indicating the (no) existence of the longrun relationship. In the second step, the selected ARDL model determined by model selection criteria is used to estimate the short- and long-run models. 3. Data We estimate Eq. (2) using annual data from the U.S. over the 1967 to 2008 period. The data span has been chosen based on availability of the data for all the series. CO2 emissions (measured in metric tons per capita) and energy consumption (measured in kg of oil equivalent per capita) are collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) provided by the Work Bank. Per capita real GDP (2005¼100) is used as a proxy for U.S. income and is taken from the Penn World Table (PWT 7.1) compiled by the University of Pennsylvania. Finally, following previous studies (e.g., Torras and Boyce, 1998; Heerink et al., 2001), the GINI coefficient is used as a proxy for income inequality and is obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. It ranges from zero (perfect equality) to one (all income received by one individual). Finally, since all variables are transformed to natural logarithms, the estimated coefficients could be interpreted as elasticities. 4. Empirical results The main advantage of the ARDL modeling is that this approach is applicable irrespective of whether the variables are Ið0Þ or Ið1Þ and hence avoids the pre-testing problem associated with unit root tests (Pesaran et al., 2001). However, the ARDL cannot be applied to Ið2Þ variables because the computed F-statistics are not valid in the presence of Ið2Þ variables (Ouattara, 2004). For this reason, the first requirement for the use of the ARDL is that none of the variables is Ið2Þ or beyond. The presence of a unit root in the variables is tested using an augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test and the more recent Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test. The results show that, for the level series, the ADF and KPSS tests seem to provide slightly different results (Table 1). The energy consumption (income), for example, is found to be nonstationary (stationary) with the ADF test, but stationary (nonstationary) with the KPSS test. For the first-differenced series, however, the results of both tests indicate that all the variables are stationary. This suggests that the four variables are Ið0Þ and/or Ið1Þ variables and none of them are Ið2Þ; hence, the ARDL modeling can be pursued on them. As discussed earlier, the ARDL starts with the F-test to identify if the selected variables are cointegrated. Because the F-test is sensitive to the number of lags on each first-differenced variable in Eq. (2), we determine the optimal lag length based on the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC); setting the maximum five lags, for example, three is found to be the optimal lag length. With three lags, the calculated F-statistic is then found to be 4.31, which lies above the upper critical value of 3.77 at the 10% level, thereby rejecting the null hypothesis of no cointegration; hence, this suggests the existence of a stable long-run relationship among the selected variables. It is important to note that, since the critical values tabulated by Pesaran et al. (2001) are generated based on large sample sizes (e.g., 500 and 1000 observations), they may not be valid for small sample sizes like our sample of 42 annual observations, thereby raising questions about the validity of the results. To address this problem, Narayan. (2005) provides new (higher) critical values for sample sizes ranging from 30 to 80 observations. In our case, for example, the upper level of 10% critical value provided by Narayan. (2005) is 4.02, which is much higher than the corresponding critical value for Pesaran et al. (2001). This also leads us to reject the null of no cointegration, providing sufficient evidence that there is a long-run relationship among the four variables. Hence, our F-tests are shown to be robust even in small samples.2 In the second step, we use the selected ARDL model to estimate the long- and short-run coefficients. The long- and short-run results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. First of all, one of our interests is the relationship between CO2 emissions and per capita income. The estimated coefficients on the income are found to be negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in both the long- and short-run; for example, a 1% increase in per capita income leads to a decrease in per capita CO2 emissions by approximately 0.35% (0.23%) in the long-run (short-run). It should be noted that a quadratic term in per capita income (ðlnYtÞ 2) is also included in Eq. (2) in order to directly examine the existence of the EKC hypothesis as previous studies did. The short- and long-run coefficients of the quadratic terms, however, are found to be statistically insignificant even at the 10% level; hence, they are excluded from the final model. These findings indicate a monotonic decrease in the relationship between CO2 emissions and income in the United States. This can thus be interpreted to mean that the U.S. may have already moved beyond the EKC threshold level of income and hence CO2 emissions decline with income growth; indeed, Fig. 1 shows that the U.S. already crossed the EKC turning point of approximately $20,000 per capita income around 1973. Our central interest is the coefficient on income inequality. The estimates are positive for both the long- and short-run and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that a low Gini coefficient (greater income equality) decreases CO2 emissions. This can thus be interpreted to provide evidence to support the political economy argument; that is, a more equal distribution of power and income in the U.S. over the past four decades has increased U.S. citizens’ demand for a clean environment and the induced policy response, which in turn has led to more stringent environmental standards and stricter enforcement of environmental laws, thereby enhancing environmental quality. Finally, the long- and short-run coefficients on energy consumption are found to be positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that CO2 emissions tend to increase as U.S. energy consumption increases with income growth; for example, a 1% increase in per capita consumption of energy results in a rise in CO2 emissions by approximately 1.05% (1.06%) in the long-run (short-run). Notice that the error-correction term (ect1) is found to be negative and highly significant (Table 3), confirming evidence of the existence of cointegration relationship among the selected variables. Finally, we conduct several diagnostic and stability tests in order to ascertain the goodness of fit of the ARDL model. Diagnostic tests on the short-run model as a system show no serious problems with serial correlation, heteroskedasticity, normality and functional form specification (Table 3). Additionally, the cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares (CUSUMSQ) tests are used to test for structural stability of our model (Fig. 2). The result shows that the estimated coefficients are generally stable over the sample period. Overall, therefore, the ARDL model presented above is well defined and provides sound findings. 5. Concluding remarks The objective of this study is to examine the growth-inequality environment nexus. Although several empirical studies on this issue exist, relatively little attention has been paid to the dynamic effects of income equality, income and other relevant variables on the environment in the framework of country-specific time series data. Therefore, the primary contribution of this study is to assess the short- and long-run effects of income inequality, per capita real income and energy consumption on CO2 emissions in the U.S. using an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration. The results show that income inequality and CO2 emissions have a positive relationship in both the long- and short-run, suggesting that greater equality of income in the U.S. has a beneficial effect on environmental quality. This finding is consistent with the results of Torras and Boyce (1998) and Magnani (2000). However, this contrasts with Heerink et al. (2001) who find that greater equality of income has a detrimental effect on the environment. We also find that income has a significant negative relationship with CO2 emissions in the shortand long-run, indicating that economic growth in the U.S. enhances environmental quality. Finally, it is found that energy consumption has a detrimental effect on the environment in both the short- and long-run.

#### Reducing income inequality eliminates the effects of climate change – reducing work hours is key

Cha 13[Mijin Cha, reporter for Demos, 2-8-2013, "How Income Inequality Contributes to Climate Change," Demos, http://www.demos.org/blog/how-income-inequality-contributes-climate-change]//Rank

Here’s another reason why income inequality is so destructive—it’s ruining our planet and increasing the severity of climate change. A new paper from the Center on Economic and Policy Research looks at a novel way to slow climate change: reduce the hours that we work. For reasons that are not entirely understood, shorter work hours are linked with lower greenhouse gas emissions. By just reducing the annual work hours by 0.5 percent for the rest of the century, one-quarter to one-half of global warming not locked in -- i.e. the warming that will already occur due to the 1990 levels of greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere -- would be eliminated. Unfortunately, the high level of income inequality makes reducing work hours very difficult in the U.S. Between 1973-2007, nearly two-thirds of all income gains went to just the top 1 percent of households. This very small minority of households could have their work hours reduced and absorb the accompanying decrease in pay. The vast majority of households, however, are working more hours and increasing productivity, but seeing a reduction in take home pay. As my colleague Joe Hines detailed, workers are increasing hours and output, but seeing their pay fall. With this level of economic insecurity, workers cannot afford to work less, even if it is better for the climate. Americans already work many more hours more per year than western European countries. In 2005, Western European work hours per person were roughly 50 percent less than the U.S. The average German worker works 20 percent less per year than the average American. The greenhouse gas emissions per capita in America is nearly twice that of Germany. Again, the reasons for this relationship is not entirely clear but reduced work hours increases leisure time, which gives people more time to cook, versus eating out, or walk, instead of drive, and other sustainable practices. Working less could also decrease commuting time and carbon footprint. Unfortunately, only a few households can currently afford to work less and have more free time. Increasing wages for the average worker is not only good for our economy, it’s good for our planet.

#### Reducing work hours by 0.5 percent eliminates the worst effects of climate change

**Rosnick, 13** - David Rosnick is an economist at the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington D.C., February 2013, "Reduced Work Hours as a Means of Slowing Climate Change," Center for Economic and Policy Research, http://cepr.net/documents/publications/climate-change-workshare-2013-02.pdf]//Rank

As productivity grows in high-income, as well as developing countries, social choices will be made as to how much of the productivity gains will be taken in the form of higher consumption levels versus fewer work hours. In the last few decades, for example, western European countries have significantly reduced work hours (through shorter weekly hours and increased vacation time) while the United States has not. Western Europe had about the same hours worked per person as the U.S. in the early 1970s, but by 2005 they were about 50 percent less. This choice between fewer work hours versus increased consumption has significant implications for the rate of climate change. A number of studies (e.g. Knight et al. 2012, Rosnick and Weisbrot 2006) have found that shorter work hours are associated with lower greenhouse gas emissions and therefore less global climate change. The relationship between these two variables is complex and not clearly understood, but it is understandable that lowering levels of consumption, holding everything else constant, would reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This paper estimates the impact on climate change of reducing work hours over the rest of the century by an annual average of 0.5 percent. It finds that such a change in work hours would eliminate about one-quarter to one-half of the global warming that is not already locked in (i.e. warming that would be caused by 1990 levels of greenhouse gas concentrations already in the atmosphere). It is worth noting that the pursuit of reduced work hours as a policy alternative would be much more difficult in an economy where inequality is high and/or growing. In the United States, for example, just under two-thirds of all income gains from 1973–2007 went to the top 1 percent of households. In this type of economy, the majority of workers would have to take an absolute reduction in their living standards in order to work less. The analysis in this paper assumes that the gains from productivity growth will be more broadly shared in the future, as they have been in the past.

#### Rising income inequality risks ecological catastrophe – multiple studies prove

Jorgenson et al. 16 [Andrew Jorgenson is Professor and Chair in the Department of Sociology at Boston College. He is also Professor of Environmental Studies at Boston College. The primary area of his research is the human dimensions of global environmental change, with a particular focus on the political economy and human ecology of climate change and natural resource depletion, 2016-04-26, "Income Inequality and Residential Carbon Emissions in the United States: A Preliminary Analysis 1," Society for Human Ecology, https://search-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/1784112708/fulltextPDF/48335CB5FDFB4447PQ/3?accountid=14667]//Rank

In contrast, James Boyce’s (1994, 2003, 2008) “power-weighted social decision rule” suggests that when the beneficiaries of environmental degradation are more powerful than those who bear the costs, the overall level of environmental degradation will be greater. Since the wealthy benefit more from environmental degradation as both consumers and producers, and the poor benefit less and are more vulnerable to harmful consequences, higher levels of income inequality are likely to lead to increased carbon emissions and other environmental harms because the interests of the wealthy are protected in the political sphere (see also Cushing et al., 2015). In a similar vein, Pattison et al. (2014) find that counties in the U.S. with the highest average household incomes have greater consumption based carbon emissions but lower production-based emissions than less affluent counties. Pattison et al. (2014) conclude that wealthier communities are able to avoid some of the consequences of their carbon-intensive consumption by shifting carbon-intensive industrial activities into poorer areas. Others have suggested that domestic inequality undermines environmental protection by reducing social cohesion and cooperation. By eroding social trust, income inequality may inhibit pro-environmental collective actions and socially responsible behaviors, thereby leading to growth in emissions (Cushing et al., 2015; Ostrom, 2008; Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Related to this, Knight and Rosa (2011) demonstrate that countries with higher levels of social trust achieve greater subjective human well-being with less environmental impact. Another approach argues that rising income inequality can increase status based consumption of goods and fossil fuels as individuals spend more and more to emulate the standards set by the “overconsuming” wealthier members of society in what we may call a Veblen effect (Schor, 1998; Veblen, 1934). Average working hours have also been shown to increase with rising income inequality (Bowles & Park, 2005), and recent cross-national research indicates that longer working hours are associated with greater environmental impacts, including growth in energy consumption and carbon emissions (Fitzgerald, Jorgenson, & Clark, 2015; Knight, Rosa, & Schor, 2013). Vona and Patriarca (2011) find that in wealthy countries, growth in income inequality reduces the development and diffusion of environmentally beneficial consumer products because it creates a larger gap between what wealthy early adopters are willing to pay and what the less wealthy can afford. And research by Jorgenson, Rice, and Clark (2010) shows that in developing nations, growth in fossil fuel consumption is positively associated with overall urbanization (the percent of the population residing in urban areas), but negatively associated with growth in urban slum prevalence (the percent of the population residing in urban slum conditions). Jorgenson et al. (2010) conclude that these divergent relationships are partly attributed to the differences in average incomes between urban slum residents and non-slum urban residents as well as the broader structural inequalities that inhibit access for urban slum residents to energy and other resources for household consumption. In this study, we explore a particular type of inequality—namely, high-income concentration at the top of the distribution. We hypothesize that where there is more income concentrated at the top, emissions will be higher for (at least) two reasons. First, there will be a stronger political economy effect in which the wealthy use their political power to avoid carbon-control measures. Second, high-income concentration leads to stronger Veblen effects in which high income households compete for status via the “over-consumption” of goods and services which require high energy use (Schor, 1998; Ehrhardt-Martinez & Schor, 2015). Veblen identified houses and transportation, both of which are highly energy intensive, as two of the three major areas of status competition (Veblen, 1934). High-income households today compete via the purchase of large homes (Dwyer, 2007; Frank, 2010), which in turn yields low population density and high residential energy use. In transportation, wealthy households purchase powerful motorized vehicles (autos, boats, and airplanes) and engage in frequent long-distance travel. In addition, this portion of the distribution engages in high consumption overall. More generally, this approach is in some ways similar to that of Chakravarty et al. (2009) who emphasize the strong intranational differences in carbon intensity, with emissions highly concentrated at the top of the income and wealth distribution.

### Income Inequality Increasing

#### Inequality increasing

Frank Sammartio, Tax Policy Center, June 15, 2017, Taxes and Income Inequality, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/142251/2001310-taxes-and-income-inequality.pdf

Growth of Income Inequality The Cambridge University economist José Gabriel Palma has proposed a helpful measure of inequality – the ratio of the average household income for a wealthy group (for example, the wealthiest one percent) over that of a poorer group (or groups). Based on data from the well-known 2016 Congressional Budget Office study of inequality, rescaled to fit the national accounts, Figure 1 shows Palma ratios for the top one percent vs. households between the 61st and 99th percentiles of the size distribution (the “middle class”) and the sixty percent at the bottom. Figure 1: Palma Ratios for Top 1% vs 61st-99th Percentile (“Middle class”) and Lower 60% Households Based on total income per household (Yh) Based on calculations from the Congressional Budget Office and National Income and Product Accounts Based on disposable income per household (DYh) Based on calculations from the Congressional Budget Office and National Income and Product Accounts The upper diagram presents ratios for total (or pre-tax) income; the lower focuses on disposable income. Either way, rising inequality stands out, although taxes and transfers cut back on the extreme ratios shown in the diagram at the top. Even for disposable income, the ratio of the rich against the middle class grew at 3.85% per year. Against the bottom group, the growth rate was 3.54%. Such rising inequality is unprecedented. These rates are a full percentage point higher than output growth, and are not sustainable in the long run. The reason is that the share of any variable (say the income of the top one percent) in the total cannot increase indefinitely. Herbert Stein’s Law “that if something cannot grow forever, it will stop” always applies in macroeconomics. As of this writing, precise estimates of the effects of the Republican tax cuts on household incomes are not available. Ballpark numbers show an increase of more than five percent of mean disposable income for the top one percent (more for the top 0.1 percent) with blips of less than one percent for most of the rest, all front-loaded toward early years of a ten-year program. The 2014 Palma ratio of 13 for the middle class might rise above 14, an insulting jump atop an inglorious trend.

In round numbers, the annual disposable income of all rich households is $2 trillion. Their consumption is $1 trillion in an economy with overall demand of $20 trillion. Their extra consumption from the tax windfall might be less than $40 billion, about 0.2% of total demand. Through this channel at least, the macroeconomic boost from upper income tax reduction would be barely visible.3 Business tax reductions have been sold as a means to stimulate economic growth. One way to assess possibilities is to look at how much firms are willing to spend on new capital goods (“net investment” in economists’ jargon). The US output/capital ratio is stable in the medium run so that the level of the capital stock regulates the size of the macro system. In other words, output increases track capital. Its growth also stimulates increasing labor productivity, with effects on employment and the real wage.

#### Income inequality high

Frank Sammartio, Tax Policy Center, June 15, 2017, Taxes and Income Inequality, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/142251/2001310-taxes-and-income-inequality.pdf

I ncome inequality has increased sharply over the past 35 years. What role has the federal tax system played in creating—or reducing—inequality? INCREASING INCOME INEQUALITY **A simple way to measure inequality is by looking at the share of income received by the highest-income people. Using a broad measure that includes labor, business**, and capital income; government cash payments (such as Social Security); and the value of in-kind benefits from government programs (such as Medicare and Medicaid), the Congressional Budget Office finds that the income share of the top fifth of the population rose from 43 to 53 percent between 1979 and 2013 (figure 1). This increase in income inequality came about despite the growth in Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, which provide the greatest boost in before-tax income to low- and middle-income households. **Much of the gain in the top income share went to the top 1 percent of the population. In 1979, they received 9 percent of all income. By 2013, their share grew to 15 percent, more than all the income received by the bottom 40 percent (figure 2). The income measure used in figures 1 and 2 includes realized capital gains, which are sensitive to business cycle fluctuations and to changes in tax rates. Because realized capital gains are a significant income component for the top 1 percent, their income share is more volatile than income shares of other groups. Top income shares have not reached these levels since the 1920s (figure 3). After falling precipitously during the Great Depression and World War II, the income share** of the top 1 percent leveled off during the next three decades. It began climbing again in the 1980s, interrupted only by the 2001 and 2008–09 recessions. Since the stock market rebound, income shares of the top 1 percent have increased again.

#### US progressive taxation enables income redistribution

Frank Sammartio, Tax Policy Center, June 15, 2017, Taxes and Income Inequality, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/publication/142251/2001310-taxes-and-income-inequality.pdf

**The US federal tax system is progressive. High-income households pay a larger share of their income in total federal taxes than low-income households (figure 5). State and local taxes, which are not included in this analysis, are much less progressive, and some, such as sales taxes, are regressive (low-income households pay a higher share of their income in sales taxes than high-income households). Because federal taxes are progressive, the distribution of after-tax income is more equal than income before taxes. High-income households have a slightly smaller share of total income after taxes than their share of income before**. Federal taxes are more progressive than they were 35 years ago. Although the average tax rate for high-income households has varied a lot, the average tax rate for these households was nearly the same in recent years as at its peaks in 1977 and 1995. Meanwhile, the average tax rate for middle- and low-income groups dropped incrementally from the early 1980s through 2007 and then fell dramatically from 2007 through 2009 because of temporary tax cuts enacted in response to the Great Recession. Average rates rebounded as those tax cuts expired, but by 2013, remained well below their 1979 values for those groups (figure 7). EFFECT OF TAXES ON INCOME INEQUALITY A more progressive tax system would reduce income inequality if nothing else changes.

### Structural Violence Bad

#### View impact calc from below. Structural violence outweighs.

Solomon BENATAR 16, Emeritus Professor of Medicine at the University of Cape Town and Adjunct Professor in the Dalla Lana School of Public Health, University of Toronto [“Politics, Power, Poverty and Global Health: Systems and Frames,” *International Journal of Health Policy and Management*, Vol. 5, No. 10, October 2016, p. 599-604, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

In the context of the health implications of climate change and environmental degradation,27 new ideas and action are required to ensure meaningful progress in the health of whole populations and the sustainability of life on our planet.28 How we view, think about and act on threats to global health critically depends on our belief system that influences how we view ourselves, the world in which we live, to what kind of future world we aspire, and what we consider to be the most appropriate research agenda for the pursuit of such goals.Whichever view is held, or what balance between them is achieved, will influence what action is considered to be necessary. All belief systems mobilize feelings and motivations through symbols that work most powerfully when subliminal. What is believed becomes an important aspect of ‘reality’ whether true or not and this applies both to religious and secular belief systems.29,30 Frames are mental structures with mostly subconscious reference points that determine automatically and repetitiously how knowledge is constructed and debated. They allow us to create what we take to be reality and to facilitate our most basic interactions with the world by structuring our ideas and concepts, shaping the way we reason and impacting on how we perceive and how we act. Cognitive bias refers to systematic patterns of deviation from norms of judgment, whereby inferences about other people and situations may be drawn through subjective perception of our own social reality. Metaphors are additional fundamental mechanisms of mind that through indirect comparisons subtly shape our perceptions and structure our most basic understandings of our experience and actions.31 The contemporary dominant belief system and its frames for global thinking are characterized by an emphasis on individualism, freedom, philanthropy and an economy dominated by market considerations, all of which give priority to monetary value and short-term interests in all aspects of life. This is the backdrop that explains the failure to prevent the recent devastating Ebola epidemic, despite ample warnings from previous smaller Ebola and other infectious disease outbreaks, and many think-tank commissions.32 In addition, a narrow version of Human Rights discourse, focused on civil and political rights, has become the favored moral compass in secular societies, with little reference to the full range of rights implicit in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and no use of other rich moral languages such as those of solidarity, virtue and character.33 It should also be noted that as the achievement of most of the Human Rights referred to in the UDHR is dependent on access to material resources, these Rights are increasingly difficult to achieve in the face of wide economic disparities. Moreover focusing on individual perpetrators and individual victims of ‘human rights abuses’ ignores the vastly greater contribution of flawed systems to the failure to achieve Human Rights more widely for whole populations of people.34 The best-known metaphor in healthcare is war against disease and this is framed within scientific innovation, competitiveness and the ‘right’ to health/healthcare. These combative and technological metaphors and frames are extrapolated to global health and buttressed by linking health to competitive economic growth as development, and to an adversarial notion of ethics (Human Rights). Such ways of thinking have been described as ‘the common sense’ of dominant practices that need to be critically re-evaluated and replaced with a new paradigm.35 Challenging the Dominant Belief System and Framing The quality of life enjoyed by, and the ongoing expectations of, the 20% of people in the world who consume 80% of the world’s energy and resources, breed reluctance to admit that our current global ecological and health predicaments are to a considerable extent attributable to endless entitlements and wasteful consumption patterns. This reluctance is supported by the popular notion that more philanthropy and new technology should have the highest priority to overcome current crises.36 Such features of the lives of the privileged and powerful also generate neglect and denial of the need for the paradigmatic change needed to restructure power relations in ways that could achieve solutions potentially within our grasp.37,38 In challenging the dominant discourse and agenda for improving global health it is suggested that the major impetus to the ‘progress’ that has led to only about 20% of people in the world having desirable lifestyles arises not only from the invisibility of power structures but more especially from the invisibility of the belief system wherein power is embedded and that determines the way we think and how we frame our ideas, values, and actions [1] .30,39 The recent Lancet-University of Oslo Commission on governance for global health40 is a prominent example of an insightful but incomplete and largely technical diagnosis of global health problems. The Report’s failure to make appropriate recommendations for progress can be explained by its ignoring the underlying economic and political values and forces that shape the ideological, intellectual and research frameworks of global health and its governance, and that underpin the underlying causal processes of health disparities.38,41 Those who benefit from this belief system have the privilege and the power to drive or support political agendas that preserve their privilege. Indeed, the global health discourse agenda has been captured and held hostage by those with the most power.42,43 However, it has also been proposed that it is not so much our belief system and values that are at fault, but rather our distortions of many highly prized constituent values within our belief system,44,45 and our lack of moral imagination26 that contribute to failure to rectify some of the forces that promote and sustain major inequalities in the determinants of global health. The dominant and dominating mind-set of the most privileged people in the world tends to lock us into our particular utopian realms of thinking and action that must surely seem mysterious, untrustworthy and irremediable to those whose lives remain severely restricted by socially constructed causes of poverty and lack of opportunities to flourish.46 In their collaborative study on framing global health McInnes and colleagues have used a constructivist theoretical approach to examine both the ideational and the material bases behind contemporary debates and controversies in the discourses about global health.47 It is surprising that a social constructivist approach, based on a combination of ideational considerations and material conditions, yields such a restricted range of frames as they describe. This shortcoming can be attributed to the fact that such frames, like those proposed by others,48,49 have been developed only from the perspective of the dominant belief system within a social world where the privileged minority lives with high consumption patterns in what has been called a ‘market civilization’ ideology.42 Such a belief system, presumed to be universal, underplays the pathophysiology and effects of the exploitation and discrimination associated with the materially impoverished lives of billions of people, and ignores the varied alternative belief systems within which other ideational biases could arise. It is legitimate to imagine that in other contexts very different notions of global health could be influenced by socially constructed systems, powerfully shaped by different beliefs. For example dystopic belief systems can arise from feelings of neglect, hopelessness, lack of empowerment, and social violence fueled by hypocrisy, arrogance, corruption, and exploitation.50-52 More optimistic traditional belief systems with their own powerful heuristic influences, as explored elsewhere, cannot be ignored.53,54 It is also possible that the methodology of an inter-philosophies dialogue55 could facilitate a constructive tension capable of modifying the dominant perspective that seems increasingly out of touch with the limits of economic growth and other dangers at a time when human activity threatens planetary sustainability.56

#### Income inequality intrinsically causes health issues and decreases life expectancy – prefer overwhelming amounts of predictive and historical studies

**Pickett and Wilkinson 15** (Kate E. Pickett, Professor of Epidemiology in the Department of Health Sciences at the University of York, former Research Career Scientist at the National Institute for Health, and Richard G. Wilkinson, Emeritus Professor of Social Epidemiology at the University of Nottingham, 2015(“Income Inequality and Health: A Causal Review,” Social Science &amp; Medicine, Volume 128, March, <https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/education/curriculum-tools/population-health/pickett.html//SR>)

The body of evidence on income inequality and health points strongly to a causal connection. The major criteria of temporality, biological plausibility, consistency, and lack of alternative explanations are well supported. Of the small minority of studies that find no association, most can be explained by income inequality being measured at an inappropriate scale, the inclusion of mediating variables as controls, the use of subjective rather than objective measures of health, or followup periods that are too short. Suicides seem to stand as an important exception to the general pattern: they tend to be more common in more equal societies, despite the evidence that depression is more common in more unequal societies.39,132 A possible explanation is that social gradients in suicides are not always consistent internationally.133 Another possibility is that there may be some truth in the view that violence can be directed either outwards or inwards against oneself. If suicide is, like homicide, often a response to adversity, we think it likely that greater equality increases a tendency to blame oneself rather than others for what goes wrong. Epidemiological causal criteria are not exhaustive. A good test of the validity of a scientific theory is its ability to make successful, testable predictions. The theory that more equal societies are healthier arose from one international study17 and has now been tested in many different contexts. The search for a mechanism led to the discovery that social relationships (social cohesion, trust, involvement in community life, and low levels of violence) are better in more equal societies, suggesting that inequality and health are linked through psychosocial processes related to social differentiation and relative deprivation.61 That inequality does have powerful psychosocial effects is now amply confirmed. We suggest that the most parsimonious explanation for the effects of income inequality is that larger income differences increase social distances, accentuating social class or status differences. This would explain why income inequality is most closely related to health when measured across whole societies coterminous with social class hierarchies.13,134 Rather than income inequality being a new and independent determinant of health, it is likely to act by strengthening the many causal processes (known and unknown) through which social class imprints itself on people throughout life. This would suggest why, not only health, but a wide range of other outcomes with social gradients are also related to inequality. It also suggests that if class and status are to become a less powerful influence both on individual lives and on whole societies, it will be necessary to reduce the material differences that so often constitute the cultural markers of social differentiation. As whole populations are exposed to societal income inequality, estimates of the population attributable risk will be high even if, for some outcomes, the causal effect on some outcomes is modest. Kondo and colleagues67 estimated that upwards of 1.5 million deaths (9.6 percent of total adult mortality for the 15-60 age group) could be averted in 30 OECD countries if each country reduced its Gini coefficient below 0.30. If individual income is also related to health partly through psychosocial mechanisms involving relative deprivation, then multilevel models that control out its effects may substantially underestimate the effects of inequality.135 It has been estimated that if the United Kingdom reduced its inequality to the average in other OECD countries, the expenditure savings on physical and mental illness, violence, and imprisonment alone would amount to £39 billion per year.136 Future research should move beyond mere replication of these findings in different samples towards more explicit attempts to clarify the causal relationships, including studies of (1) different measures of income inequality (top- and bottom-sensitive measures, for example) in relation to different health and social outcomes, (2) time lags for different outcomes, (3) further modeling and testing of specific causal pathways, and (4) whether inequalities in wealth are as much a part of the picture as inequalities in income. Comparable measures of wealth inequality are available for only a limited number of countries, but initial explorations of the relationships with life expectancy are interesting. Life expectancy in Denmark, which seems to be an outlier in relation to its more equal distribution of income, appears to fall into place in relation to its large inequalities in wealth.137 The evidence that large income differences have damaging health and social consequences is already far stronger than the evidence supporting policy initiatives in many other areas of social and economic policy, and the message is beginning to reach politicians. The world leaders we mentioned at the start of this chapter have all referred to inequality as a cause of social and economic harm. But to recognize the problem is not the same as tackling it effectively. The gap between the richest and poorest 20 percent of households in countries like the United States and United Kingdom is not only very much wider than it used to be in the 1970s, but it is still twice as large as in some other successful market democracies. The reason why politicians do not do more is almost certainly a reflection of the undemocratic power of money in politics and the media.138 Narrowing the gap will require not only redistributive tax policies but also a reduction in income differences before tax. The halving of top tax rates since the 1970s has led not only to a widening of income differences after tax but, more surprisingly, to an acceleration in pre-tax income differences particularly in the private sector where pay for top executives seems unrelated to company performance.139-141 has written about the risks of policymakers requiring unachievable standards of proof in social epidemiology before they are willing to act, and Popper30 emphasized that scientific theories are never finally proven true. Adopting too high a standard of evidence may mean that it is never considered strong enough. Schrecker quotes Michael Marmot143 as saying "While we should not formulate policies in the absence of evidence to support them, we must not be paralyzed into inaction while we wait for the evidence to be absolutely unimpeachable."

#### Income inequality hurts health – biological studies and historical coherence

Pickett and Wilkinson 15 (Kate E. Pickett, Professor of Epidemiology in the Department of Health Sciences at the University of York, former Research Career Scientist at the National Institute for Health, and Richard G. Wilkinson, Emeritus Professor of Social Epidemiology at the University of Nottingham, 2015(“Income Inequality and Health: A Causal Review,” Social Science &amp; Medicine, Volume 128, March, <https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/education/curriculum-tools/population-health/pickett.html//SR>)

A psychosocial explanation of the effect of income inequality on health and behavioral outcomes is consistent with the biology of chronic stress, new studies of the neuroscience of social sensitivity, and concepts from evolutionary biology. Income inequality is linked to lower levels of social cohesion and generalized trust, suggesting that inequality acts as a social stressor.108-110 Chronic stress impairs memory and increases risk of depression, lowers immune responses, elevates blood pressure and risk of cardiovascular disease, and affects hormonal systems.111 Research shows that the ways in which we relate to one another, such as friendship, social support, and social networks, are as protective for health as smoking is deleterious.112 If we have friends, we are less likely to contract a common cold infection in randomized controlled trials.113 Likewise, if we have a difficult relationship with our spouses or partners, we heal more slowly in trials of experimental wound healing.114 A meta-analysis of 208 laboratory studies of acute psychological stressors and cortisol responses shows that stronger cortisol responses were elicited if tasks were uncontrollable or characterized by "social-evaluative threat" (threats to self-esteem or social status).115 Even low levels of psychological distress were found to be related to mortality in a meta-analysis of 10 large prospective cohort studies.116 Telomere length, a measure of cell aging, was found to be shorter by age 9 among African American boys who lived in highly disadvantaged environments compared to those who were raised in more affluent environments.117 Neuroscience studies also highlight the importance of psychosocial factors for human physiology. A neuroimaging study showed that social pain (exclusion) activated the brain in the same ways as physical pain. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was more active during experiences of social exclusion and was positively correlated with self-reported distress.118 In another study, baseline sensitivity to physical pain predicted sensitivity to social rejection, and social exclusion was associated with more sensitivity to physical pain.119 In two experiments, participants received either acetaminophen (a pain suppressant) or a placebo for 3 weeks. Acetaminophen reduced daily reports of social pain, and functional magnetic resonance imaging showed that acetaminophen reduced neural responses to social pain in areas of the brain previously shown to be related to both social and physical pain.120 Evolutionary explanations of human sensitivity to social relationships and hierarchies stress the importance of belonging and people's need for positive relationships and connectedness. Social exclusion affects cognitive, emotional, and behavioral outcomes, and adaptations to low social rank in both animals and humans include altered levels of hormones and behaviors, such as withdrawal, apathy, or hypervigilance.121 A theory linking submission and subordination to depression suggests that it results from an inability to stop, or escape from, a submissive defeat strategy, and the evidence reviewed by Johnson and colleagues supports this; in more than 20 research studies, people with depression were more likely to report feeling inferior or experiencing shame.122 Coherence In rich countries, there is no association between average levels of income (e.g. gross national income per capita) and measures of health, such as life expectancy.123-126 Yet within rich countries, there are strong associations between individual income and life expectancy. This pattern suggests that it is relative income within societies that is important for health in rich countries, in turn suggesting that psychosocial mechanisms are relevant. Recent studies of income inequality in relation to psychological states and traits and sociological outcomes lend coherence to a psychosocial explanation of the health and social effects of income inequality on health. International comparisons show that status anxiety is higher in more unequal countries, for all socioeconomic groups.127 Status anxiety and trust were found to mediate the association between income inequality and subjective well-being.128 In more unequal countries, people exhibit higher levels of self-enhancement, i.e., believing themselves to be better than average.129 In both ecological and multi-level analyses, people in more unequal U.S. States scored lower on a measure of agreeableness, reflecting less concern for social harmony and getting along with others.130 In more unequal European countries, people show less solidarity; they are less willing to help others.131

#### Deaths from structural violence are greater every year than from wars – changing laws that facilitate inequality is vital

**Ansell, 17** - David A. Ansell, Senior Vice President, Associate Provost for Community Health Equity, and Michael E. Kelly Professor of Medicine at Rush University Medical Center (The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills, p. 7-10)

There are many different kinds of violence. Some are obvious: punches, attacks, gunshots, explosions. These are the kinds of inter- personal violence that we tend to hear about in the news. Other kinds of violence are intimate and emotional. But the deadliest and most thoroughgoing kind of violence is woven into the fabric of American society. It exists when some groups have more access to goods, resources, and opportunities than other groups, including health and life itself. This violence delivers specific blows against particular bodies in particular neighborhoods. This unequal advantage and violence is built into the very rules that govern our society. In the absence of this violence, large numbers of Americans would be able to live fuller and longer lives. This kind of violence is called structural violence, because it is embedded in the very laws, policies, and rules that govern day-to- day life.8 It is the cumulative impact of laws and social and economic policies and practices that render some Americans less able to access resources and opportunities than others. This inequity of advantage is not a result of the individuals personal abilities but is built into the systems that govern society. Often it is a product of racism, gender, and income inequality. The diseases and premature mortality that Windora and many of my patients experienced were, in the words of Dr. Paul Farmer, "biological reflections of social fault lines."9 As a result of these fault lines, a disproportional burden of illness, suffering, and premature mortality falls on certain neighborhoods, like Windora's. Structural violence can overwhelm an individual's ability to live a free, unfettered, healthy life. As I ran to evaluate Windora, I knew that her stroke was caused in part by lifelong exposure to suffering, racism, and economic deprivation. Worse, the poverty of West Humboldt Park that contributed to her illness is directly and inextricably related to the massive concentration of wealth and power in other neighborhoods just miles away in Chicago's Gold Coast and suburbs. That concentration of wealth could not have occurred without laws, policies, and practices that favored some at the expense of others. Those laws, policies, and practices could not have been passed or enforced if access to political and economic power had not been concentrated in the hands of a few. Yet these political and economic structures have become so firmly entrenched (in habits, social relations, economic arrangements, institutional practices, law, and policy) that they have become part of the matrix of American society. The rules that govern day-to-day life were written to benefit a small elite at the expense of people like Windora and her family. These rules and structures are powerful destructive forces. The same structures that render life predictable, secure, comfortable, and pleasant for many destroy the lives of others like Windora through suffering, poverty, ill health, and violence. These structures are neither natural nor neutral. The results of structural violence can be very specific. In Windora's case, stroke precursors like chronic stress, poverty, and uncontrolled hypertension run rampant in neighborhoods like hers. Windora's ill- ness was caused by neither her cultural traits nor the failure of her will. Her stroke was caused in part by inequity. She is one of the lucky ones, though, because even while structural violence ravages her neighbor- hood, it also abets the concentration of expensive stroke-intervention services in certain wealthy teaching hospitals like mine. If I can get to her in time, we can still help her. Income Inequality and Life Inequality Of course, Windora is not the only person struggling on account of structural violence. Countless neighborhoods nationwide are suffering from it, and people are dying needlessly young as a result. The mag- nitude of this excess mortality is mind-boggling. In 2009 my friend Dr. Steve Whitman asked a simple question, "How many extra black people died in Chicago each year, just because they do not have the same health outcomes as white Chicagoans?" When the Chicago Sun- Times got wind of his results, it ran them on the front page in bold white letters on a black background: "health care gap kills 3200 Black Chicagoans and the Gap is Growing." The paper styled the head- line to look like the declaration of war that it should have been. In fact, we did find ourselves at war not long ago, when almost 3,000 Americans were killed. That was September 11,2001. That tragedy propelled the country to war. Yet when it comes to the premature deaths of urban Americans, no disaster area has been declared. No federal troops have been called up. No acts of Congress have been passed. Yet this disaster is even worse: those 3,200 black people were in Chicago alone, in just one year. Nationwide each year, more than 60,000 black people die prematurely because of inequality.10 While blacks suffer the most from this, it is not just an issue of racism, though racism has been a unique and powerful transmitter of violence in America for over four hundred years.11 Beyond racism, poverty and income inequality perpetuated by exploitative market capitalism are singular agents of transmission of disease and early death. As a result, there is a new and alarming pattern of declining life expectancy among white Americans as well. Deaths from drug overdoses in young white Americans ages 25 to 34 have exploded to levels not seen since the AIDS epidemic. This generation is the first since the Vietnam War era to experience higher death rates than the prior generation.12 White Americans ages 45 to 54 have experienced skyrocketing premature death rates as well, something not seen in any other developed na- tion.13 White men in some Appalachian towns live on average twenty years less than white men a half-day's drive away in the suburbs of Washington, DC. Men in McDowell County, West Virginia, can look forward to a life expectancy only slightly better than that of Haitians.14 But those statistics reflect averages, and every death from structural violence is a person. When these illnesses and deaths are occurring one at a time in neighborhoods that society has decided not to care about—neighborhoods populated by poor, black, or brown people— they seem easy to overlook, especially if you are among the fortunate few who are doing incredibly well. The tide of prosperity in America has lifted some boats while others have swamped. Paul Farmer, the physician-anthropologist who founded Partners in Health, an inter- national human rights agency, reflects on the juxtaposition of "unprecedented bounty and untold penury": "It stands to reason that as beneficiaries of growing inequality, we do not like to be reminded of misery of squalor and failure. Our popular culture provides us with no shortage of anesthesia."15 That people suffer and die prematurely because of inequality is wrong. It is wrong from an ethical perspective. It is wrong from a fair- ness perspective. And it is wrong because we have the means to fix it.

#### Structural violence is skyrocketing as inequality deepens – policy change focused on concentrated poverty is the key to reversing it

**Ansell, 17** - David A. Ansell, Senior Vice President, Associate Provost for Community Health Equity, and Michael E. Kelly Professor of Medicine at Rush University Medical Center (The Death Gap: How Inequality Kills, p. 194-198)

The Chicago Transit Authority Blue Line train has a stop just in front of my hospital. The life expectancy around the Blue Line stop in Chicago's Loop, just east of Rush University Hospital, is 85 years. Three stops down the Blue Line from Rush is Mr. M's neighborhood, where life expectancy plummets to less than 69. No measured assessment of the health conditions in America's neighborhoods could fail to connect the marginalized existence of so many and the economic structures and racial discrimination that have enriched many at the expense of the poor. Even if you don't agree that structural violence is the root cause of our neighborhood ills, there can be no doubt that something is dreadfully wrong. Neighborhood and life conditions have deteriorated to the point where they drive patients like Mr. M to madness and, worse, suicide. And yet we are anesthetized by these neighborhood conditions. We have tolerated the wickedness of inequity as if it were a natural condition of a modern capitalist society. We avert our gaze so we do not have to endure the jarring emotional dissonance created by the juxtaposition of great wealth and mammoth poverty. Despite the evidence that structural violence inflicts terrible psychological stress on the poor, the City of Chicago's Health Department closed its mental health clinics a few years ago.5 At the same time, Chicago's jails and emergency rooms overflow with the mentally ill. Under what measure of fairness and justice can this be justified? Concentrated poverty and distress are mushrooming in the United States. For those on the short end of the wealth stick, the system is rigged. The negative impact of structural violence has skyrocketed as jobs, opportunities, and wealth have deserted more and more American neighborhoods in the twenty-first century. The United States now boasts more high- poverty neighborhoods in any time since the 1960s.6 Since 2000, the number of people living in high- poverty ghettos and slums nearly doubled, from 7.2 million to 13.8 million, while poverty became more densely concentrated. More than one in four African Americans and more than one in three Latinos now live in neighborhoods of extreme poverty. Contrast this to white America. One in thirteen white Americans lives in this concentrated poverty—nothing to celebrate, but disproportionate to the US black and Latino experience.7 Because white poverty is more dispersed than black and Latino poverty, the death gaps within the white community can be difficult to discern. While white America experiences better health overall than black America, some neighborhoods in white America are not inoculated against the impact of structural violence. A11 analysis by the Washington Post found that since 2000, American white women have been dying at higher rates expiring in their 30s, 40s, and 50s, an invisible crisis driven by the impact of postglobalization job loss on small-town America. In one of the hardest-hit groups—rural white women in their late 40s—the death rate has risen by 30 percent. As life has evolved in rural America, as jobs have been dispatched overseas, as poverty has swelled, more white men and women are dying prematurely. A greater proportion of Americans lived in poverty in 2015—a staggering 45 million—than in the late 1960s. Children are the hardest hit, with almost half of them below five years old living in poverty.8 Chicago is an epicenter for child distress, with the highest child poverty rate in the nation. While black and Latino men have been imprisoned at unprecedented rates, black women and their children have faced an epidemic of evictions because of poverty and racism.9 The wealth gap between whites and minorities is the largest it has been since 1989.10 The wealth gap for single women in America is even starker. Single black and Hispanic women have a median wealth of $100 and $120 respectively; the median for single white women is $41,500. Nearly half of all single black and Hispanic women have zero or negative wealth, meaning that their debts exceed their total assets. These statistics demonstrate graphic inequity, but we should not forget that the preponderance of poverty in the United States is among whites.11 We have performed enough analyses. There are no more observations or judgments to make. If we were studying the impact of structural violence on health and longevity in a randomized clinical trial, the experiment would have been halted long ago on ethical grounds. It is time to act. It is time for healing. Act We can act on behalf of the poor. We can choose to neither objectify nor dismiss their experiences. We can insist on and pursue their right for health and longevity. We can speak up against structural violence. We can demand political and policy solutions to mitigate or eliminate the structures that impart violence. We can advocate for a fair and equitable health-care system organized around the precept of health as a human right. We can expect our institutions to do more to serve the interests of America's high-poverty communities and their residents. We can expect our leaders and policy makers to hold all our institutions to greater accountability for the lives of the poor. Finally, we can act personally to preferentially serve the poor. To speak against the forces of structural violence- racism; economic exploitation; mass incarceration; the lack of safety, good education, and decent-paying jobs—requires us to make the invisible visible. That means we have to acknowledge and address the distress in our high-hardship communities. We can seek to understand all the ways in which racial and anti-poor bias is explicitly and implicitly built into our institutions and then work to overcome these biases. To act against structural violence first requires us to expose the conditions that curtail life and hasten death in our midst.

### Answers to: Growth Tricks Down to the Poor

#### Growth does not trickle down to the poor

Lance Taylor, economist, December 15, 2017, <https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/why-stopping-tax-reform-wont-stop-inequality> Why Stopping Tax “Reform” Won’t Stop Inequality

Congress’s budget and legislative proposals could only work for President Donald Trump’s “struggling families” and “forgotten people” if they would generate strong trickle-down growth. Structural constraints on income distribution and wealth dynamics won’t let trickle-down happen. Trump’s slogan about making America great again is for the top one percent of the income distribution – effectively a “capitalist” class – not for “workers” in the middle of the distribution or the struggling, forgotten households further down.

## Unemployment

### Automation Means Unemployment

**Innovation will not spur job growth in the modern economy, it will undermine it**

Andy Stern, 2016, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream, Andrew L. "**Andy**" **Ster** is the former president of the then 2.2.million member Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is now President Emeritus of SEIU, which grew by more than 1.2 million workers during his tenure**p. 3019-20**

**Innovation and the hope that it will spur new economic growth also has its limits** . **The 2013 Oxford Study is required reading for anyone who believes that technology will not massively disrupt jobs . It concluded that 47 percent of jobs in the US are at risk of being eliminated due to software , robotics , and machines learning artificial intelligence** . One of the myths that innovation believers spout is that automation will only replace repeatable tasks . While this is true in the short term , **automation is creeping into more complex and white - collar tasks and will soon impact those as well . The entrepreneurs Steven Berkenfeld is funding** **are creating software that helps companies produce more — and more efficiently — with fewer people in work that once involved brain work like writing , researching , diagnosing , teaching , and investing . The idea that the technologies that we are creating today could be the engine of job growth in the long term seems very unlikely** . The most persuasive arguments for why this is unlikely to be the case have been made by McAfee and Brynjolfsson , who suggest that technological change is faster and more pervasive than ever before and the focus of this change is on creating cheap ways to automate jobs . In both of their recent books , they explain how **computers , digital technologies , and robotics are accelerating .** McAfee has also written on his blog , “ The pace and scale of this encroachment into human skills is relatively recent and has profound economic implications . Perhaps the most important of these is that ***while digital progress grows the overall economic pie , it can do so while leaving some people , or even a lot of them , worse off*** . ” Brynjolfsson and McAfee explain in the New York Times , “ [ T ] **echnologies** are going to continue to become more powerful , and to acquire more advanced skills and abilities . **They can already drive cars , understand and produce natural human speech , write clean prose , and beat the best human Jeopardy** ! players . Digital progress has surprised a lot of people , and we ain’t seen nothing yet . **Brawny computers , brainy programmers , and big data are a potent combination , and they’re nowhere near finished . ” This does not bode well for the innovation - leading - to - job - growth line of thinking** . An important part of the argument that McAfee and Brynjolfsson lay out that hasn’t been widely reported on is the role of general - purpose technologies , or GPTs . GPTs are technological innovations that interrupt the normal march of progress . Past examples include steam power , electricity , and the internal combustion engine . They are , quite simply , the most important technological innovations in history . Many feel that the computer is the most recent GPT . GPTs typically improve over time and lead to numerous complementary innovations ( e.g . , networking , Internet , business computer software ) . Therefore , having a static view of the impact of computerization makes little sense to Brynjolfsson , McAfee , and others , as they see the impact of computerization as an ongoing , accelerating impact , one that feeds off itself in delivering ever - expanding possibilities for new invention and automation . As Brynjolfsson and McAfee argue , the technologies we are developing now really are different . Before the “ digital revolution , ” other industrial advances gave humans more power and strength , but did not affect mental work : people were still needed to think . Even in the beginning of the digital revolution , as McAfee told Thomas Edsall of the New York Times , “ Computers became better at math , and at some clerical abilities , but we people were still miles ahead in other areas . So employers needed to hire humans if they wanted to listen to people speak and respond to them , write a report , pattern - match across a large and diverse body of information , and do all the other things that modern knowledge workers do . ” Employers also needed people if they wanted lots of physical tasks done , including driving a truck or vacuuming a floor . The same with most tasks involving sensory perception , such as determining if a soccer ball has crossed a goal line . ” But as McAfee pointed out to Edsall , “ All of the above abilities have now been demonstrated by digital technologies , and not just in the lab , but in the real world . So employers are going to switch from human labor to digital labor to execute tasks like those above . In fact , they’re already doing so . I expect this process of switching to accelerate in the future , perhaps rapidly , because computers get cheaper all the time , are very accurate and reliable once they’re programmed properly , and don’t demand overtime , benefits , or health care . ” But as computers and the digital revolution mature , and technology and big data begin to encroach on and then exceed many of the skills of knowledge workers , **putting our blind faith in ‘ innovation ’ in hopes that it will create jobs seems to be misplaced optimism .** Call me a true believer in the speed and extraordinary consequences created by technology if you want , but it’s almost impossible for me to envision any of the mitigating policies , even if they are implemented in ideal form , producing a net increase in middle - income jobs twenty or twenty - five years from now . **Combine technological unemployment with the two great de - couplings ( growth from income , and work from jobs ) , add a dash of globalization and income inequality , and you get a highly combustible brew** . Yes , timing matters . **The policies listed above — a new stimulus package , infrastructure investment , upgrading the EITC , bolstering unions , raising the minimum wage , and shorter workweeks — might keep the brew from boiling over for a while . But if these** mitigating policies remain our main long - term strategies for reinvigorating the economy , our leaders will be walking us toward the edge of the cliff with a blindfold over our eyes .Andy Grove gave the following advice to companies , but it’s just as applicable to our nation as a whole as we grapple with economic change and uncertainty : “ An organization that has a culture that can deal with these two phases — debate ( chaos reigns ) and a determined march ( chaos reined in ) — is a powerful , adaptive organization . ” Such an organization has two attributes : First , it tolerates and even encourages debates . These debates are vigorous , devoted to exploring issues , indifferent to rank andinclude individuals of varied backgrounds . And , second , it is capable of making and accepting clear decisions , with the entire organization then supporting the decision . May our nation have the wisdom to freely debate our course , and then steer together in a direction to ride this tsunami of change to a new and glorious future .THE MORE I tried to imagine our likely future as a technology - rich society with significantly fewer jobs , the more anxious I became . Like almost everyone I knew , I’dfeel lost and certainly diminished if there wasn’t work that paid me a living wage . Besides paying the bills , work provides us with opportunities to contribute , be validated , become part of a community , and feel pride . It gives purpose to our lives . So it was only natural that my initial thought for a solution to the coming tsunami of technological unemployment would be to guarantee a job for every American who wants one . That , as noted above , was part of President Roosevelt’s program to attack long - term unemployment during the Great Depression . The WPA put eight million Americans to work building bridges , parks , roads , hospitals , and airports . Could that be the solution to the joblessness ahead — atwenty - first - century jobs - for - all program ? There’s certainly a lot of work to be done : in addition to fixing our crumbling streets , bridges , and railroads , people could get paid to coach their neighborhood sports teams , remove graffiti , provide child care , mentor teens , drive senior citizens to doctors ’ appointments , and tend their community garden . As long as we could design a system to track and subsidize these efforts — which shouldn’t be hard , given the software already designed for the sharing economy — we could create a sector of the government dedicated to funding and administering work that benefits the common good . However , the more deeply I considered such a program , the more complicated itbecame . Not least , how could we get the American people to agree upon a set of activities that everybody would value equally enough to fund ? Would these new publically funded jobs be in addition to or would they ultimately displace private - sector funded workers ? Imagine the fiery debates that would take place in Congress and throughout the nation as Americans argued about the nature and value of child care versus elder care , or whether composing music is a more culturally enriching and valuable enterprise than developing a video game , or whether we should really pay our fellow citizens to reduce their carbon footprint or distribute family - planning information to teenagers , activities that might offend a large number of Americans on religious or ideological grounds . Inevitably , a handful of people in a government agency would end up deciding the value of a particular job or category of work for the entire country at the expense of individual differences and choice . Also , a guaranteed jobs program would require a huge government bureaucracy . And it would involve the type of intricate tracking mechanisms that inevitably raise concerns about personal freedoms and privacy . Are we really going to force adults to work at jobs they don’t want ? Are we going to monitor and drug - test the millions of Americans who take these jobs and treat them like criminals if they slip up ? After satisfying America’s genuine infrastructure needs , will a guaranteed jobs program with the best intentions devolve mainly into make - work or a way for big companies to replace their own workers ? The more I put a twenty - first - century WPA to the test , the more expensive it became . It’d be a lot easier and more efficient just to give people cash .

Giving people cash , not a job , is the central feature of a universal basic income ( UBI ) , in which every citizen in a country or region receives a certain amount of money on a regular basis without having to do anything to be eligible for that money . At first the notion of “ money for nothing , ” as the Dire Straits song goes , was alien to everything I had worked for in my life . But the more I researched UBI , the more the idea intrigued me . It has a long history in the United States , beginning with Thomas Paine and other Revolutionary War period social thinkers . After a hiatus of 200 years in the US ( but not in Europe ) , the idea returned to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s as poverty issues grabbed the headlines . The Rev . Martin Luther King , Jr . , and President Richard M . Nixon both wanted to give Americans a guaranteed minimum income with no work requirements . Our nation was very close to having a basic income policy : in 1970 , the US House of Representatives passed a plan that was to be funded by a negative income tax , only to have the US Senate reject it .

#### Growth increases the rich-poor gap – the faster the economy grows, the more wealth concentrates in the upper class

Andy Stern, 2016, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream, Andrew L. "**Andy**" **Ster** is the former president of the then 2.2.million member Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is now President Emeritus of SEIU, which grew by more than 1.2 million workers during his tenure.

Like most of the people who purchased the book , I read very little of it — the first sixty pages and parts of the rest . So **why did Capital in the Twenty - First Century inspire so ma**ny op - ed pieces and debates on radio , the Internet , and TV ? **Because it gave credence to a phenomenon that millions of Americans have been wrestling with since the 2008 recession — the growing gap between their own incomes and those of the wealthiest one percent who’ve been getting richer and richer despite the economic downturn** . That unease had found earlier expression in Occupy Wall Street , the spontaneous and almost anarchistic protest movement that took over Zuccotti Park in New York’s financial district on September 17 , 2011 . I visited the park several times to lend the protestors my support . Their slogan — “ We are the 99 percent ! ” — struck a chord with people who felt disenfranchised by social and economic inequality around the world . Over the next few years , their disgruntlement was borne out by a slew of disturbing statistics , which fueled further interest in Piketty . **The facts behind the disgruntlement speak for themselves and were widely reported in the news media : • The richest one percent in the United States now own more wealth than the bottom 90 percent .** • **The wealthiest 160,000 families in the United States have as much wealth as the poorest 145 million families . • The richest 85 people in the world own as much wealth as the bottom half of humanity . • If you are born poor in America , you have a much greater chance of staying poor than if you were born into the same class in countries such as Canada or Denmar**k . On April 16 , 2014 , I attended a presentation by Piketty at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York . It was followed by a discussion of his work by two Nobel Prize – winning economists : Joseph Stiglitz ,Piketty’s theory rests on a formula he devised for measuring economic inequality : r > g . What do r and g mean ? r is the rate of return on capital , which Piketty defines as real estate , stock , and other financial assets ; g is the rate of growth in the economy . **There are two basic types of income : income produced by capital , which tends to be concentrated in the hands of a small group of wealthy people . And income from labor , which is disbursed broadly through the entire population . Wage growth is directly dependent on the growth of the economy . So when r > g , the earnings from capital increase faster than wages . Hence , the people who own capital accumulate a higher proportion of the nation’s total income and inequality gets worse , as is happening in Europe , Japan , and the United States** **according to Piketty . The rate of growth of capital in these countries is rising at 4 to 5 percent a year , whereas their economies are growing at a rate of only 1 to 1.5 percent a year — a trend he sees as continuing well into the future** .During his talk at the Graduate Center , Piketty showed half a dozen charts andgraphs to illustrate why the rich keep getting richer in Europe and the United States . The chart on page 44 is one of them : It shows the share of the national income accumulated by the top 10 percent of earners in the United States between 1910 and 2010 . Another similar chart showed the share of the top 1 percent of earners in Britain , Canada , and Australia during this same period . What’s fascinating is not just the decline in income inequality between 1945 and 1979 in the US and a similar period in the other Anglo - Saxon countries , but also that the resulting equality stabilized . Why did this occur ? According to Piketty , the owners of capital took a particularly big beating during andbetween the two world wars . In Europe , many physical assets — including factories and plants and the infrastructure needed to move products — were destroyed . Assets were appropriated to finance the wars and higher income taxes were levied . There was rampant inflation and , in some cases , economic collapse . During this forty - five - year period , g was either the equivalent or higher than r , closing the historical gap between workers and the wealthy .And then , something equally unforeseen occurred . The economy took a sharp turn in the direction of ever - increasing inequality . **Since 1979 , r ( the rate of return on capital ) has been greater than g ( the rate of economic growth ) , leading to more inequalit**y . **And in 2010 , a whopping 93 percent of the new wealth created in the United States went to the top one percent of earners . What’s most disturbing is that economic inequality has been rising to the level of the Gilded Ag**e ofthe late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries , when a small number of bankers and industrialists ( labeled “ the robber barons ” by critics ) controlled the US economy . Earlier I discussed the various factors that led to the structural changes in the US economy . Among them : the decoupling of wages and jobs from growth ; the decline in unions and worker power ; the deregulation of banks and financial institutions , and the disruptive impact of emerging technologies . Piketty gathers these factors under the umbrella of a powerful new storyline : the return of patrimonial capitalism , where the economic elites inherit their wealth instead of working for it . “ Unless drastic measures are taken , the future belongs to people whosimply own stuff they’ve inherited from their parents , ” says Piketty . How do we stop wealth and power from concentrating in the hands of the one - tenth of one percent ? Piketty suggests a global wealth tax — in effect , an annual progressive tax on stocks and bonds , property , and other assets that usually aren’t taxed until they are sold . “ The study of history is important because a lot of what is happening now has happened in the past , ” **Piketty emphasize**d in his presentation at the Graduate Center . He noted how the inventions of the automobile , airplane , and radio in the early 1900s brought a huge concentration of wealth , just as Facebook and Google are doing today . “ That doesn’t imply that wealth andinequality will rise indefinitely , there will be some mobility , ” he said . “ But **the large wealth concentration will restrict economic growth and keep our democratic institutions from functioning properly . ”**

#### Technological innovation will produce massive unemployment

Andy Stern, 2016, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream, Andrew L. "**Andy**" **Ster** is the former president of the then 2.2.million member Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is now President Emeritus of SEIU, which grew by more than 1.2 million workers during his tenure, **p. location 1054-6**

Behind each headline lurks Moore’s Law , the observation made in 1965 by Intel co - founder Gordon Moore , that the number of components in an integrated circuit doubles every two years , resulting in an exponential growth in computing power . Why does this occur ? High - tech companies like Intel keep shrinking the size of transistors so that they can place more of them on each chip and in closer proximity to each together . As a result , the electrons have less distance to travel , improving the speed , power , and overall performance of computers . In 2014 , the semiconductor industry manufactured 250 billion billion ( 250 x 1018 ) transistors at a rate , on average , of eight trillion transistors a second . But some experts predict that the cost of continuing to shrink transistors will outstrip the value of doing so around 2021 , putting a crimp in Moore’s Law . Will that mean an end to the fifty - year exponential increase in computing power ? Not according to Ray Kurzweil , who , in The Age of Spiritual Machines , proposed “ The Law of Accelerating Returns . ” Unlike Moore’s Law , which only applies to the technology of semiconductor circuits , **Kurzweil’s Law encompasses all technological change** , which occurs , he says , in paradigm shifts : “ An analysis of the history of technology shows that technological change is exponential , contrary to the common - sense ‘ intuitive linear ’ view . So we won’t experience 100 years of progress in the twenty - first century — it will be more like 20,000 years of progress ( at today’s rate ) . The returns , such as chip speed and cost - effectiveness , also increase exponentially . There’s even exponential growth in the rate of exponential growth . **Within a few decades , machine intelligence will surpass human intelligence , leading to the Singularity — technologic**al change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history . **The implications include the merger of biological and non - biological intelligence , immortal software - based humans , and ultra - high levels of intelligence that expand outward in the universe at the speed of light** . ” In terms of computing power , Kurzweil sees one paradigm replacing another : in the 1950s , we had vacuum - based computing , which gave way to the transistors of the 1960s and the integrated circuits that enabled the high - speed personal computers and mobile devices we use today . Soon that paradigm will shift to 3D computing . In fact , chipmakers have already begun creating chips with three - dimensional transistors — a process of stacking the circuits in layers so that there’s no need to keep shrinking transistors . And so it goes , according to Kurzweil : Every new technology advances along an S - curve and flattens out as the technology reaches its limits . As one technology ends , the next paradigm takes over . **What’s next ? Kurzweil sees new materials like graphene and carbon nanotubes replacing silicon . He also sees major advances in quantum computing , which will mimic the human mind and do computations so quickly that , in comparison , it will seem that today’s digital computers would take millennia to provide the same answer . WE ARE LIVING in a time of unprecedented** **change . Every morning , I wake up to news of an advancement in science , medicine , or technology that is more wondrous and promising than any of the science fiction I read when I was growing up** . **In 1972** , when I graduated college , **the price of the fastest supercomputers on earth was between $ 5 and $ 8.8 millio**n ( the equivalent of almost $ 30 and $ 43 million today ) . **Forty years later , I could buy an iPhone 4 with equal performance for less than $ 400** . What a thrill to be alive in the wonder - filled world of Moore’s Law — or should I say Kurzweil’s Law of Accelerating Returns . **And yet , there is a dark side to all this change that will improve our lives : the loss of millions of middle - class jobs , perhaps forever , but definitely for the** **foreseeable future .** In September 2013 **, I read a study by two Oxford professors on the potential impact of computerization on 702 different kinds of work . The provocative headline from the study was that 47 percent of US jobs are at risk because of advances in machine learning and mobile robotics** . The study received a good deal of attention in the financial press and seemed to warrant more discussion , so I invited one of its authors , Carl Benedikt Frey , to address a meeting I helped convene on behalf of the Open Society Foundations on the future of work . Frey used a series of slides to show us his methodology , thinking , and results . He and his partner , Michael A . Osborne , had made several assumptions — for example , he said , “ computers are basically good at routine work , from cognitive to manual work , like record - keeping , calculations , repetitive customer service , picking / sorting , and repetitive assembly . ” He told us that the line between routine and non - routine work ( e.g . , truck driving and medical diagnosis ) is slowly shifting . “ More jobs which used to be safe - havens to automation are going to be at risk in the future , ” he said . “ The basic trend driving this is the growing availability of data — big data . One estimate shows that all the printed material in the world is 200 petabytes . [ A petabyte is 1,000,000,000,000,000 bytes of digital information . One petabyte is enough to store the DNA of the entire population of the US — and then double it . ] In 1999 , we had a total of 12,000 petabytes of stored information . By 2015 , we’ll have 960,000 petabytes , ” Frey said . That’s a huge amount of information for algorithms “ to dig into ” for the purposes of analyzing , mining , sharing , storing , and using information for every job and purpose imaginable , he added . The low - risk occupations tended to be in education , healthcare , management , and computer engineering . It is highly unlikely that robots will take over the jobs , for example , of primary school teachers , therapists , and mental health counselors . “ When we got through Y2K with barely a hiccup , the whole mindset changed . Companies started trusting technology and especially the Internet more . So by the time the financial crisis came in 2008 , CEOs could say , ‘ I don’t need to have a pair of hands backing up the new technology anymore . I can get rid of all this redundancy . ’ ” A convergence of other factors — in particular , Big Data and the Cloud — enabled companies to outsource more business functions . The result ? Even more automation and layoffs ! That pattern continues six years into the recovery . Each week , Berkenfeld evaluates fifteen or more proposals from executives who want to meet with his committee . Most want to take their companies public . “ I’ll say yes , no , or only if you do such and such — for example , an audit , or more due diligence on certain items . I’ve seen thousands of deals and thousands of companies and hundreds of different business models . ” **Nearly all of the companies are developing technologies that aim to enhance productivity and cut labor costs** . For example , one company manufactures a solar compactor that contains a new device for sending information about the status of individual garbage cans to a sanitation company’s headquarters . It’s easy to see why municipalities are interested in buying these high - tech compactors . Instead of having garbage trucks drive the same route every day to empty half - filled cans , headquarters can map out a more efficient route to empty only the cans that are overflowing with trash — a win - win for the city and its residents , who no longer need to spend so much time waiting in traffic behind slow - moving garbage trucks . Taxpayers will come to see the productivity - enhancing technology as a plus , since it will eventually lower the cost of collecting their garbage . But only some sanitation workers will be happy , since many of them will end up losing their jobs . Berkenfeld gives another example . A company he recently took public manages the data centers for 500 other companies around the world . In his first meeting with the company’s CEO , he asked , “ How many people does it take to manage the data at each of those 500 companies ? ” “ I figured that each company that maintained its own data center would need to hire two , three , or as many as five people internally to manage their data , for a total of 1,000 to 2,500 data managers . But by outsourcing that task to the CEO’s company , it took those other companies a total of only 180 people to manage all the data . The CEO’s company had turned up to 2,500 jobs into 180 , reducing by 82 percent the number of people required to run those 500 data centers . ” And a similar dynamic is at play in a growing number of industries . “ Every company is trying to figure out how to do more with less , ” explains Berkenfeld . “ It’s not about automating a job altogether . It’s about how to make every job as productive as possible . ” He gives a couple of examples representing the extremes on the skills scale . At one extreme is food service workers . “ We won’t , ” says Berkenfeld , “ lose them any time soon , but we’ve all been to restaurants with iPads , or other devices that allow you to pay at your table . Someone is still serving your table , but that person can serve ten to twenty tables instead of five . ” At the other extreme is medical diagnosis : “ So much of that function can be outsourced now . We haven’t seen a reduction in the numbers of radiologists yet , but the workflow of each radiologist is much higher . The same is true of robotic - assisted surgery . We won’t get rid of surgeons any time soon but we’ll need less of them . ” More recently , Berkenfeld pointed to a study from the McKinsey Global Institute that took a long , hard look at automation and helped to illuminate some of his points . The McKinsey study suggests that the best way to understand and track the progress of automation in the near term is to shift the focus from the automation of jobs to the automation of activities within jobs . As Berkenfeld pointed out , that distinction is extremely important to his evolving ideas , because it more accurately reflects how a number of businesses are currently thinking about enhancing productivity . The conclusions of the McKinsey study are as staggering as those of the Oxford study although different in their approach . Most notably , **45 percent of all activities that workers take on in the US economy can be automated using available technologies . This represents nearly $ 2 trillion in annual wages of American workers . If AI progresses and is able to process and understand natural language a little better , that number quickly jumps to 58 percent of work activities that are automatable .** Berkenfeld also pointed out that the study shed some light on the key myths around automation . First , it argued compellingly that automation of activities would impact activities at all levels of income , not just middle - income occupations as some suggest . Furthermore , it strongly defended the notion that perhaps the best “ safe haven ” from automation will be jobs that require creativity and emotional sensing . Unfortunately , it also pointed out that only 4 percent of work activities require creativity above a median human level and only 29 percent of work activities require sensing emotions above a median human level , suggesting that those activities that are safe from automation are relatively rare .McKinsey’s written conclusions focused mostly on the impacts for organizations and managers , using management consulting terminology like , “ new top - management imperatives : keep an eye on the speed and direction of automation , for starters , and then determine where , when , and how much to invest in automation . ” And , “ We found that the benefits ( ranging from increased output to higher quality and improved reliability , as well as the potential to perform some tasks at superhuman levels ) typically are between three and ten times the cost . The magnitude of those benefits suggests that the ability to staff , manage , and lead increasingly automated organizations will become an important competitive differentiator . ”But it seemed to me and to Berkenfeld that McKinsey was somewhat reticent about coming out and saying it , so he summed it up for me in an email , “ **When 45 percent of the work activities of you , me , and our co - worker Sam can be automated , all three of us probably won’t be employed for long and none of us will have all that much bargaining leverage** . ” For the most part , I think automation is good and inevitable . Witness the solar compactor and the social , ecological , and logistical benefits it provides . But , unless significantly more work or new types of jobs are created , increased automation will result in the loss of more cherished middle - income jobs causing considerable pain in toomany middle - and lower - income American families . After talking with Andy Grove and pondering whether the US economy is at a strategic inflection point , I concluded that the trend **- lines for productivity and GDP would continue to rise but wages and employment all pointed to being flat or declining** . **Without bold new thinking and policies , we were likely to see more income inequality and a further diminishment of the American Dream** . What Berkenfeld helps me see is technology’s shaping role in the process from the points of view of companies , entrepreneurs , and the investment bankers who fund them . Berkenfeld tells me what his colleagues atBarclays and other investment banks are looking for : “ Give me a business model that doesn’t require a lot of capital — software , for instance , instead of manufacturing . And give me something that has a very large potential market that I can make a lot of money on . Again : software . ” Why software ? “ Because you can replicate it for free . That’s the economics we’re looking for . We’re applying the same criteria to every investment and eight out of ten times we’re wrong , maybe even more than that . But when we hit on that business model , it’s worth an enormous amount of money to us . ” As we talk , **I’m struck by how little the subject of labor comes up , beyond the need to make workers more productive and either reduce or eliminate them** . “ Is labor a factor at all when you evaluate a company ? ” “ Not really , ” Berkenfeld says . “ Twenty years ago , we used to ask , ‘ What’s the story with labor at this company ? Do they have any unions ? When’s the next collective bargaining group agreement ? ’ If the company was unionized , we’d consider it a risk factor : they could get shut down for a couple of months by a strike and not hit their financial forecasts . Also , unions made it harder for companies to manage their costs . Today , you’ll still find labor in IPO prospectuses , but only as a legacy factor . Labor isn’t significant anymore . ”And yet , there’s another dynamic at play . **Technology and the productivity it enables makes it easier for CEOs to get rid of their biggest headache : people** . “ As Henry Ford said : ‘ Why do I always get the whole person when all I want is a pair of hands ? ’ If I could just hire someone and put them in a box for thirty years an leave them there , that would be great , ” says Berkenfeld . “ But it doesn’t work that way . If I hire someone , I’ve got to train them , manage them , and fire them . I’ve got to worry about them getting sick , their parents getting sick , their kids and dog getting sick . If a woman gets pregnant and goes on maternity leave for three months , I have to figure out how to cover for her . She might feel discriminated against , or harassed . People want to know where they stand : to get a performance review at the end of the year and eventually a promotion . I have to work out health benefits , severance , and vacation schedules for them . It goes on and on and on . ”

#### Even if new jobs are eventually created, there will be a massive disruption

Andy Stern, 2016, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream, Andrew L. "**Andy**" **Ster** is the former president of the then 2.2.million member Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is now President Emeritus of SEIU, which grew by more than 1.2 million workers during his tenure, p. location 1267-80

A number of very famous economists have argued that technological disruption inevitably results in new types of jobs after the initial job loss and displacement of labor . **For example , it was tough going for buggy - whip makers when consumers started buying Henry Ford’s cars . But look at all the jobs that were eventually created** in steel mills , auto factories , and rubber - and - tire plants ; in gas stations and repair shops ; in car dealerships and used car lots ; while building interstate highways and transporting goods from coast to coast . In the short run , self - driving cars and the other high - tech stepchildren of Moore’s Law will cause job loss and displacement . **But twenty years from now , according to the techno - optimists , our nation’s entrepreneurial spirit and know - how will have created new types of jobs we can’t envision yet , heralding an era of even greater prosperity . However , “ even if the optimists are right , the transition from the jobs of today to the work of tomorrow is going to be very disruptive for most people , ” Berkenfeld writes . “ We’re going to have a lot of youth unemployment , a lot of people in their forties and fifties getting laid off and going from $ 100,000 a year middle - class jobs to much less and no benefits . Technology is opening up more opportunities for entrepreneurs , and then there’s a part of the population , which is much larger , being replaced by i**t . There are two narratives : the haves and have - nots . And the polarization is getting worse . ” I agree with Berkenfeld that the transition from the economy of today to that of tomorrow is going to be rough and even devastating for too many Americans . I am not at all convinced that technological disruption ( because it has in the past ) will result inenough new types of jobs to fill the hole that Berkenfeld and Frey are predicting . Doodling on a piece of paper , I draw a facsimile of the snake - like graph that helped me understand the strategic inflection points gestating since the mid - 1970s . As GDP and productivity keep rising at the roof of the snake’s mouth , wages and jobs keep stagnating at the bottom . Imagine plugging the snake’s tail into a socket powered by emerging technologies : the mouth grows wider and wider .MY CONVERSATIONS WITH Berkenfeld are helping me to see the strategic inflection points in a more granular light . Through his eyes and experiences I can see that **entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are techno - dancing to the tune of more efficiency and productivity , which will mean fewer jobs . While robots and AI won’t replace every worker , they’ll make workers far more productive and cut down on the total number needed to do the work . At the same time , technology will make it easier for companies to hire contract workers instead of full - time employees** — the topic of my next chapter .

#### Innovation means massive unemployment

Andy Stern, 2016, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream, Andrew L. "**Andy**" **Ster** is the former president of the then 2.2.million member Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is now President Emeritus of SEIU, which grew by more than 1.2 million workers during his tenure, p. location 2435-6

I tell Canada what David Cote said : that it’s increasingly important to study the right subjects — STEM subjects — if you want to succeed in today’s economy . “ I get that , ” Canada says . “ Right now , everyone’s saying : ‘ You should go into STEM and become an engineer . ’ I get the same pressure from my board . They say that we should teach more coding to our kids — and plumbing , too . My kids don’t look down on plumbers , they’ll do anything to earn a buck . And if there’s really a shortage out there , and we could get a thousand kids to be plumbers , I’m all for it . But **I’ve given up trying to predict which jobs will be around ten years from now because , in every single industry , I know entrepreneurs who are trying to figure out how to do those jobs without people . ” That’s what Steven Berkenfeld told me based on his evaluation of hundreds of proposals each year from entrepreneurs : most of whom are developing software that will enable companies to do more with less people** . And it’s also what I saw at Honeywell , where David Cote is putting more intelligence on the machine , lessening his need for human resources specialists . “ Apparently , the hardest thing to teach a robot is how to change a baby , ” says Canada . He stands up and goes through a mimic’s routine of changing a baby’s diaper . Then he gestures incredulously at me , as if to signal the fact that changing a baby’s diaper is no **big deal . “ There are all these kids at Stanford trying to make a billion dollars , trying to find the next big thing , and you’re telling me that they’re not going to figure out how to teach that robot how to change a diaper ! People keep saying that there are certain jobs computers will never be able to do . Really ? This cat is out of the bag and it’s not going back in again . Technology is going to deprive a lot of people of work** . ”

**Any job gain from innovation is small**

Andy Stern, 2016, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream, Andrew L. "**Andy**" **Ster** is the former president of the then 2.2.million member Service Employees International Union (SEIU). He is now President Emeritus of SEIU, which grew by more than 1.2 million workers during his tenure, p. location 2536

As a short - term policy , continuing to support innovation in industry - shifting technologies is a smart policy for two reasons . First , these **innovations continue to create jobs** , new industries , and businesses that fuel short - term growth . Second , they help to create a better standard of living for Americans and people across the globe . We should continue to invest and encourage our best and brightest to think of new ways to harness the power of these technologies to make the world a better , fairer , and more just place . **At the same time , we must keep in mind the limited scale and nature of this job creation** . As McAfee noted in a presentation he made to the Open Society in 2014 , **the “ big four ” firms of the twenty - first century ( Apple , Amazon , Facebook , and Google ) have fewer than 200,000 full - time employees in the US combined .**

#### Automation means there will not be enough jobs to support full employment by 2030

[**James Manyika**](https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/james-manyika) is chairman of and a director at the McKinsey Global Institute, where [**Susan Lund**](https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/susan-lund) and [**Michael Chui**](https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/michael-chui) are partners and [**Jacques Bughin**](https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/jacques-bughin) and [**Jonathan Woetzel**](https://www.mckinsey.com/our-people/jonathan-woetzel) are directors; **Parul Batra** is a consultant in McKinsey’s San Francisco office; and **Ryan Ko** and **Saurabh Sanghvi** are consultants in the Silicon Valley office, November 2017, What the future of work will mean for jobs, skills, and wages, https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/future-of-organizations-and-work/what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages

In an era marked by rapid advances in automation and artificial intelligence, new research assesses the jobs lost and jobs gained under different scenarios through 2030. The technology-driven world in which we live is a world filled with promise but also challenges. Cars that drive themselves, machines that read X-rays, and algorithms that respond to customer-service inquiries are all manifestations of powerful new forms of automation. Yet even as these technologies increase productivity and improve our lives, their use will substitute for some work activities humans currently perform—a development that has sparked much public concern. Video Automation and the new world of work Powerful new technologies are increasing productivity, improving lives, and reshaping our world. But what happens to our jobs? Building on our January 2017 report on automation, McKinsey Global Institute’s latest report, Jobs lost, jobs gained: Workforce transitions in a time of automation (PDF–5MB), assesses the number and types of jobs that might be created under different scenarios through 2030 and compares that to the jobs that could be lost to automation. The results reveal a rich mosaic of potential shifts in occupations in the years ahead, with important implications for workforce skills and wages. Our key finding is that while there may be enough work to maintain full employment to 2030 under most scenarios, the transitions will be very challenging—matching or even exceeding the scale of shifts out of agriculture and manufacturing we have seen in the past. In an era marked by rapid advances in automation and artificial intelligence, new research assesses the jobs lost and jobs gained under different scenarios through 2030. The technology-driven world in which we live is a world filled with promise but also challenges. Cars that drive themselves, machines that read X-rays, and algorithms that respond to customer-service inquiries are all manifestations of powerful new forms of automation. Yet even as these technologies increase productivity and improve our lives, their use will substitute for some work activities humans currently perform—a development that has sparked much public concern. Video Automation and the new world of work Powerful new technologies are increasing productivity, improving lives, and reshaping our world. But what happens to our jobs? Building on our January 2017 report on automation, McKinsey Global Institute’s latest report, Jobs lost, jobs gained: Workforce transitions in a time of automation (PDF–5MB), assesses the number and types of jobs that might be created under different scenarios through 2030 and compares that to the jobs that could be lost to automation. The results reveal a rich mosaic of potential shifts in occupations in the years ahead, with important implications for workforce skills and wages. Our key finding is that while there may be enough work to maintain full employment to 2030 under most scenarios, the transitions will be very challenging—matching or even exceeding the scale of shifts out of agriculture and manufacturing we have seen in the past. Automation will have a far-reaching impact on the global workforce. 1. What impact will automation have on work? We previously found that about half the activities people are paid to do globally could theoretically be automated using currently demonstrated technologies. Very few occupations—less than 5 percent—consist of activities that can be fully automated. However, in about 60 percent of occupations, at least one-third of the constituent activities could be automated, implying substantial workplace transformations and changes for all workers.

#### Automation will result in unemployment

Thomas Straubhaar 2017 (University of Hamburg, “On the Economics of a Universal Basic Income”, <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/IEForum22017_2.pdf)>

Nowadays, one of the strongest tailwinds for a UBI comes from rapid technological change. For example, Erik Bryn- jolfsson and Andrew McAfee worry how human work in the “second age of the machine” could withstand robots with artificial intelligence (AI).9 The development of robotics and AI may result in a substitution/replacement of the human labour force. A large part of the work now done by people could be taken over by robots. Consequently, jobs will be lost and it remains uncertain how many new jobs will be created to replace them. Thus, concerns are rising about the future of employment, the viability of social welfare and the financial stability of social security systems. Furthermore, tax systems that rely on labour income might come under pressure, because robots do not pay taxes (or make contributions to social security systems). Finally, technological change may result in increased in- equality within a society and a stronger polarisation be- tween capital owners and the labour force – especially the lower-skilled workers.10

#### Tens of millions of jobs will be replaced by automation

Tony Mecia is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard, February 2, 2018, The Case for Free Money, Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-case-for-free-money/article/2011427

Another factor in the basic-income debate is the rising role of technology in the workforce. Unemployment is at its lowest level in nearly two decades, and it isn’t easy to imagine that robots are coming for American jobs. But looking ahead five or 10 years or more, we can expect that advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence will allow machines to handle a much broader array of responsibilities than they do today. Tech leaders like Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg and Tesla’s Elon Musk favor a basic income in part because of worries about how to provide for people displaced by technology. In his commencement address at Harvard last year, Zuckerberg, 33, said his generation “will have to deal with tens of millions of jobs replaced by automation like self-driving cars and trucks.” If that’s the lens you’re looking through, the signs are all around us: Technology companies are experimenting with driverless cars. Amazon is trying home delivery by drone. Companies are hiring robots as security guards. Patrons at Japanese restaurants order from computers with no waiters in sight. A much-cited 2013 study by two Oxford professors (an economist and an engineer) showed that 47 percent of U.S. jobs are at high risk of being replaced by computers “over some unspecified number of years, perhaps a decade or two.” The fields most at risk are office work, sales, service, construction, and manufacturing; the jobs that seem safer are in health care, education, the arts, computers, and the sciences. A 2015 study by McKinsey & Co. found that 45 percent of work tasks could be done by existing technology, especially predictable physical work, data collection, and data processing.

#### AI will replace most jobs

Andrew Keen, January 2018, Stop Working, Universal Basic Income is ready to Go Mainstream, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/universal-basic-income-y-combinator-andrew-keen

But, for all its political seductiveness, UBI has never really convinced anyone except radical idealists such as More and Marx. So why is this rather kooky 500-year-old idea about to go mainstream? The answer, as with everything else these days, is smart technology. Known broadly as artificial intelligence, it is about to change the 21st-century world as radically as industrial technology changed the 19th-century world. Most troubling is that the smart machine is about to replace human labour in every area - from manual to highly skilled jobs such as medicine, law and teaching. Over the next quarter of a century, it will make many of us, perhaps even most of us, redundant. Climate change is the greatest technological issue of our age. The trauma is expected to be epochal. In a much-cited white paper, two Oxford University economists predict 47 per cent of jobs in the US will be at risk over the next 20 years. Elsewhere, a 2017 McKinsey report suggests smart technology could eliminate half of today's jobs by 2035. So how will 50 per cent of humanity survive if they have no jobs?

### Need UBI to Solve Unemployment

#### A UBI is needed to solve unemployment created by automation

David Morris, September 3, 2017, Universal Basic Income Could Grow the U.S. Economy by an Extra 12.5%, http://fortune.com/2017/09/03/universal-basic-income-economy-study/

Robert Reich, 2016, Robert B. Reich is Chancellor's Professor of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley and Senior Fellow at the Blum Center for Developing Economies. He served as Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration, for which Time Magazine named him one of the ten most effective cabinet secretaries of the twentieth century. He has written fourteen books, including the best sellers "Aftershock", "The Work of Nations," and"Beyond Outrage," and, his most recent, "Saving Capitalism." He is also a founding editor of the American Prospect magazine, chairman of Common Cause, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and co-creator of the award-winning documentary, "Inequality For All." His latest documentary, "Saving Capitalism," is streaming now on Netflix, Why We’ll Need a Universal Basic Income, <http://robertreich.org/post/151111696805> Imagine a little gadget called an i-Everything. You can’t get it yet, but if technology keeps moving as fast as it is now, the i-Everything will be with us before you know it. A combination of intelligent computing, 3-D manufacturing, big data crunching, and advanced bio-technology, this little machine will be able to do everything you want and give you everything you need. There’s only one hitch. As the economy is now organized, no one will be able to buy it, because there won’t be any paying jobs left. You see, the i-Everything will do … everything. We’re heading toward the i-Everything far quicker than most people realize. Even now, we’re producing more and more with fewer and fewer people. Internet sales are on the way to replacing millions of retail workers. Diagnostic apps will be replacing hundreds of thousands of health-care workers. Self-driving cars and trucks will replace 5 million drivers. Researchers estimate that almost half of all U.S. jobs are at risk of being automated in the next two decades. This isn’t necessarily bad. The economy we’re heading toward could offer millions of people more free time to do what they want to do instead of what they have to do to earn a living. But to make this work, we’ll have to figure out some way to recirculate the money from the handful of people who design and own i-Everythings, to the rest of us who will want to buy i-Everythings. One answer: A universal basic income – possibly financed out of the profits going to such labor replacing innovations, or perhaps even a revenue stream off of the underlying intellectual property. The idea of a universal basic income historically isn’t as radical as it may sound. It’s had support from people on both the left and the right. In the 1970s, President Nixon proposed a similar concept for the United States, and it even passed the House of Representatives. The idea is getting some traction again, partly because of the speed of technological change. I keep running into executives of high-tech companies who tell me a universal basic income is inevitable, eventually. Some conservatives believe it’s superior or other kinds of public assistance because a universal basic income doesn’t tell people what to spend the assistance on, and doesn’t stigmatize recipients because everyone qualifies. In recent years, evidence has shown that giving people cash as a way to address poverty actually works. In study after study, people don’t stop working and they don’t drink it away. Interest in a basic income is surging, with governments debating it from Finland to Canada to Switzerland to Namibia. The charity “Give Directly” is about to launch a basic income pilot in Kenya, providing an income for more than 10 years to some of the poorest and most vulnerable families on the planet. And then rigorously evaluate the results.

#### Need UBI to replace millions of workers who will lose jobs. If we don’t the economy will be devastated

The Merkle, January 8, 2018, <https://themerkle.com/elon-musk-makes-case-for-universal-basic-income-again/>, Elon Musk Makes the Case (Again) for Universal Basic Income

I would argue, yes, probably. Even though not all jobs can be performed by computers or robots, there is a clear need to address millions of people losing their jobs quickly. After all, the entire nation freaks out when unemployment goes up by 2%, so something on the level of all truckers being replaced without receiving new work would be nothing short of a disaster. And this disaster scenario is exactly why Universal Basic Income may be necessary to save the economy. While I have no doubt that some of these workers will find new jobs or be retrained for different ones, there will be a large portion of the population which does not. Both humanity and the economy can’t let those people suffer.

## Populism/Nationalism

### UBI Reduces Populism and Nationalism

**A basic income is needed to reduce resentment that is leading to the growth of the far right**

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, p. location 60-63

The shares of national income going to ‘ capital ’ and ‘ labour ’ used to be roughly stable ; that old consensus has gone . **We are in a Second Gilded Age , in which more and more income is going to a minority of ‘ rentiers ’ who are thriving from the proceeds of property – physical , financial and ‘ intellectual ’ . This has no moral or economic justification** . **And the inequities are multiplying** , as is the resentment . **The mixture of anxiety , anomie , alienation and anger is creating a ‘ perfect storm ’ , enabling populist politicians to play on fears in order to build support for agendas that have echoes of the ugly aftermath of the First Gilded Age** . ***Unless a new income distribution system can be constructed*** – or at least the firm beginnings of one **– the drift to the far right** , which underpinned Brexit and the triumph of Donald Trump in 2016 , **will only grow stronger** . I would argue that , as the anchor of a more egalitarian and more emancipatory system , **basic income has become a political imperativ**e , which is one of the reasons for writing this book .

#### UBI alleviates the pressure that produces poverty and nationalism

Behzad Yaghmaian 2017 (“We Need Universal Basic Income to End Economic Anxiety Over Refugees”, https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/06/27/we-need-universal-basic-income-to-end-economic-anxiety-over-refugees)

The far right counters neoliberal globalism with anti-globalism and nationalism. Yet there is another way: solidarity-based globalism. Neoliberal globalism did not just hit the middle and working classes in richer countries. It also hurt very poor communities in the global South and diminished protections for refugees. The marginalized class in wealthy countries, refugees and those escaping poverty form a global triangle of the casualties of neoliberal globalism. Their interests coincide. A solidarity-based globalism would reunite forces seemingly at odd with each other. It would include a universal basic income, funded by taxes on billionaires and financial speculation, and an end to austerity policies. These policy proposals are neither new nor revolutionary. But they are more urgent than ever if we are to reverse the dangerous political path ahead for many Western countries, while making sure the world protects refugees. The idea of a universal basic income (UBI) is simple. Each citizen (and in some cases, resident) receives a fixed monthly income from the government regardless of her or his employment status to meet the person’s basic needs. UBI is a form of social security and an anti-poverty device. The existing welfare system in Western Europe was created to safeguard citizens against the fluctuations and risks of the market system. Yet it can act as a trap, by disincentivizing employment for people who cannot access wages above the welfare payment. Universal basic income corrects this problem, as its unconditional payment scheme is an incentive to work. If you’re receiving UBI and you find a job – no matter how much it pays – you will not lose your regular, fixed UBI payment. There have been several pilot projects of UBI, including in Brazil and India, and growing interest in Europe, where UBI is now a part of public discussion and political campaigns. We won’t have direct evidence of the effect of UBI on attitudes toward refugees until it has been implemented in refugee-hosting countries over the long term. Yet the largely positive outcomes of the pilot projects indicate that UBI can address some of the economic anxieties driving anti-immigrant politics in the global North. If the losers of neoliberal globalism see a noticeable improvement in their well-being, in their sense of autonomy and the dignity that they had lost, this will undermine the reasons for resentment of refugees and migrants. Universal basic income weakens and eventually eliminates the economic case against refugee protection by lifting the rest of society out of poverty. UBI should start at the national level, but will be most effective if implemented across the E.U. Even so, there is no evidence so far of “UBI-shopping” – people moving to places where UBI is implemented – in the pilot countries.

## Environment

### UB Improves the Environment

#### Can’t save the environment until the drudgery of work is reduced

Timothy Roscoe Carter 2014 (Basic Income Earth Network, “The One Minute Case for a Basic Income”, <http://basicincome.org/bien/pdf/montreal2014/BIEN2014_Carter.pdf)>

The global economy is dependent on industries and consumption that erode natural habitats and pollute the environment. The poor are dependent upon jobs in these industries for their very survival. Middle class consumption is needed to produce the demand that fuels these industries, and the middle class buys into the system out of fear of becoming poor. The rich are able to clean up their own environment, even if that means stopping wind turbines that might be an eyesore on their private beaches, while the powerless live next to literal dumps. The changes necessary to significantly clean the environment will produce massive disruptions laying off millions and raising prices of life necessities. The poor and middle classes will never accept this to clean the planet for the rich, nor should they. We cannot begin the work of healing Earth until we divorce survival from work and compensate everyone for the costs of the cleanup. A basic income will not by itself fix the environment, but it is necessary to begin the work.

### UBI would encourage people and governments to protect the environment, reducing the risks of human extinction

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, p. 490-1

The Ecological Imperative Humanity and the planet face an impending ecological catastrophe in the threat posed by climate change . Already we are seeing disappearing species , **shrinking icecaps , rising seas , expanding deserts , extremes of rain and drought , and storms , cyclones and hurricanes of unprecedented destructive power . And many other forms of environmental pollution , linked to industrialization and urbaniz**ation , are putting health and well - being at risk . If we have a sense of inter - generational justice and a care for the natural wonders of the world , **we need to act urgently to avert disaster .** **What has this to do with basic income ? Probably most significantly , a basic income would encourage people to shift some of their time from resource - depleting labour activities to resource - preserving ‘ reproductive ’ activities such as caring or voluntary work . This is discussed further in Chapter 8 on work and labour . However , there are also justice issues involved . Environmental pollution is a regressive phenomenon , since the rich can find ways of insulating themselves from bad air , dirty water , loss of green spaces and so on** . Moreover , much pollution results from production and activities that benefit the more affluent – air transport , car ownership , air conditioning , consumer goods of all kinds , to take some obvious examples . A basic income could be construed , in part , as partial compensation for pollution costs imposed on us , as a matter of social justice **. Conversely , a basic income could be seen as compensation for those adversely affected by environmental protection measures . A basic income would make it easier for governments to impose taxes on polluting activities that might affect livelihoods or have a regressive impact by raising prices for goods bought by low - income households .** For instance , hefty carbon taxes would deter fossil fuel use and thus reduce greenhouse gas emissions and mitigate climate change as well as reduce air pollution . Introducing a carbon tax would surely be easier politically if the tax take went towards providing a basic income that would compensate those on low incomes , miners and others who would lose income - earning opportunities . The basic income case is especially strong in relation to the removal of fossil fuel subsidies . Across the world , in rich countries and in poor , governments have long used subsidies as a way of reducing poverty , by keeping down the price of fuel . This has encouraged more consumption , and more wasteful use , of fossil fuels . Moreover , fuel subsidies are regressive , since the rich consume more and thus gain more from the subsidies . But governments have been reluctant to reduce or eliminate the subsidies for fear of alienating voters . Indeed , a number of countries that have tried to reduce fuel subsidies have backed down in the face of angry popular demonstrations . A basic income could resolve this impasse , as the Iranian example shows ( see Chapter 10 ) . If subsidies on fossil fuels were removed , fuel prices would rise . However , the vast amount of money governments spend on those subsidies could then be redirected to finance ‘ green dividends ’ , paid equally to everybody . This compensation would be progressive ; people using more fossil fuels would pay more , while the dividend would be worth more to those with low incomes , in relation both to spending on fossil fuels and to income . If , in addition to removing subsidies , fossil fuels were taxed to cover ‘ externalities ’ ( costs not factored into the market price , such as illness and deaths from air and water pollution ) , these taxes too could be redirected to top up green dividends . In this double way , low - income citizens would be economically better off . And all would benefit from reduced use of fossil fuels in terms of less pollution , improved health and a better ecological future for the planet . Some advocates , such as climate scientist James Hansen , have argued that 100 per cent of carbon tax revenues should be given out as equal green dividends . 15 Others have suggested that companies using fossil fuels for production should be compensated with part of the money collected , at least for a period in which to convert to other sources of energy . **Either way , here is a source of funding a basic income , a way of building up the financial base for payment , and justifiable on social justice principles . *This adds up to a formidable case for a basic income system as a valuable weapon in the struggle against environmental degradatio*n** , which is also a fight for inter - generational justice . However , the main ecological argument is that a basic income would give people a modest inducement to do valuable forms of work that would help reproduce and strengthen family and community life . **It would enable the relatively poor to engage in society and would appeal to what** John **Highlight B erger** , in his book Pig Earth , **called ‘ the culture of survival ’ rather than ‘ the culture of progress** ’ , the drive for consumption and the accumulation of wealth .

## Welfare Reform

#### Current welfare programs are failing because they include perverse incentive and negative externalities

Dr. Luke Martinelli 2017 (IPR Research Assistant at the University of Bath, “The Fiscal and Distributional Implications of Alternative Universal Basic Income Schemes in the UK”, Institute for Policy Research, http://www.bath.ac.uk/ipr/pdf/working-papers/basicincome1.pdf)

UBI is currently experiencing a dramatic resurgence of interest. While the reasons for UBI’s apparent desirability need not overly concern us here, there is increasing recognition that important features of mature welfare states – means-testing, contributory insurance principles, and ‘active’ labour market requirements – are increasingly unfit for purpose. They are stigmatising, intrusive and bureaucratic (O e, 2004); they discourage work by giving rise to poverty and unemployment traps (Gamel et al, 2006); and they distort incentives for family formation and communal living (Gri iths, 2017). Furthermore, labour market changes have left a growing number of people, including burgeoning numbers of precarious and low-paid workers, with inadequate incomes (European Parliament, 2016; Gregg et al., 2014; Goos and Manning, 2007). To varying degrees, UBI promises to solve or ameliorate these varied problems. More recently, the spectre of rapid automation and technological unemployment has fuelled further enthusiasm for UBI (Srnicek and Williams, 2015).

#### But – UBI is an effective solution to these challenges

Vanessa Brown Calder 2017 (Policy analyst at the Cato Institute, “Universal Basic Income — Disease or Cure?”, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/universal-basic-income-disease-or-cure)

So, what are the arguments in favor of UBI? Depending on who you talk to, there are a variety of rationales for the idea. For one thing, an idealized UBI effectively sidesteps many of the traditional welfare state’s conventional problems. See figure 1 For example, many UBI proposals promise large efficiency gains. These occur both because some or much of the existing welfare state would be eliminated in favor of it, and also because printing checks requires minimal oversight and monitoring as compared to managing a complex welfare system (see Figure 1). Part of the promise of UBI is limiting bureaucracy and dollars lost in transfer. Closely connected to improvements in efficiency are improvements in transparency and fairness. The current welfare state rewards individuals who learn to “game” a complicated benefits system or individuals with the highest tolerance for standing in line. Under UBI, economically unproductive activities like these produce no additional payoff. Supporters also tout the soft social benefits of UBI. In theory, because individuals are provided for equally by the state, class division and social isolation would fall. The usual dividing lines between “takers” and “makers” would evaporate. For some people, choices to engage in non-paid work like caretaking or creative ventures would become possible. UBI also reduces or eliminates the paternalism that is typically a prominent feature of welfare programs. It does this by ending government’s role as the arbiter of eligibility to receive benefits. Under UBI, everyone is equally deserving. Then, once individuals receive their income, it allows them freedom to decide what to do with it: no seafood restrictions on your food stamps, or location restrictions on your housing voucher. For economists, some of these features recommend the policy. They look at UBI as decision- and utility-maximizing for the individual, as well as a program that avoids the steep benefit cliffs that penalize work. They argue that recipients are always better off with a cash transfer than an in-kind benefit. These benefits, in tandem with a reduction in overhead costs and efficiency improvement, make the idea especially tantalizing.

## Education

### UBI Keeps Kids in School

#### UBI keeps kids enrolled in school

James Surowiecki is the author of “The Wisdom of Crowds” and writes about economics, business, and finance for the magazine, June 20, 2016, The Case for Free Money, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/20/why-dont-we-have-universal-basic-income

The U.B.I. is often framed as a tool for fighting poverty, but it would have other important benefits. By providing an income cushion, it would increase workers’ bargaining power, potentially driving up wages. It would make it easier for people to take risks with their job choices, and to invest in education. In the U.S. in the seventies, there were small-scale experiments with basic-income guarantees, and they showed that young people with a basic income were more likely to stay in school; in New Jersey, kids’ chances of graduating from high school increased by twenty-five per cent.

## Stigmatization/Paternalism Advantage

#### UBI avoids stigmatization and paternalism

James Surowiecki is the author of “The Wisdom of Crowds” and writes about economics, business, and finance for the magazine, June 20, 2016, The Case for Free Money, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/20/why-dont-we-have-universal-basic-income

It’s easy to administer; it avoids the paternalism of social-welfare programs that tell people what they can and cannot buy with the money they’re given; and, if it’s truly universal, it could help destigmatize government assistance. As Sunkara puts it, “Universal programs build social solidarity, and they become politically easier to defend.”

#### A basic income empowers people and reduces paternalism

Tony Mecia is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard, February 2, 2018, The Case for Free Money, Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-case-for-free-money/article/2011427

One of the problems with existing welfare programs is that they create few incentives to take a job and are “hopelessly complex and opaque,” says Michael Tanner, senior fellow at the Cato Institute. A basic income would empower individuals and remove government-knows-best paternalism, he says: “Poor people are poor because they don’t have money, but almost none of these programs give people money. We treat people like they are 10 years old. We pay their landlord, their doctor, their grocery store.” He says he is “skeptically sympathetic” to a universal basic income—believing it would remedy some of the drawbacks of existing programs but that it is far too expensive to be practical.


# PRO answers to CON

## Answers to: Low Taxes Key to Economy

#### Low taxes aren’t key to the economy

Chad Stone 17, Chief Economist at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, where he specializes in the economic analysis of budget and policy issues, 4-27-17, “Economic Growth: Causes, Benefits, and Current Limits,” <https://www.cbpp.org/economy/economic-growth-causes-benefits-and-current-limits>

History shows that tax cuts for the rich are far from a surefire way to boost growth — and that higher taxes don’t preclude robust economic and job growth. Compare, for example, changes in employment and economic growth following the Bush tax cuts of 2001 with those following the Clinton tax increases on high-income taxpayers in 1993, which supply-siders were certain would lead to slower growth and large job losses (see Figure 2). Small business job-creation was also more robust under Clinton. After the Bush tax cuts for the very highest-income households expired at the end of 2012, the economy continued to grow and add jobs steadily.



In a comprehensive review of the literature, economists Bill Gale and Andrew Samwick conclude that “growth rates over long periods of time in the U.S. have not changed in tandem with the massive changes in the structure and revenue yield of the tax system that have occurred.”[9] When Kansas enacted large tax cuts overwhelmingly for the wealthy, Gov. Sam Brownback claimed the tax cuts would act “like a shot of adrenaline into the heart of the Kansas economy.” But rather than seeing an economic boom since the tax cuts, Kansas’ growth — including small business job growth, economic growth, and growth in small business formation — has lagged behind the country as a whole.[10] These simple relationships are not controlled experiments to isolate the effect of tax cuts on growth, but they are a warning against credulous acceptance of supply-side claims. Careful economic research reinforces that conclusion. It finds that tax cuts on high-income people’s earnings or their income from wealth (such as capital gains and dividends) don’t substantially boost work, saving, and investment.

#### Trickle down economics is crap – high rates do not slow growth

Mark Thoma 16, Professor of Economics at the University of Oregon, 6/1/2016, “Tax hikes on the wealthy: Good or bad for growth?”, CBS News, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/tax-hikes-on-the-wealthy-good-or-bad-for-growth/

Conservatives have argued for decades that tax cuts are the key to economic prosperity. And the tax plan presumptive GOP nominee Donald Trump is pushing would cut taxes for the top 0.1 percent of earners by an average of approximately $1.3 million per year, embracing that conservative point of view.¶ On the other hand, Democrats such as front-runner Hillary Clinton take another approach. Clinton says she'll reform the U.S. tax code so that the wealthiest pay their fair share. The response from Republicans has been predictable: They argue that such a tax plan will lower growth and harm the economy.¶ Do the conservative arguments against tax increases have any merit? Or are they, as Democrats claim, a way to serve an ideological goal of smaller government and reward wealthy Republican donors? Let's take a closer look.¶ Increasing taxes on the wealthy will harm economic growth: This argument is made frequently, along with the claim that increasing growth will lift all boats, but the evidence doesn't support either claim. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Peter Diamond and John Bates Clark medalist Emmanuel Saez have noted, since the 1970s no clear correlation exists between economic growth and top tax-rate cuts across Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries.¶ As for the trickle-down argument, this claim falls apart when you examine what happened to the distribution of income after tax cuts for the wealthy enacted during the Bush administration. Income of those at the top went up substantially, with no corresponding gain for those lower in the income distribution.¶ Increasing taxes on the wealthy won't solve the income inequality problem: Higher taxes for the highest earners may not solve the problem, but it would help. Again, consider the tax cuts on the wealthy enacted during the Bush years. In addition to not generating a positive trickle-down economic growth effect, those cuts contributed to the stunning increase in income inequality in recent decades. Raising taxes would have the opposite effect.¶ Tax increases will blunt the incentive to invest in new businesses: Decreasing taxes did not increase economic growth, so why would increasing taxes to levels they've been at in the past be harmful? In addition, it's hard to believe that a reduction in expected aftertax income of, say, 10 percent from $10 million to $9 million, or even from $300,000 to $270,000, would cause someone to pass on the investment opportunity.¶ The wealthy will move to other countries to avoid the tax increase: A recent study examined the propensity of the rich to move between U.S. states in response to state tax increases. The lead author of the study, Cristobal Young of Stanford University, summarized the results by saying, "The most striking finding in our study is how little elites seem willing to move to exploit tax advantages across state lines."¶ If the wealthy aren't willing to move between states in response to tax differences, it seems even more unlikely that would undertake the far more difficult task of moving to another country.¶ Increasing taxes on the wealthy won't increase tax revenue: The Laffer curve argument that increasing taxes will cause the wealthy to pursue tax-avoidance strategies or forego profitable opportunities to the extent that tax revenues actually fall has been examined again and again, and the message is clear. Tax avoidance may increase somewhat, but nowhere near enough to cause tax revenues to fall.¶ Diamond and Saez have looked at this closely, and they found that the revenue-maximizing top federal marginal income tax rate would be in or near the range of 50 percent to 70 percent (taking into account that individuals face additional taxes from Medicare and state and local taxes).¶ Less will be donated to private charities: Would tax increases cause the wealthy to reduce their charitable giving? Research on this question suggests it's the other way around. Back in the 1970s, when the top rate of federal income tax was 70 percent, wealthier Americans (those with incomes of over $500,000 in 2007 dollars) gave around twice as much of their money to charity than they did in 2007, when the top rate had fallen to 35 percent.¶ Why does this happen? When taxes are higher, the benefit of the tax deduction for charitable giving is also higher, so people tend to increase the amount they give. In addition, the wealthy give their biggest donations almost exclusively to universities and colleges, hospitals and medical centers, and arts institutions. They rarely make large gifts to social-service groups, grass-roots organizations or nonprofit groups that focus on the poor or minorities.¶ So to the extent that the increased tax revenue is used to support these groups, social welfare could benefit.¶ The wealthy deserve what they earn: This argument assumes that they're paid according to their contribution to society. But in a world of monopoly power, regulatory capture and asymmetric power relationships in bargaining over the wage and profit shares of business earnings, the presumption that those at the top of the income distribution earned their income flies out the window.¶ If we assume that fairness is defined as keeping what you contribute to the social good (what economists would call the value of their marginal product), and no more than that, such fairness would compel us to take the income the wealthy earn in excess of their contribution to the social good.¶ Where should that income go? Substantial evidence shows that wage earners have earned less than their marginal products in recent decades. So under the principle that people should have an income equal to what they contribute, fairness would suggest that we redistribute to underpaid wage earners some of the income the wealthy earn in excess of their contribution, either through direct payments, tax adjustments or spending on social programs that benefit lower-income households.¶ It's a tax on small businesses: The number of small-business owners that would be affected by a tax increase on incomes over $250,000 is fairly small. For example, an analysis of President Obama's proposal in 2009 to increase the rates for those in the top two tax brackets would affect only 1.9 percent of small businesses.¶ Many of those who would be affected are investors in the businesses who play no role at all in day-to-day management. And they could always escape the tax completely by filing as corporations. You also have to wonder how many people would choose to give up their businesses if their incomes were only, say, $350,000 due to a tax increase.¶ Arguments about the size of government and the taxes needed to support the many things that government does are certainly fair game for politicians. But the argument that tax increases on the wealthy will cause substantial harm to the economy does not withstand a close look at the evidence.

## Answers to: Better to Increase Social Welfare Spending

### A basic income would reduce inequality between women, age groups, those with disabilities. Means tested programs cannot solve for this

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, p. location 474-5

The Demographics of Justice **Would a basic income foster social justice between men and women , across all age groups , and for those with disabilities or impairments** that are treated as disabilities in a modern market economy ? There is a rich literature on these issues , which I will not attempt to summarize . The short answer is ‘ not by itself ’ . But it **would help** , especially if combined with anti - discrimination measures and mechanisms to strengthen the individual and collective voice of disadvantaged groups . **The first reason for this claim is that a basic income would be paid individually . It would not go only to someone designated or self - designated as ‘ household head ’ or ‘ family head ’ , or to a family or household where interpersonal power relations are rarely equal . An individualized basic income would not overcome all the structured inequalities within households or families , but it would reduce financial dependence and provide** a **way of checking on the fair allocation of monetary resources , because each person would know how much they were due . A second reason is that a basic income would be universal and uniform ( equal for each person in a household , or for each adult )** . **By contrast , a means - tested benefit would exclude a financially deprived woman in an above - poverty household . The same applies , often more forcefully , to household members with disabilities and the dependent elderly . An individual universal payment would be fairer . A third reason is that a basic income would be unconditional . Behavioural conditionality is not only morally questionable , but is inherently more onerous on some** **people than on others and is thus unjust . This has been clearly demonstrated by conditional cash transfer schemes , widely adopted in Latin America and elsewhere , which commonly pay grants to low - income mothers provided their children go to school and receive health check - ups . Such schemes are much favoured by the ‘ libertarian paternalists ’ whose ‘ nudge ’ agenda has been influential in policy making , especially in the US and Britain** ( see Chapter 3 ) **. Yet these conditions almost invariably impose obligations on women as mothers that are not imposed on men , in practice if not in theory , constituting an unfair burden that is both time - using and psychologically stressful . In terms of interpersonal justice , therefore , a basic income would be beneficial , whatever else might be said for or against it** .

Tanner 14 (Michael D. Tanner – Cato Institute senior fellow, Michael Tanner heads research into a variety of domestic policies with a particular emphasis on poverty and social welfare policy, health care reform, and Social Security. – “The Basic Income Guarantee: Simplicity, but at What Cost?” – CATO Unbound – August 26, 2014 – http://www.cato-unbound.org/2014/08/26/basic-income-guarantee-simplicity-what-cost)

And obviously we should be concerned that the existing welfare system has utterly failed at its primary mission: lifting people out of poverty and enabling them and their children to become independent and self-supporting members of society. Last year alone, the federal government spent nearly $700 billion to fund anti-poverty programs. State and local governments kicked in an additional $300 billion, bringing the total to roughly $1 trillion. Since the Start of the War on Poverty in 1965, we have spent nearly $19 trillion. Recent studies suggest that welfare programs did help to reduce the worst deprivations of material poverty, especially in their early years. But they have long since reached a point of diminishing returns. We may have reduced the discomfort of poverty, but we have failed to truly lift people out of poverty. Therefore I am sympathetic to the argument that some form of guaranteed basic income would be an improvement over what we have today. For example, while I am skeptical of some of the predicted administrative savings, there would be clear advantages to a simplified system. Second, it would treat poor people like adults, expected to save and budget, rather than doling out small allowances for those specific goods and services that the government believes they should have. Third, as Zwolinski notes, it helps break up the entrenched constituencies that support the welfare state.

### Undermines Marriage

#### Most welfare programs are for single parent families, discouraging marriage

Ro*bert Rector is a leading national authority on poverty, the U.S.welfare system and immigration and is a Heritage Foundation Senior Research Fellow, November 18, 2014,* How the War on Poverty Has Hurt American Marriage Rates, <http://dailysignal.com/2014/11/18/war-poverty-hurt-american-marriage-rates/> DOA: 3-14-15

It is no accident that the collapse of marriage in America largely began with the War on Poverty and the proliferation of means-tested welfare programs that it fostered. When the War on Poverty began, only a single welfare program—Aid to Families with Dependent Children —assisted single parents. Today, dozens of programs provide benefits to families with children, including the Earned Income Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, the Women, Infants and Children food program, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, child nutrition programs, public housing and Section 8 housing, and Medicaid. Although married couples with children can also receive aid through these programs, the overwhelming majority of assistance to families with children goes to single-parent households. The burgeoning welfare state has promoted single parenthood in two ways. First, means-tested welfare programs such as those described above financially enable single parenthood. It is difficult for single mothers with a high school degree or less to support children without the aid of another parent. Means-tested welfare programs substantially reduce this difficulty by providing extensive support to single parents. Welfare thereby reduces the financial need for marriage. Since the beginning of the War on Poverty, less-educated mothers have increasingly become married to the welfare state and to the U.S. taxpayer rather than to the fathers of their children. As means-tested benefits expanded, welfare began to serve as a substitute for a husband in the home, and low-income marriage began to disappear. As husbands left the home, the need for more welfare to support single mothers increased. The War on Poverty created a destructive feedback loop: Welfare promoted the decline of marriage, which generated a need for more welfare. second major problem is that the means-tested welfare system actively penalizes low-income parents who do marry. All means-tested welfare programs are designed so that a family’s benefits are reduced as earnings rise. In practice, this means that, if a low-income single mother marries an employed father, her welfare benefits will generally be substantially reduced. The mother can maximize welfare by remaining unmarried and keeping the father’s income “off the books.” For example, a single mother with two children who earns $15,000 per year would generally receive around $5,200 per year of food stamp benefits. However, if she marries a father with the same earnings level, her food stamps would be cut to zero. A single mother receiving benefits from Section 8 or public housing would receive a subsidy worth on average around $11,000 per year if she was not employed, but if she marries a man earning $20,000 per year, these benefits would be cut nearly in half. Both food stamps and housing programs provide very real financial incentives for couples to remain separate and unmarried. Overall, the federal government operates more than 80 means-tested welfare programs that provide cash, food, housing, medical care and social services to poor and low-income individuals. Each program contains marriage penalties similar to those described above. Low-income families generally receive benefits from several programs at the same time. The marriage penalties from multiple programs when added together can provide substantial financial disincentives to marriage. For example, if a single mother who earns $20,000 per year marries a man who earns the same amount, the couple will typically lose about $12,000 a year in welfare benefits. In effect, the welfare system makes it economically irrational for most low-income couples to marry. The anti-marriage aspect of the welfare state can be illustrated by comparing means-tested welfare with the federal income tax code. For example, under a progressive income tax system with only a single schedule of tax rates indiscriminately covering both single persons and married couples, nearly all individuals would experience an increase in taxes owed when they married and lower taxes if they remain separate or divorce. The current federal income tax system mitigates this anti-marriage effect by having separate tax schedules for singles and married couples. By contrast, the means-tested welfare system, in most cases, does not have a separate schedule for married couples. When a low-income mother and father marry, they will generally experience a sharp drop in benefits, and their joint income will fall. The anti-marriage penalty is often most severe among married couples where both parents are employed. These marriage penalties are harmful to mothers, fathers, children and society at large. Reform is needed. Yet with over 80 different means-tested aid programs, the U.S. welfare system is complex. Eliminating all anti-marriage incentives in these programs overnight would be extremely expensive. However, policymakers can reduce welfare’s anti-marriage penalties incrementally. A good first step would be to reform the Earned Income Tax Credit to help mitigate marriage penalties. This is in contrast to proposals that would expand EITC for unwed fathers, which would actually increase marriage penalties. Marriage is good for children, mothers and fathers, but marriage is disappearing in low-income communities. In part, this is due to the fact that the U.S. welfare system actively penalizes many low-income parents who do marry. The anti-marriage incentives built into the welfare state are indefensible. Policymakers should reduce welfare’s marriage penalties.

### Increases Immigrant Poverty

#### Welfare increases immigrant poverty, encouraging work is better

George Borjas, October 2015, Robert W. Scrivner Professor of Economics and Social Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; and Research

Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Does Welfare Reduce Poverty? [file:///Users/StefanBauschard/Desktop/Poverty2015.pdf](file:///C:\Users\StefanBauschard\Desktop\Poverty2015.pdf) DOA: 3-14-16

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 made fundamental changes in the federal system of public assistance in the United States, and specifically limited the eligibility of immigrant households to receive many types of aid. Many states chose to protect their immigrant populations from the presumed adverse effects of welfare reform by offering state-funded assistance to these groups. I exploit these changes in eligibility rules to examine the link between welfare and poverty rates in the immigrant population. My empirical analysis documents that the welfare cutbacks did not increase poverty rates. The immigrant families most affected by welfare reform responded by substantially increasing their labor supply, thereby raising their family income and slightly lowering their poverty rate. In the targeted immigrant population, therefore, welfare does not reduce poverty; it may actually increase it.

### Answers To: Welfare Cutbacks Increase Poverty

#### Welfare cutbacks have not increased poverty among immigrants

George Borjas, October 2015, Robert W. Scrivner Professor of Economics and Social Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; and Research

Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Does Welfare Reduce Poverty? [file:///Users/StefanBauschard/Desktop/Poverty2015.pdf](file:///C:\Users\StefanBauschard\Desktop\Poverty2015.pdf) DOA: 3-14-16

Table 1 summarizes some of the key trends in program participation for the 1994-2000 period. As suggested by earlier research, the decline in welfare use during this period was steeper among immigrants. In particular, the fraction of native families receiving either cash benefits or food stamps fell from 11.2 to 7.3 percent between 1994 and 2000. In contrast, the fraction of immigrant families receiving similar benefits dropped by 6.3 percentage points over the same period (from 15.2 to 8.9 percent). Moreover, the decline in program participation was limited to non-citizens—precisely the group of foreign-born persons targeted by welfare reform. Their participation rate fell by 10.2 percentage points (from 18.5 to 8.3 percent). The evidence, therefore, suggests that welfare reform—at least at the national level—had a sizable chilling effect on immigrant participation in these welfare programs. The second panel of Table 1 shows similar trends when the definition of welfare is expanded to include Medicaid. The proportion of native families receiving some type of assistance (defined as cash benefits, food stamps, or Medicaid) dropped by 2.7 percentage points. In contrast, the proportion of non-citizen families receiving some type of assistance dropped by 6.8 percentage points (from 23.7 to 16.9 percent). Table 1 shows that this relative decline in welfare use in the immigrant population was not accompanied by a concurrent rise in the poverty rate. In fact, the fraction of poor families declined more for immigrants than for natives during the period. In particular, the poverty rate among natives fell from 14.6 percent in 1994 to 11.9 percent in 2000, a 2.7 percentage point drop. In contrast, the poverty rate among immigrants fell by 5.9 percentage points, from 23.7 to 17.8 percent. Finally, the data indicate that the poverty rate dropped most for non-citizen families (from 30.1 to 22.3 percent), presumably the group that would have been most adversely affected by the cutbacks in PROWRA.

#### Poverty fell the most where welfare cutbacks were the deepest

George Borjas, October 2015, Robert W. Scrivner Professor of Economics and Social Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; and Research

Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Does Welfare Reduce Poverty? [file:///Users/StefanBauschard/Desktop/Poverty2015.pdf](file:///C:\Users\StefanBauschard\Desktop\Poverty2015.pdf) DOA: 3-14-16

The second panel of Table 3 documents the impact of the state actions on the poverty rate of immigrants and natives. The poverty rate among native families fell by roughly the same amount in the two types of states. In the more generous states, the fraction of poor native families fell by 1.3 percentage points (from 13.2 to 11.9 percent), while in the less generous states the native poverty rate fell by 2.5 percentage points. However, the decisions made by states on whether to provide state-funded assistance to immigrants seem to have an impact on non-citizen families. The non-citizen poverty rate fell by 6.0 percentage points in the more generous states and by 9.9 percentage points in the less generous states. In short, the descriptive evidence suggests that poverty declined the most in those states where the welfare cuts were the deepest.

### Oppression

#### Government benefits are not distributed equally – they are racially coded and doled out at least according to preexisting notions of normalcy, race, class, and gender. While some services, like Social Security, are unconditional entitlements, programs intended to help persons living in poverty have harsh conditions attached to them, operating under the assumption that the poor are deviant and untrustworthy. This creates a hyper regulatory state that uses surveillance of social services to discipline and punish the most marginalized in society. This requires a re-imagination of the role of the state which requires institutional engagement.

Bach, Associate Professor of Law @ University of Tennessee, 14 (Wendy, “The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and Support,” Yale Journal of Law & Feminism, Vol. 25, No. 2)

In contrast, if you are a poor, and more likely than in a world without structural racism, African American, and if you are living as a parent in the inner city, any support you receive is likely to be structured quite differently. The meager support that may be available comes in the form of welfare, Food Stamps, public housing, underfunded, overpoliced schools and publically funded, overcrowded health care facilities. Moreover, and central to the arguments put forward here, this support is likely to come at an enormous punitive risk both within the initial social welfare system and beyond. The regulatory mechanisms of those systems of support are likely to function in at least two ways. They will, if you are lucky and resourceful enough to navigate the many barriers to receipt, dole out some much-needed but meager support. But the price of that support is exposure to a set of mechanisms, here termed regulatory intersectionality, by which regulatory systems intersect to share information and heighten the adverse consequences of what those systems quite easily deem to be unlawful or noncompliant conduct. Quite simply if you are poor, African American and living in the inner city, by seeking support you risk far more than simply being deprived of support. By seeking support you elevate your risk of exposure to ever more punitive consequences. You risk exposure, in the examples in this article, to a child welfare system that is far more likely to take and keep your children and in which your children are likely to fare horribly. You also risk exposure to a criminal “justice” system that is more likely to impose harsh criminal consequences for your allegedly deviant conduct. The state you encounter not only fails to respond to your need in any meaningful way. Instead the state is hyperregulatory, meaning here that its mechanisms are targeted, by race, class, gender and place, to exert punitive social control over poor, African American women, their families and their communities. Feminist political and legal theorists are currently engaged in a vital project. This work, led by scholars like Martha Fineman and Maxine Eichner, teaches that both dominant American political theory and, more importantly, the structures of current state institutions fail to enable families to meet dependency needs and are, in the name of an emaciated view of autonomy, obscenely content to leave gross inequality in place. This work provides a potent critique, a clearly better vision of the state we need and a theory that holds great promise in getting us there. As we consider their vision, however, we must remember, as the work of Kimberle Crenshaw, Khiara Bridges, Kaaryn Gustafson and Dorothy Roberts, among many others, counsels, that if we are to build institutions that are responsive to some of the most vulnerable among us, we must seek to understand the particular institutional realities that constitute the relationship between poor and disproportionately African American women and the current state, and we must ask how these particular realities impact the path to a supportive or responsive state.

#### Federal laws empower infiltration into personal details of welfare recipients lives. Surveillance exists to enforce conditions on political subjects that are meant to normalize their behavior according to racist, heterosexist, and neoliberal values. This constitutes a policy of neo-eugenics.

\*NEG alts that don’t take action turn suffering into a spectacle to be observed instead of a problem to be stopped – this locks in a relationship to Others that transforms them into objects and their pain into our pleasure, which means the ALT is both unethical and can’t solve

\*NEG DA impacts that are based on attempts to manage future conflicts cause neo-eugenics because the entire idea underpinning the philosophy is that the state’s job is to manage Life and push it into the future, but that ignores the lives that have to be sacrificed in order to make that future livable – that means you can’t weigh the DA unless they beat the case, otherwise the judges impact calculus is complicit in mass slaughter

Smith, Government Prof @ Cornell, 11

(Anna Marie, “Neo-eugenics: A Feminist Critique of Agamben,” Occasions 1:2, http://arcade.stanford.edu/occasion/neo-eugenics-feminist-critique-agamben)

Agamben’s text, however, also lends itself to a more expansive reading. It can also be interpreted as an invitation to cultivate a more acute sensitivity to the ways in which even the most humanitarian forms of governance can have, as their hidden core principle, the brutal violation of fundamental human rights. As he defends the decision to wage war on Iraq, former President George W. Bush proclaims the exemplary achievements of American democracy. But in this same country, the State has stripped the welfare mother of almost all the basic rights that make a human life worth living, such as the right to refuse demeaning work. (This fact became all the more obvious, even to the corporate media, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.) The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA) has eliminated her statutory entitlement to poverty assistance;[9] she must look to her state constitution to give her claim to emergency aid any binding force. American constitutional law not only refuses to recognize the very concept of social rights[10] but deliberately refuses to construct the poor as a suspect class where equal-protection doctrine is concerned.[11] The State is empowered by the law to intervene in the intimate and sexual dimensions of a poor single mother’s life in ways that would be considered legally and ethically unacceptable if these same interventions were aimed at professional women. The state has what the courts regard as a legitimate interest in forcing the welfare mother to cooperate with child support enforcement—even if she is fleeing from a violent biological father; it can order her to disclose her sexual history and to open her home, the personal conduct of her teenage children, and her very DNA structure[12] to intensive governmental scrutiny. Federal law allows the states to deprive needy families of benefits when the eligibility time limits are exceeded and to set benefit levels at below-subsistence levels. Workfare rules require custodial mothers with young children to perform duties out of the home on a rigid schedule even though they may not have access to adequate and affordable childcare. In the guise of a poverty program ostensibly aimed at families with dependent children, the state can put so much pressure on a poor single mother that it places her in an absolutely desperate condition, one in which it becomes all the more likely that she will “voluntarily” give up her children for adoption. Indeed, three states evidently do not want to leave the custodial relinquishment effect of poverty policy to chance. They actually require welfare applicants to endure pro-adoption counseling and educational materials designed to encourage them—solely on the basis of their application for means-tested aid alone, with not even the slightest allegation of child abuse or neglect—to relinquish their custodial rights.[13] There is hardly any difference between the slurs that are commonly circulated in American society and government about the welfare mother—that is, the demonizing representations that construct her as a species of vermin or pestilence—and the absolutely obnoxious and horrific claim that her life is not worth living and does not deserve to be lived.[14] But mainstream American political rhetoric is also invested in portraying the state’s relationship with the poor in a humanitarian light: the state is “reluctantly” withdrawing redistributive supports only because they perversely fostered welfare dependency, and it is introducing therapeutic interventions designed to promote the work ethic and patriarchal and heterosexist family values. What we are really witnessing, however, is a massive reduction in social rights and the augmentation of a harsh punishment regime that advances racial-capitalist and patriarchal interests by keeping the poor disorganized, desperate, and eager to work for low wages.[15] Child support enforcement continues to fail as an antipoverty measure—given the fact that the biological fathers of the children of welfare mothers are typically too poor to meet their legal obligations—but the encapsulation of millions of adults within custodial mother/obliged biological father dyads greatly enhances the state’s ability to render the poor mass into a policeable totality. This tactic also interrupts the formation of solidaristic relations among the poor at an intimate level, and perpetuates neoliberal and traditional family values by displacing entitlement with private patriarchal dependency.[16] Agamben, like Foucault, encourages us to pay close attention not just to the eternal return of exclusion but to the structure of exclusion as well. For his part, Foucault is perhaps the better theorist of the two where the institutionally specific analysis of disciplinary technology is concerned. But they both read the text of State authority against the grain, as it were. In its ideological self-presentation, the State establishes its governmental interests by referring to its showcase policies, namely the ones that are widely accepted as “mainstream” measures for enhancing the “normal” citizen’s well-being. In the American case, we are seductively invited to position ourselves as citizens of a country that has built up the best form of government in human history, one that is deeply committed to securing the conditions necessary for the pursuit of the “good life.” Agamben and Foucault resist the lure of modern State legitimation discourse. Refusing to follow the ostensive gesture of the State itself—again, the state prefers to point out its “mainstream” policies that serve the “general population”—Agamben and Foucault seek to interpret power relations by investigating the “extreme” cases involving individuals who are rendered into nonpersons through the application of purportedly “extraordinary” law (Agamben) or problematized fields of insufficiently disciplined subjectivity (Foucault). But Agamben would argue that Foucault himself vacillates on this crucial point and at times endorses the view that unilateral forms of exclusionary governance—those that are embodied in State practices such as banishment, the quarantining of the sick within fenced-off spaces like the leper colony, or the execution of criminals, for example—were more or less eclipsed by modern disciplinary technologies.[17] In my view, Foucault’s juridico-discursive and biopower regimes should be understood as ideal types that can bring to light the operations of power that are constitutive of modern liberal democratic societies. The fact that Foucault did not address fascism in his development of these two governance types is indicative of his scrupulous attention to the institutional specificities of distinct political regimes.[18] Further, it is a virtue of Foucault’s work that the political status of the individuals targeted by biopower remains somewhat ambiguous; to a certain extent, they retain some types of liberal democratic rights even as they are excluded. Power in Foucault’s model is a sophisticated force that works best when it finds ways to bend freedom against itself, such that the subject misrecognizes his or her disciplined condition as a form of liberation. Agamben would vigorously resist these suggestions. He would charge Foucault with failing to push the investigation of the “exception” to its proper limit. Agamben’s eccentric reading of Foucault is consistent with his ambitious objective, namely to establish a theory that lays bare the timeless structure of any possible form of Western governance. From a political theory perspective, it is nevertheless important to note that Agamben proposes a salutary challenge to the status quo. He is effectively insisting that we must reverse the analytical gaze of the social sciences: we must investigate the nature of sovereignty from the perspective of the “exception,” rather than the “mainstream,” policy of the State. It is “the politicization of bare life as such” that constitutes the “decisive event of modernity,” not the establishment of a liberal democracy dedicated to securing the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The opposition that is taken for granted between absolutism and democracy has always been a fragile one, and these two modes of governance are currently entering into a “real zone of indistinction.” Absolutism only appears to lie at the other end of the regime-type continuum at a maximal distance from democracy.[19] Once we pierce the ideological obfuscations that are thrown up by the State, we can grasp the fact that the absolutist assertion of sovereign power over bare life is secretly tied to the most humanitarian moments of liberal democratic State authority. Standing confidently—some would say arrogantly—on our Enlightenment inheritance, we westerners are enthralled by our own legitimation discourse, namely humanitarianism. We find it almost inconceivable, for example, that it is becoming increasingly difficult to draw the line between imperialist military campaigns and humanitarian aid projects.[20] Similarly, we, the American wealthy, like to tell ourselves that we have always been very generous—if not overly generous—toward the poor. It is, in fact, power that lies at the heart of poverty program design: its structures owe everything to the struggles between racial-capitalist and patriarchal forces that are deeply invested in the production of a docile low-wage workforce and in the promotion of the traditional heterosexual family, on the one side, and progressive forces like the poor people’s protests and the civil rights movement, on the other. Agamben’s ambitious deployment of transhistorical overview is quite suggestive; like Hortense Spillers’s concept of the American grammar book[21] (i.e., Spillers’s diagnosis of the underlying structure of gender and race hierarchies that remains constant in American culture from the colonial period to the present), his theory interrupts our complacent assumption that liberal democratic formations are somehow magically endowed with such a distinct orientation to the law, and such resilient and self-sustaining capacities, that we need not consider the possibility that they can harbor antidemocratic moments—such as slavery, imperialism, and eugenics—at their very core, or that they can descend quite quickly into various forms of absolutism. Agamben and Spillers help us to resist the lure of progressivism: the myth that the West is always moving forwards in its bid to achieve a just form of social cooperation. They show us how to grasp the continuities between the various moments of constitutive exclusion in the history of American identity, whether they involve the strategic production of the indigenous “savage” or that of the slave woman and the welfare mother. However, Agamben, unlike Spillers, moves at such a distance from historical specificities that he loses sight of institutionalized gendered dynamics. His objective is not only to thematize Western discourse on a metaphysical level, in the Derridean sense, but to establish a critical sociopolitical theory that can bring to light the fundamental character of Western governance that has purportedly endured, like a timeless essence, from Aristotle’s ancient Greece to post-9/11 American government. Like Spillers, Agamben underlines the fact that biopolitics constructs the national population in a racially essentialist manner. But he cannot detect the specificity of racial formations; he cannot help us to understand the ways in which the anti-Semitism of the Nazis resembles, but also deviates from, institutional racism in contemporary American society. Further, he completely fails to grasp the centrality of gender to the biopolitical project of producing bare life. For Agamben, the sovereign preserves for itself “the natural right to do anything to anyone.”[22] As the line between legitimate authority and the right of the sovereign in a state of exception to protect “the people” by producing bare life is increasingly blurred, we become unable to identify “any one clear figure of the sacred man.”[23] In effect, “we are all virtually homines sacri.”[24] “Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.”[25] The historical record, however, makes it crystal clear that it is the structurally disempowered who are most vulnerable to the exercise of arbitrary state power in the state of emergency. Women are placed in especially constrained positions by the modern State when it devotes itself to population management. In the context of positive eugenics, the “fittest” women of the racial nation are asked to serve as the wombs of “the people” through natalist propaganda and policies. Negative eugenics in turn promotes the exclusion of the “unfit” through selective immigration controls, sterilization, and the discouragement of child-rearing. Poor women typically bear the brunt of these policies. In some eugenic contexts, the “unfit” woman is offered partial redemption, but only insofar as she is rendered into a sterile worker, a prostitute, or a military servant.[26] The practical implications of Agamben’s failure to address the historically specific and stratified character of the State’s targeting (i.e., the fact that in the midst of an emergency, the State escalates its already established class, race, ethnic, and gender profiling instead of striking out in an unpredictable manner) are sobering. If we convinced ourselves that vulnerability is equally distributed, we would implicitly reinforce our already excessive tendency toward bourgeois self-regard.[27] We would also foreclose all radical attempts to hold the agents who actively participate in the establishment of eugenics policy, and those who benefit handsomely from its operation, collectively responsible.[28] Out of our bourgeois narcissism, we would refuse to face the Other and to receive the Other’s inscrutable and yet insistent demand.[29] Instead of facing the Other, we would merely fixate on the image of the Other’s suffering. We would derive compensation for our perceived vulnerability through our consumption of this image; it would become our fetish. We would congratulate ourselves for having the fortitude to commodify suffering, and we would act as if we could exhaust our moral obligation by doing so. Thus, we would forget that we had forgotten the Other and that we were keeping our backs turned against the Other’s face. Fetishism, however, is not solidarity. If any person can be rendered into bare life, then we should assume that Agamben’s absolute sovereign will strike in a random fashion, anywhere and everywhere at once. If absolutism is omnipresent, then virtually every form of political organizing is doomed to fail. Once again, Agamben’s argument risks the incitement of bourgeois self-regard and quietistic resignation. Agamben’s sensitization is one-sided—it raises our awareness of the fact that it is the interests of powerful elites, not charity, that structure poverty programs, but it allows us to avoid the inconvenient truth: the State remains a terrain of struggle, and it is our moral duty to contribute to the advance of social justice. Today’s welfare mothers are not strategically positioned in exactly the same way as the Nazis’ concentration camp inmates; nor are they subjected to totalistic domination like the slave woman or Carrie Buck.[30] They can, and they do, engage in political organizing; they have a few—albeit far too few—allies in civil society, Congress, state legislatures, and local governments; and they are exercising their right to self-determination against very steep odds.[31] To return to Agamben, what precisely is the relationship between human reproduction and governance? Introducing Aristotle’s distinction between the life of the citizen and bare life, Agamben deploys a distinctly liberal democratic topographic metaphor: “In the classical world . . . simple natural life is excluded from the polis in the strict sense, and remains confined—as merely reproductive life—to the sphere of the oikos, home.”[32] The concept of confining a particular social practice to a distinct spatial region, like a “sphere,” seems to be at odds with the ancients’ organicism. To be sure, Agamben refers in particular to Aristotle’s rejection of the argument that governing the polis amounted to nothing more than the continuation of the sort of governing required in the household on a grander scale. But Agamben’s introductory passage on Aristotle continues to muddy the water even further. At one moment he is referring to distinct “spheres” of governance—the political versus the reproductive—in which different types of leadership take different fields of human activity as their proper object. At the next, he discusses Aristotle’s hierarchy of moral ends: man is “born with regard to life, but exist[s] essentially with regard to the good life.”[33] In fact, the organicism that was proper to the ancients had a very specific character. The Greek citizen’s household was not a distinct “sphere” of human intersubjectivity in the modern sense; household relations had a great deal of bearing upon the good of the community and the ability of the polis to facilitate the pursuit of the good life. Ideally, the male citizen conducts himself ethically when he acts as the head of the household, for he enters into relations with other citizens from the most felicitous position when he does so, and the good of the polis depends upon the ethical performance of social roles in every nook and cranny of the citizens’ world. It is also best for the citizen to manage his economic affairs properly—that is, to achieve a subsistence standard of living and to generate the small surplus necessary for honoring virtuous friends with appropriate gifts. Ultimately, however, these domestic matters ought to be determined by a set of ethical principles that are unique; the guiding principles for household management cannot be derived from the ones that are proper to political deliberation. This is not because the household was located in a separate domestic sphere, however. In the ideal polis, the citizen rules and is ruled by other citizens in turn. In the household, the patriarch is directing subjects who allegedly do not meet the male citizen’s standard of rationality, namely women, children, and slaves. Even if the “good man” is the same as the “good citizen” in the ideal polis, the art of governing one’s peers remains distinct from that pertaining to the management of one’s dependents.[34] Let us assume, then, that the polis remains properly constituted, and that the household in question is headed by a male citizen. In that case, we certainly cannot construct the household as if it existed in a distinct sphere—it is not wholly apart from the polis, and it is not a special place within the polis that cannot be considered a proper object of public deliberation. The citizen has to adopt a different leadership posture when he applies himself to the task of heading the household, but that is not because the polis has no interest in regulating reproduction. He does so only because he must deal with his inferiors when he acts as the head of the household and manages his domestic affairs.[35] Agamben’s use of Aristotle to set up his broader argument could distract us from the fact that Aristotle actually wanted the legislator to take a deep interest in the management of human reproduction. In The Politics, for example, the discussion of constitutional types is juxtaposed with a substantial section in which a plan for the ideal city-state is sketched out, complete with advice on demographics, territorial considerations, the best division of labor, public planning, military preparation, and education.[36] At its foundation, the polis must seek to enhance the moral development of the citizen,[37] but educational institutions work best when they receive the best pupils. Reflecting the biological and medical thinking of his day, Aristotle lays out a model family law. Indeed, the topic is treated as if the text does not sense any particular need for extraordinary explanation; for Aristotle’s students,[38] this expansive view of the polis—which includes population management within the scope of legitimate governmental interests—was entirely unremarkable. The legislator in the ideal city-state naturally concerns [themselves] himself with the task of establishing the legal conditions that foster the best types of human reproduction. The polis’s interest in ensuring the reproduction of the best offspring is so extensive that it may quite properly establish rigid and narrow age requirements for marriage (around eighteen for women and thirty-seven for men).[39] The legislator is invited to consider a law that would require pregnant mothers to perform daily pilgrimages in order to enhance their physical fitness.[40] As for the treatment of the unfit child, The Politics states plainly that “there should certainly be a law to prevent the rearing of deformed children.”[41] The legislator is also counseled to establish the upper limit of children in the ideal family and to ensure that miscarriages are induced when a family has reached that limit. Of course, the liberal democratic idea of a right to privacy has no place in Aristotle's scheme. Men and women form intimate partnerships, not as an expression of their individual and autonomous wills, but to “render service to the state by bringing children into the world.”[42] Fascist organicism similarly seeks to extend the grip of the sovereign into every corner of the Reich such that the will of the Führer defines virtually every field of social activity, from the courts to the market, the church, and the family. Agamben quite rightly draws our attention to the integration of eugenics into fascist social policy. The National Socialists sought to secure the life of the people by preserving the Aryan racial stock from miscegenation and degeneration.[43] They adopted laws permitting the sterilization of those deemed to be carrying “hereditary disorders of the body or the mind.” They prohibited marriage for anyone who was institutionalized or who suffered from contagious disease, mental illness, or hereditary disease. Only those with Aryan blood were considered full citizens with the right to a passport, and Jews were not allowed to marry full citizens.[44] Agamben could have also pointed to the fact that these prohibitions were combined with positive eugenics strategies. The Aryan woman was charged with the duty of marrying an Aryan man, bearing children, and faithfully rearing the Reich’s future generation. Aryan women who bore more than four children received the Cross of Honor of the German mother. In Hermann Göring’s “Nine Commandments for the Workers’ Struggle,” German Aryan women were called to “take hold of the frying pan, dust pan and broom and marry a man.”[45] Taking inspiration from Agamben, and yet rejecting his metaphysical approach to governance, I would argue that contemporary social policy is an expression of neo-eugenics. Neo-eugenics is a special kind of biopolitics that resembles fascist organicism but is unique in several key respects. Eugenics is certainly alive and well in the United States today. Not only are publications like The Bell Curve that espouse a theory of biologically determined and racially differentiated intelligence received as mainstream texts, but we are also witnessing the training of a myriad of forces upon the poor that effectively discourage them from forming kinship groups and bearing and rearing children on their own terms.[46] The harsh character of poverty assistance policy, the gap between the living wage and the minimum wage, gender- and race-based discrimination, and the stratified nature of the labor market operate in tandem. Together, they guarantee that millions of American adults will never earn enough to support a family even when they do manage to find full-time and year-round jobs. The racial bias of the criminal justice system places a disproportionate number of black and Latino men and women in prison at precisely the moment in their life cycles in which nonincarcerated adults typically start building their families. American infant mortality rates are the worst for any developed country,[47] while HIV infection and AIDS continue to hit poor women of color particularly hard. Even if a poor black woman beats the odds and manages to bear and rear a healthy child and to provide him or her with an adequate diet, decent housing, a safe neighborhood, adequate childcare, and early education, she is still exposed to the inequitable child welfare system that threatens to cancel out her parental rights in an arbitrary manner.[48]

#### Welfare Surveillance transforms entitlements to government assistance into a privilege conferred onto the “deserving poor.” The conditions enforced by surveillance construct welfare recipients into subjects to be manipulated according to the cultural values that are calculated by governmental elites. The act of means and moral testing defines single-black mothers as outside of the body politic, justifying continued marginalization

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(Dorothy, “Welfare and the Problem of Black Citizenship,” <http://racism.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1256:welfare01-2&catid=56&Itemid=179&showall=1&limitstart>=)

The stratification of our welfare system that distributes benefits according to race and gender also differentiates between two classes of inhabitants -- citizens and subjects. Citizens receive welfare as an entitlement: Government has an obligation to support citizens as compensation for their social contribution or as a prerequisite to their full participation in political and economic life. For example, the government pays citizens Social Security benefits that are unencumbered by behavioral conditions, caseworker investigations, or social stigma. Subjects, on the other hand, receive inferior, inadequate, and stigmatizing relief at the government's discretion. Poor mothers who receive AFDC, for example, are considered unworthy of government assistance; their benefits, set below the poverty level, are conditioned on conformance to behavioral rules and submission to government inspection. This surveillance of welfare recipients' everyday lives is so contrary to the government's respect for citizens that it unmistakably marks these families as government subjects. Black organizers who agitated for relief entitlements during the Depression suggested that the investigation of applicants' morals was a violation of citizenship rights. One complained: "Your Administrators here in Baltimore take it upon themselves to inquire into the morals of the applicant. . . . The writer does not believe that the letter of the Relief law, or even its spirit gives the Administrators that authority. May I mention that in France, to hold a moral inquest upon the applicant for aid is forbidden by law." Given this connection between citizenship and entitlement to welfare, it is not surprising that current welfare reform proposals include the elimination of public assistance for undocumented immigrants. The critical difference between these two forms of welfare lies in their relation to individuals' autonomy. While welfare for citizens enables them to be self-ruling persons, welfare for subjects enables the government to rule them. Gordon makes this distinction in her defense of welfare entitlements: "Citizens have rights to which they are entitled by law, and losing this understanding endangers the republic. . . . Moreover, the feeling of entitlement is also vital to the republic. It is the attitude of citizenship, the essence of independence; without it we would have subjects, not citizens." The very relegation of subjects to inferior programs that supervise and humiliate them reinforces their lack of citizenship qualities while bolstering the virtues of the citizens who receive dignified entitlements. Citizens' compensation by social insurance makes them appear independent and self- sufficient; subjects' receipt of charity makes them appear dependent and irresponsible. Current welfare reform rhetoric condemns mothers who receive AFDC for transmitting a pathology of "welfare dependency" to their children. According to this view, reliance on this form of welfare reflects a lack of work ethic and leads to a myriad of social problems, including crime, unwed motherhood, and long-term poverty. Yet Americans do not view reliance on Social Security as "dependency" at all, despite the program's strong redistributive effects and the millions of nonworking wives and children who in fact depend on its benefits for subsistence. Gordon gives the following example of the downward-spiraling process that results from stigmatizing welfare recipients: The stigmas of "welfare" and of single motherhood intersect; hostility to the poor and hostility to deviant family forms reinforce each other. The resentment undercuts political support for the program, and benefits fall farther and farther behind inflation. The resulting immiseration makes poor single mothers even more needy and less politically attractive. The economic downturn of the last decade has deepened both the poverty and the resentment, and created the impression that we are experiencing a new, unprecedented, and primarily minority social problem. Thus, Black single mothers' inferior status in the welfare state has intensified their political and economic marginalization, making them even less worthy of citizenship rights. By casting their need for public assistance as "dependency," welfare reform rhetoric suggests that these women lack the independence required to be citizens, entitled to dignified government support. B. Welfare as a Waiver of Privacy One of the key differences between welfare extended to citizens and welfare extended to subjects is the degree to which each conditions its benefits on government intrusion into recipients' privacy. Public relief for single mothers is structured to permit bureaucratic supervision of clients in order to determine their eligibility based on both means and morals testing. Citizens avoid these impositions because they receive their benefits in the form of entitlements that are not subject to the discretion of caseworkers, supervisors, or administrators. Since welfare's inception, states have conditioned payments on mothers' compliance with standards of sexual and reproductive morality, such as "suitable home" or "man in the house" rules. More recently, welfare mothers have been required to undergo mandatory paternity proceedings involving state scrutiny of their intimate lives. Over the last three years, at least thirty states have applied for federal waivers allowing them to change their welfare programs to incorporate a form of behavior modification. Means testing and morals testing allow welfare bureaucrats to place recipients under surveillance to check for cheating or lapses in eligibility. Such testing also forces recipients to assume a submissive stance lest offended caseworkers cut them from the rolls. A Black domestic's experience with poor relief in the 1930s remains typical of welfare recipients today: "The investigators, they were like detectives, like I had committed a crime. . . . I had to tell them about my life, more than if I was on trial . . . the investigator searched my icebox . . . I was ashamed of my life . . . that's how you're made to feel when you're down and out like you're nothing better than a criminal." Privacy doctrine does not shield from state intrusion people who receive welfare as subjects; rather, their acceptance of government benefits constitutes a waiver of privacy. Because families are not entitled to government support, the Supreme Court has reasoned, the government may force them to open up for inspection, shrink, rearrange, or break up in order to qualify for benefits. Courts sometimes find egregious invasions of poor families' privacy to be unconstitutional, but most of the day-to-day decisions of family life remain vulnerable to legitimate state supervision. While poor single mothers (subjects) must endure government surveillance for their paltry benefits, "self-sufficient" traditional families (citizens) receive huge public subsidies -- Social Security, tax breaks, and government-backed mortgages -- without any loss of privacy. The Supreme Court invalidated early welfare eligibility requirements, such as AFDC's "man in the house" rule, designed to "legislate morality" of recipients. Other precedents, however, affirm the state's power to condition eligibility for benefits on conformity with majoritarian family norms. In Dandridge v. Williams, for example, the Court upheld Maryland's regulation that placed an absolute cap of $250 monthly per family, regardless of the family's size or financial need. The Court found that the state's interest in encouraging employment was a sufficiently rational reason to defeat recipients' equal protection challenge. The Court rejected the objection that some families had no employable member on the ground that "the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Nor do welfare recipients fare well under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which provides that the government may not condition the conferral of a benefit on the beneficiary's surrender of a constitutional right, although the government may choose not to provide the benefit altogether. The Court has avoided the unconstitutional conditions problem in cases involving public assistance to the poor by distinguishing between direct state interference with a protected activity and the state's mere refusal to subsidize a protected activity. The former, the Court concedes, raises a constitutional issue because it involves state action, whereas the latter is a constitutionally insignificant failure to act. For example, the Court refused to require the state or federal governments to pay the cost of abortion services for poor women, even though they pay for the expenses incident to childbirth, reasoning that "[a]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation." By regarding welfare benefits as an undeserved subsidy, the Court allows the state to treat recipients as subjects whose behavior may be modified to fit current social policy.

#### The poor are forced to submit to abusive surveillance.

Budd 2011 (Jordan, Professor of Law interim dean, “Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment”, <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1576&context=wmborj>, pg. 752-753 Last Access 07/18/15 )

In 1275, an English woman named Alice Crese failed to pay Richard of Ely for¶ two shillings’ worth of bread.2¶ Richard brought her before the Court of St. Ives Fair,¶ which ordered that she “pledge her body” for the debt.3¶ Seven centuries later, the poor¶ still face the prospect of pledging their bodies for the debt of bread. Legislatures across¶ the United States are considering scores of drug testing proposals that will require the¶ indigent to periodically submit to invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing condition¶ of public assistance.4¶ The majority of the proposals require no suspicion of¶ drug use whatsoever; they rest instead on the implicit notion that the poor are intrinsically¶ predisposed to immoral conduct and that, once indebted, their bodies are the¶ domain of the state in any event.5¶ Not surprisingly, the proposals face nearly insurmountable¶ difficulties under conventional Fourth Amendment authority. Perhaps more¶ surprisingly, there is great uncertainty whether the federal courts will accede to that authority and prohibit the proposed search practices, given a series of recent decisions¶ that have upheld related privacy intrusions in defiance of apparently controlling law.6¶ This Article explores these legislative developments and the constitutional context¶ within which they arise, and makes the case for using the impending battle to reclaim¶ for the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy right.

### Privacy

#### Invasion of privacy has become an exercise of everyday basis for welfare recipients.

**Gilman 2001(**Michele Estrin Gilman, Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore School of Law, “WELFARE, PRIVACY, AND FEMINISM”, pg 27, <http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.phpID=170124119105000025098127112012072077122024024079020086078020122005121115108105116081017021040022038009060124026101088114013030055090056092048095112100000100026111029086011066090097023072103085089114031103004082015111108004098067117000105121127070&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2> Last Access 7/22/15 L.T)

The welfare system strips poor women of privacy not simply as a necessary precondition for processing applications, but also to reinforce the subjugation of the poor.7 The government has historically sought to make public assistance so stingy and so unappealing that few will bother to apply.8 At the same time, public policy punishes women who do not fit the patriarchal norm of a married, two-parent family with a male breadwinner.9 Privacy invasions are a primary tactic for stigmatizing welfare and single motherhood.10

#### Welfare surveillance corrupts notions of privacy, stripping it from those without the means to pay.

**Gilman 2001(**Michele Estrin Gilman, Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore School of Law, “WELFARE, PRIVACY, AND FEMINISM”, pg 33-34 <http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=170124119105000025098127112012072077122024024079020086078020122005121115108105116081017021040022038009060124026101088114013030055090056092048095112100000100026111029086011066090097023072103085089114031103004082015111108004098067117000105121127070&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2> Last Access 7/22/15 L.T

Our most disadvantaged citizens have long had less privacy than¶ their wealthier counterparts. As a constitutional matter, the poor have¶ fewer protections under the Fourth Amendment, which protects¶ reasonable expectations of privacy from warrantless government¶ searches and seizures. People who live in crowded, urban neighborhoods and who cannot afford “a freestanding home, fences, [9and] lawns,” have a lowered expectation of privacy and are thus more likely to suffer unregulated intrusions by government agents.52 In addition to these class distinctions, welfare mothers bear the brunt of sexist and racist assumptions that underlie judicial decisions justifying state surveillance.

#### Specifically, welfare recipients are constantly subjected to warrantless drug tests.

Budd 2011 (Jordan, Professor of Law interim dean, “Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment”, <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1576&context=wmborj>, pg. 792 Last Access 07/18/15 LT)

In applying these principles, the Court has required that probable cause support the¶ extraction of blood from a drunk-driving suspect,333 barred suspicionless drug testing¶ of maternity patients for purposes of identifying child-abuse suspects,334 and prohibited¶ the extraction of a bullet from a suspect’s body even in the presence of probable cause,¶ given the gravity of the intrusion.335 Prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment,¶ the Court similarly restricted the search of a suspect’s stomach under the Due¶ Process Clause336 and more recently has underscored the significant liberty interest¶ implicated when the state seeks to forcibly inject medication into a nonconsenting¶ person’s body.337 As these cases intuitively confirm, “The integrity of an

individual’s¶ person is a cherished value of our society”338 and triggers “the greatest Fourth Amendment¶ protection.”

#### The government justifies surveillance of the poor through a psychologically damaging process of criminalization.

**Budd 2011** (Jordan, Professor of Law interim dean, “Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth Amendment”, <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1576&context=wmborj>, pg. 796-797 Last Access 07/18/15 LT)

A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court in an opinion¶ rooted in an entirely different, and frankly biased, set of analytic assumptions.379 The¶ opinion proceeds squarely in the tradition of the bifurcated Fourth Amendment and¶ offers arguments and rationales that are impossible to reconcile with conventional¶ authority.380 To make sense of the opinion, one must accept at the outset the premise¶ that the poor inhabit a different constitutional universe where their presumed culpability¶ justifies intrusions that are otherwise at odds with traditional doctrine. Throughout¶ the opinion, poverty is implicitly employed as a proxy for individualized suspicion as¶ the poor are cast as an inherently criminal, child-abusing, and drug addicted class.

#### Rejecting surveillance in favor of privacy is critical for both individuals and society.

**Macnish 1995** (Kevin, is a Teaching Fellow and Consultant in Applied Ethics at the University of Leeds. Kevin's research is in the ethics of surveillance, security and technology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.“Surveillance Ethics”.<http://www.iep.utm.edu/surv-eth/#H3>. Accessed 7/21/15)

One of the core arguments against **surveillance** is that it **poses a threat to privacy, which is of value to the individual and to society**. This raises a number of questions about privacy, what it is and to what extent and why it is valuable. Much of the early work on privacy was carried out in the legal realm, particularly in the United States. Warren and Brandeis’ The Right to Privacy (Warren and Brandeis 1890) is generally taken as the first attempt to define the concept of privacy. Here the authors claim that the right to privacy is an instance of the “right to be let alone” and establish limits to that right, arguing that it is not absolute. Developments in technology then gave rise to defining legal cases, such as Katz v. United States (1967) which related privacy and surveillance to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution (forbidding unreasonable search and seizure by the state). Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) then established that the right to privacy involved the right to make important choices without government intervention, drawing a connection between privacy and autonomy. This was drawn upon in Roe vs. Wade (1972) to argue for a woman’s rights in abortion. In the aftermath of these legal decisions the concept of privacy was increasingly debated by philosophers. Judith Jarvis Thomson (Thomson 1975) argued that the right to privacy consists of a cluster of rights which overlap with both property rights and rights of the person. She held that there are no privacy rights which do not overlap with clusters of other rights, and so there is no distinct right to privacy. A violation of someone’s right to privacy only occurs when one of these other rights has also been violated in a relevant manner. Hence the illicit viewing of another’s diary involves a breach of his right to dispose of his property as he sees fit; extracting information through torture involves a violation of someone’s right not to be injured. In both cases there is a violation of a person’s privacy, but this is only because other, more fundamental rights have been violated. Thomas Scanlon (Scanlon 1975) responded by arguing that Thomson’s analysis was convoluted and counter-intuitive. Instead he proposed that we have socially-defined zones of privacy which enable us to act with the assumption that we are not being monitored. These zones are motivated by our interest in not having to be alert to specific observation at all times. James Rachels (Rachels 1975), responding to both Thomson and Scanlon, argued that privacy was rather a matter of relationships. In defining our relationships with others, we use varying degrees of privacy to establish intimacy. With a stranger we uphold a high degree of privacy, whilst with a close family member we may have and expect much less privacy. Indeed, he argued, what it means to be a friend is for the relationship to involve less privacy than would otherwise be the case. More recently W.A. Parent (Parent 1983) argued that privacy involved the control of undocumented information about oneself. This has been contested by Jeffrey Reimann (Reiman 2004) and Tony Doyle (Doyle 2009), who hold that privacy is not restricted to information. A porn star whose body is freely available for all to see may still have his or her privacy violated if spied upon in his or her own home. Daniel Nathan (Nathan 1990) and Danah Boyd (Boyd 2010) agree with Parent that control is an important issue, while Herman Tavani and James Moor (Tavani and Moor 2001) hold that privacy relates more accurately to the access another has to me than to who controls the information about me. Despite the disagreements, most would agree that on an individual level,**privacy affords us the space to be ourselves and to define ourselves through giving us a degree of autonomy and protecting our dignit**y. **In our interactions with others we may define the intimacy of our relationships with them through the amount of privacy we relinquish in that relationship. As we engage with society at large we gain confidence and security from our privacy**, safe that those we do not know do not in turn know all about us. **We fear the stranger and what they might do if they knew our vulnerabilities.Through keeping those vulnerabilities private, we maintain a level of personal safety. Privacy is also of value to society at large.** As noted, **we may appear in public safe in the knowledge that our weaknesses are not on display for all to see, allowing for confident personal interaction.** When we vote we do so in the belief that no-one can see our decision and treat us well or poorly in the light of how we voted. **Privacy is thus** important in the social context of democracy. **In many cases we do not want to know everything about everyone around us and so privacy can protect the rest of us from being exposed to too much information**. **Thanks to a level of anonymity I may also feel emboldened to speak out publicly against corruption or injustice, or** simply to **be more creative in self-expression.** Many of these benefits can be seen through the contrast with states employing high levels of surveillance, such as the former German Democratic Republic. Here the surveillance carried out by the MinisteriumfürStaatssicherheit (Stasi) was instrumental in quashing open dissent and enforcing the behavioural uniformity foreseen by Orwell (Funder 2004). **There is also of a tension between the safety of the individual as granted by his or her privacy, and the safety of the community which comes from denying the individual his or her privacy.** On the most basic level, I feel safest if you know nothing about me but I know everything about you. This is reversed from your perspective, leading to the tension of balancing privacy against security. This balance suggests that it may be morally justifiable to deny one person’s privacy in the interests of the security of the community, although it is by no means always clear when these situations might arise.

#### Loss of dignity and vulnerabilities via surveillance causes dehumanization.

Burt 14(Alex, is a freelance writer: specializing in the expression of libertarian views and opinions. He discussed all things political, current events and especially-liberty. Old Dominion University. “The Loss of Individuality”.The Nolan Chart. <https://www.nolanchart.com/loss-individuality.Accessed>7/25/15.)

When people lose the all important feeling of individuality, they forget about their potential as a human being. They lose sight of their passions and fall short of realizing their true calling in life. This dismemberment of the individual and slicing of dreams is what is plaguing our society today. Somewhere along the line, we as individuals lost sight of what we are capable of achieving in life. The powers that be have made it a point to cut the individual down and make sure that we all adhere to a certain way of being. We have all been pushed down into a place where they want us. And that place is a strongly censored, chained-up prison. Sure, we think that we’re free, but to them, they have us right under their thumbs. They censor everything, from the media, and even from individuals who see past the charade. But do people really want to know the truth? I believe that there are those that do. But others are just as happy living in a comfortable fantasy land, where they believe everything is on the up and up. Those that are in power have made this fantasy land a very easy place to live in. Nothing is closer to, or farther away from freedom, than the illusion of freedom. And those in power have been very diligent about letting us know that we still live in a free country. That couldn’t be farther from the truth, and to me, it’s unacceptable. We live in a country that was founded on the importance of individual freedom, and as I write, these freedoms are being ripped away from right under our noses. Only, everyone is too busy dreaming in la-la land to notice this. And social media plays a big part in this distraction. They know that we are too busy updating our Facebook statuses, complaining about the cold weather, or checking to see how many “likes” we got on our latest “selfies.” But to me, this latest attraction to internet popularity is a prime example of people who are struggling to find their own individuality again. Sadly, social media does not help anyone acquire this, it only makes it harder to find. People are striving for individuality on these sites, but the opposite is happening. Everyone now thinks they can become popular based on looks or how well they compose a tweet.Attention has fallen upon the way someone presents their face and body, not on any special talent or skill. Look inside yourself for something that makes you unique and special. Everyone has that special something. And getting a record amount of “likes” on pictures of yourself is not it.This is the trap of false recognition that the majority of people have fallen in. Because in all honesty, becoming popular on the internet as a result of being vain, amounts to no more than a mountain of crap in the real world. Get out there and make something of yourself.Stand up for something you believe in, and you will gain the right kind of attention–attention that means something. You will be remembered as someone who pushed with full force to change the world, in some way, for the better. Not as someone who got a million “likes” on a “selfie.” And while we sit, not paying attention to what is happening in our country, those in power are stripping away everything that we now take for granted: our freedoms. So I implore everyone to set your phone down for a while, shut down Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, etc. and pay attention to what is being taken away from you. I promise you that when it’s gone, you won’t care about how many “likes” you got on your latest meaningless status, picture, or tweet.

#### Dehumanization outweighs death.

Piven 01( Jerry S. Ph.D. teaches in the Department of Humanites and Social Sciences, New School University.Henry W. Lawton is a Social Worker and is current President of the International Psychohistorical Association.“Psychological Undercurrents of History”.iUniverse. https://books.google.com/books/about/Psychological\_Undercurrents\_of\_History.html?id=jeEWHcgRk9MC accessed 7/25/15)

How we think about a disaster ("diagnosis") directs what we attempt to do in its aftermath ("treatment"). To label a catastrophic event a "trauma" or °crisis" is the beginning, not the end, of understanding. The words are not self-explanatory, but embedded, sometimes engulfed, in mostly unstated connotations and assumptions. An understanding of bombing occurs at the intersection of experience, memory, sense of history, sense of place, and of meaning. These emotionally "map" what kind of event the bombing was, how it was experienced, its impact on the community, how the community absorbed that terrible impact, and the nature of the adaptation to it. If there was a single explosion, there were multiple—often competing—accounts of the bombing. A recent formulation of Frank M. Ochberg.one of the early formula-tors of the controversial concept (Young 1995, 199510, the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, is especially apt with respect Co the complexity of understanding an event such as the Oklahoma City bombing: There is a considerable difference between the impact of human cruelty, a particular form of trauma, which I call, arbitrarily, "victimization," and natural or accidental events. Thegeneric term for any catastrophic encounter, including earth-quake, fire and flood, is, by contrast, °traumatization." When wedefined PTSD, we ignored this difference. PTSD was traumatization. But every "victimized" patient of mine complains less about "traumatization" than about "victimization." What are the symptoms of victimization? These include shame, self-blame, feeling lowered in dominance, disgust, paradoxical gratitude (the Stodcholm Syndrome), and other stigmata of encounters with evil (see Ochberg 1988). Victims of cruelty are not no terrified by death and destruction—they are dehumanized and belittled. Primo Levi used die expression "to be on the bottom" to explain how he and his fellow concentration camp victims were diminished. In some respects, dehumanization is worse than death. Death is biological. Dehumanization is spiritual.... ...We should attend to assaults on spirit, as opposed to assaults on flesh. We need, in my opinion, to explore the human response to cruelty, because forms of endurance and adaptation perpetuate cruelty. Silence may be merely diminished oxygenation of grey matter. Silence may be unexpressed shame. Silence may be the price of survival in a totalitarian state or a totalitarian family. (1997, 202-203)

#### Patriarchy The government specifically targets poor & minority women.

**Gilman 2001(**Michele Estrin Gilman, Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore School of Law, “WELFARE, PRIVACY, AND FEMINISM”, pg 26, <http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.phpID=170124119105000025098127112012072077122024024079020086078020122005121115108105116081017021040022038009060124026101088114013030055090056092048095112100000100026111029086011066090097023072103085089114031103004082015111108004098067117000105121127070&EXT=pdf&TYPE=2> Last Access 7/22/15 L.T*)*

As a historical matter, poor women have always had less privacy¶ than other women. To begin with, they often worked outside the¶ “sanctity” of the home, serving as a cheap form of labor.3¶ Further, the¶ government freely intruded into the homes of poor, single mothers,¶ often as a surrogate for the absent male.4¶ These intrusions continue¶ today. As a condition of receiving welfare benefits, poor women have¶ been subjected to drug tests, and they continue to face unannounced¶ home inspections by government officials, fingerprinting, and¶ restrictions on their reproductive choices. These formal welfare¶ requirements overlay routinized surveillance of poor women, who¶ must comply with extreme verification requirements to establish¶ eligibility, travel to scattered offices to procure needed approvals,¶ reappear in person at welfare offices at regular intervals to prove their¶ ongoing eligibility and answer intrusive questions about their child¶ rearing and intimate relationships. Thus, while many Americans are¶ uneasy about their privacy in a time of technological transformation,¶ the harms poor women face from privacy deprivations go far beyond¶ unease.5

#### UBI will benefit women

Jessic Flanigan, January 25, 2018, Slate, The Feminist Case for a Universal Basic Income, <https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/01/the-feminist-case-for-universal-basic-income.html> Jessica Flanigan is an assistant professor of leadership studies and philosophy, politics, economics, and law at the University of Richmond.

Proponents of the UBI would do well to acknowledge the gender implications of the policy, and feminists, in turn, should throw their support behind the movement.

Here are the top three reasons UBI is a feminist cause:

1. Women Are More Likely to Be Poor

Globally, women are more likely to live in extreme poverty than men. In the United States, women as a group are poorer than men due to the economic burdens associated with caregiving and the segregation of women into “pink-collar” industries that typically pay less than male-dominated industries. One of the main benefits of implementing a UBI in the U.S. and elsewhere is that giving people cash is a relatively direct and effective way to fight poverty.

The basic income is also a matter of economic justice for women as a whole. While capitalism has been beneficial to women on balance, the current system reflects historical patterns of female exclusion from labor markets and policies that denied property rights to women. For example, throughout the 19th century and into the 20th century, married women lacked legal protections for their property rights under the legal doctrine of coverture. And until the 1980s, husbands retained unilateral control over marital property in some jurisdictions. As I have argued elsewhere, a UBI would make capitalism more just by compensating those who live with the legacy of historical and enduring economic injustices.

And because a basic income would make the decision to work more voluntary, women would no longer choose to remain in toxic jobs solely because they can’t afford not to. In this way, a UBI could address gender-based mistreatment in workplaces. By freeing women of their economic dependence on employers, a UBI would also improve women’s bargaining positions, enabling them to negotiate for more flexible hours or better conditions.

But a UBI would not discourage work to an extent that would undermine the economy. People would still need to work to afford most consumer goods and luxuries. And unlike minimum wage requirements, touted by Fight for $15 activists, a UBI neither raises the cost of employing low-income workers relative to other workers nor disproportionately burdens employers to provide a decent standard of living for people in their communities. With an even starting ground, the opportunities to move beyond the lowest-paying work could be more readily available to marginalized workers who’ve been left out for too long.

2. Women Could Make Unfettered Decisions About How to Structure Their Families and Lives

Child care is extraordinarily expensive, and women, especially single moms, end up shouldering an enormous burden for this cost. Some parents who would prefer to work are unable to because they cannot afford quality child care for their kids. Women are more likely to leave the workforce for this reason than men. A UBI for mothers and children would enable women who want to work to pay for child care.

In addition, a UBI (including child benefits) would formally recognize and reward socially valuable labor that people currently perform outside of the paid economy, such as caregiving for children, disabled people, and elderly relatives. The UBI could amount to “wages for housework,” something feminists in the 1970s pushed for.

Furthermore, because a UBI aims to pay all individuals and not households, it allows people to make decisions about marriage and cohabitation based their intrinsic desires, not based on tax policies such as the “marriage penalty” that working couples currently face or means-tested welfare programs that withhold benefits from women when their household income increases after marriage.

A further benefit for families? With an added, guaranteed boost to their income, women in abusive relationships would have the financial security to leave, even if they lack qualifications or credentials that would enable them to support themselves and their families. UBI would do more than almost any other economic policy imaginable to make women less susceptible to abuse both in the workplace and at home.

3. Respect: Universal, Rather Than Targeted Assistance, Will Defy Stereotypes

Historically, feminists not only critiqued outright sexism but also the paternalism of efforts to protect women from the world by robbing them of their autonomy. Paternalism has long been used to justify policies that limit women’s and other marginalized people’s choices, like bans on abortion, or sex work, or women working in dangerous industries, on the grounds that they are incapable of deciding for themselves how to live their lives. Today, many social policies in the U.S. are influenced by extremely paternalistic thinking that perpetuates discriminatory stereotypes about women’s abilities to make informed and reasonable decisions for themselves.

Conservative complaints about welfare recipients spending benefits on junk food and luxuries have been part of a more general racialized narrative, which has informed existing welfare policy and also perpetuated offensive and stigmatizing stereotypes about members of marginalized groups, especially women of color. But liberals who support limiting the provision of benefits to housing, food, and health care are subject to the same charges of paternalism when they advocate for in-kind benefit policies (such as food transfers and food vouchers) that perpetuate a politics of suspicion and mistrust, instead of supporting cash benefit programs.

Most of the arguments against UBI also ring of paternalism. How could we trust that low-income women would use the money to do the things I’ve detailed here? Low-income people, like the rest of their fellow citizens, are generally the best judges of whether a profession or purchase is in their overall interest, and the evidence suggests that recipients of cash transfers generally spend their income on necessities. Trusting women and all people with the right to spend their money how they see fit, as UBI allows, would push back against decades of paternalistic social policy.

UBI activists still disagree about whether UBI is a right or a benefit, whether it should be provided in addition to or instead of other benefits, and about how large the UBI should be. But the core case in favor of the UBI—that it has the potential to significantly alleviate poverty and liberate all citizens from many of the injustices associated with the current economic order—is a case that all feminists should get behind.

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## Answers to: Shouldn’t Give to Everyone

#### Giving to everyone solves stigma problems and eliminates disincentives to work created by hitting certain targets

Tony Mecia is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard, February 2, 2018, The Case for Free Money, Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-case-for-free-money/article/2011427

With such high costs associated with a basic income program, it might seem logical to limit the payouts of money to those who need it. Why give $1,000 a month to Jeff Bezos, Warren Buffett, and millions of others who are thriving economically? Advocates insist that the idea works only if everybody receives the money. This is not charity. It is an equitable way to compensate everybody for being part of a wealthy society. And as a practical matter, it greatly simplifies the distribution of money, with no applications or income tests. It also removes any stigma attached to receiving government benefits and limits the disincentive to work that comes with benefits tied to income thresholds.

## Answers to: People Will Stop Working

#### Work efforts won’t decline

James Surowiecki is the author of “The Wisdom of Crowds” and writes about economics, business, and finance for the magazine, June 20, 2016, The Case for Free Money, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/20/why-dont-we-have-universal-basic-income

Critics of the U.B.I. argue that handing people cash, instead of targeted aid (like food stamps), means that much of the money will be wasted, and that a basic income will take away the incentive to work, lowering G.D.P. and giving us a nation of lazy, demoralized people. But the example of the many direct-cash-grant programs in the developing world suggests that, as the Columbia economist Chris Blattman puts it, “the poor do not waste grants.” As for the work question, most of the basic-income experiments suggest that the disincentive effect wouldn’t be large; in Manitoba, working hours for men dropped by just one per cent. It’s certainly true that the U.B.I. would make it easier for people to think twice about taking unrewarding jobs. But that’s a good consequence, not a bad one.

#### UBI improved the quality of life in Manitoba without reducing work rates

James Surowiecki is the author of “The Wisdom of Crowds” and writes about economics, business, and finance for the magazine, June 20, 2016, The Case for Free Money, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/20/why-dont-we-have-universal-basic-income

In the mid-nineteen-seventies, the Canadian province of Manitoba ran an unusual experiment: it started just handing out money to some of its citizens. The town of Dauphin, for instance, sent checks to thousands of residents every month, in order to guarantee that all of them received a basic income. The goal of the project, called Mincome, was to see what happened. Did people stop working? Did poor people spend foolishly and stay in poverty? But, after a Conservative government ended the project, in 1979, Mincome was buried. Decades later, Evelyn Forget, an economist at the University of Manitoba, dug up the numbers. And what she found was that life in Dauphin improved markedly. Hospitalization rates fell. More teen-agers stayed in school. And researchers who looked at Mincome’s impact on work rates discovered that they had barely dropped at all. The program had worked about as well as anyone could have hoped.

Mincome was a prototype of an idea that came to the fore in the sixties, and that is now popular again among economists and policy folks: a basic income guarantee. There are many versions of the idea, but the most interesting is what’s called a universal basic income: every year, every adult citizen in the U.S. would receive a stipend—ten thousand dollars is a number often mentioned. (Children would receive a smaller allowance.)

## Answers to: too expensive

#### UBI in practice has zero cost

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/10/finland-universal-basic-income-ubi-social-security> **Declan Gaffney 12/10/2015**

If this all sounds too good to be true, that’s because it is. To be clear, it needs to be said that some of the more obvious objections to UBI are misplaced. The argument that it is “too expensive”, for example, makes no sense given that UBI is a scheme of income redistribution where gains and losses across the population add up to zero. The same applies to the objection that UBI is politically impossible to deliver: a lot of policy proposals have been politically impossible right up to the time a government implemented them.

#### UBI can be paid for with a tax on AI

Tristan Green, November 2017, The Next Web, We could fund a universal basic income with the data we give away to Facebook and Google, https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/12/05/we-could-fund-a-universal-basic-income-with-the-data-we-give-away-to-facebook-and-google/

The solution that combines government oversight with a tax on AI companies — a UBI funded by the dividends of our data — may be the best option. To be blunt: we should make Google, Microsoft, Facebook and other such AI companies pay for it with a simple data tax. In the US we could levee a specific percentage of all advertising revenue leveraged from data extracted by algorithms, for example, to fund programs that provide a stipend for displaced workers or simply for the impoverished. Let’s be clear here: the vast majority of us haven’t the slightest clue as to the sheer jaw-dropping amount of data these companies already have on us. The reason Google and Facebook can get away with it is because we’re all willing to consider our data an even trade for the ability to use Search and Messenger for free. It’s not an even trade though, you need only view those companies’ value on the stock market to understand that. Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Amazon, and Apple are all on the short list of companies which will likely hit a trillion dollar valuation, and each that does will do so on the back of AI technology. Those outfits can afford to help subsidize the unemployment they’ll share the responsibility for causing.

## Libertarianism Answers

#### Public benefits enhance freedom

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, **p. 628-9**

Doing away with those would enhance freedom . But **many public services also enhance freedom . A public health service , for instance , can restore the ability to act freely to someone who falls ill or has an accident . Similarly , benefits and services for the disabled , and requirements for public amenities , help to create a society in which there is equal freedom for all** . For right libertarians , a basic income would be ideal ‘ if we scrap all existing welfare programmes ’ , 7 a delightful prospect in their eyes , partly because it would facilitate lower taxes . Typical of this position , in mid - 2016 , former New Mexico Governor Gary Johnson ( and erstwhile libertarian US presidential candidate ) came out in favour of a basic income , saying it would save ‘ bureaucratic costs ’ . 8 Proceeding on this rationale , right libertarians should see a trade - off between the level of basic income and the extent to which other welfare schemes should be scrapped . But a basic income could not replace schemes that seek to rectify or compensate for brute ill - luck or disadvantages that cannot be attributed to ‘ free choice ’ . **Someone with a disability cannot be blamed for their extra costs of living or needs . Needs - based supplements , in terms of monetary benefits or public services , should always be preserved** .

#### Broad economic and political support for a UBI, markets can’t solve inequality

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, **p. location 170-9**

The fourth wave could be said to have started in a quiet way with the establishment of the Basic Income European ( now Earth ) Network ( BIEN ) in 1986 . After attracting a steady stream of converts , the wave gathered real momentum in the wake of the financial crash of 2007 – 8 . Since **then a wide range of economists and commentators have come out in support of some variant or another of basic income** , often associated with fears of technological unemployment , growing inequality and high unemployment . Supporters in this fourth wave include : Nobel Prize winners James Buchanan , Herbert Simon , Angus Deaton , Christopher Pissarides and Joseph Stiglitz ; academics Tony Atkinson , Robert Skidelsky and Robert Reich , former Secretary of Labour under Bill Clinton ; prominent economic journalists Sam Brittan and Martin Wolf ; and leading figures in the BIEN movement , such as German sociologist Claus Offe and the Belgian philosopher Philippe van Parijs . Latterly , the idea has been taken up by Silicon Valley luminaries and venture capitalists , some putting up money for the cause , as we shall see . They include Robin Chase , co - founder of Zipcar , Sam Altman , head of the start - up incubator Y Combinator , Albert Wenger , a prominent venture capitalist , Chris Hughes , co - founder of Facebook , Elon Musk , founder of SolarCity , Tesla and SpaceX , Marc Benioff , CEO of Salesforce , Pierre Omidyar , founder of eBay , and Eric Schmidt , Executive Chairman of Alphabet , Google’s parent . Some people have rejected basic income on the rather crude reasoning that suppor from this quarter means it must be wrong ! **All that can be said at this stage is that the breadth of support , from across the political spectrum , from business executives to trade union leaders to social activists , and across all disciplines of the social sciences , promises a more robust movement than at any time in the past . The fourth wave has been spurred by the emergence of mass insecurity and rising inequality as well as by concerns about labour displacement by robotics , automation and artificial intelligence . Basic income now appears to be more deeply embedded in public debate** **, helped by the realization on the left that labourism has run its course , and on the right that chronic insecurity and inequality have made the market economy increasingly unstable and unsustainable .**

#### Basic income supports freedom, social justice, economic security. Most of modern wealth comes from past generations, not individual efforts

#### A basic income could be funded from rents on community resources

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, p. location 343-9

What is the ethical or philosophical justification for a basic income ? A **fundamental claim is that it is an instrument of social justice that reflects the intrinsically social or collective character of society’s wealth . In the writer’s view , social justice is the most important rationale for moving towards basic income as an economic right , although it is complementary to the other two major rationales , namely freedom and economic security** . Regrettably , much public debate on basic income has focused on it as an alternative form of social protection to existing policies , and therefore much of the discussion has been on so - called ‘ consequential ’ aspects , such as the alleged effect on labour and work . The authentic justification lies elsewhere , beginning with social justice . Social Inheritance – **Thomas Paine and Social Dividends The social justice perspective is linked to the intuitively reasonable claim that society’s wealth is collective in character ; our incomes and wealth today are due far more to the efforts and achievements of past generations than to anything we may do ourselves** . Consider the oft - quoted words by Thomas Paine in his ‘ Agrarian Justice ’ , written in the winter of 1795 and sent to the Directory of the French Republic in 1796 : It is a position not to be controverted that the earth , in its natural , uncultivated state was , and ever would have continued to be , the common property of the human race . . . it is the value of the improvement only , and not the earth itself , that is in individual property . **Every proprietor , therefore , of cultivated land , owes to the community a ground - rent** ( for I know of no better term to express the idea ) **for the land which he holds ; and it is from this ground - rent that the fund proposed in this plan is to issue .** 1 His plan derived from this reasoning was remarkably clear and radical , bearing in mind the social and political turmoil in France and the United States where he was writing . The proposal was : To create a National Fund , out of which there shall be paid to every person , when arrived at the age of twenty - one years , the sum of fifteen pounds sterling , as a compensation in part , for the loss of his or her natural inheritance , by the introduction of the system of landed property . And also , the sum of ten pounds per annum , during life , to every person now living , of the age of fifty years , and to all others as they shall arrive at that age . 2 Paine also recommended that ‘ the blind and lame ’ should receive regular payments on the same basis as the elderly . He cannot be faulted for specifying what was in effect a capital grant for others rather than a regular basic income , since the latter would have been impractical with the administrative structures of the time . And he went on to justify his call for universalism : It is proposed that the payments . . . be made to every person , rich or poor . It is best to make it so , to prevent invidious distinctions . It is also right it should be so , because it is in lieu of the natural inheritance , which , as a right , belongs to every man , over and above the property he may have created , or inherited from those who did . Such persons as do not choose to receive it can throw it into the common fund . 3 We can see in this the nucleus of the ‘ social dividend ’ approach to basic income . And in words that deserve to ring in the ears of all contemporary politicians and commentators , Paine went on a few pages later to state emphatically : ‘ It is not charity but a right , not bounty but justice , that I am pleading for . . . I care not how affluent some may be , provided that none be miserable in consequence of it . ’ **4 A basic income can thus be conceived as a social dividend paid from the collective wealth of society created and maintained by our ancestors and as a shared return on the commons and natural resources that belong to all** . This reasoning supports basic income as social justice rather than as a response to poverty per se , and contrasts with the system of entitlements based on direct contributions that was to emerge in social insurance schemes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries debate between ‘ right ’ and ‘ left ’ libertarians . Both are based on the argument that every individual has or should have self - ownership , and thus owes no duty of service to others , except through their own voluntary action . However , the two factions differ in their attitude to nature , ‘ natural resources ’ and ‘ property ’ . A right - wing perspective starts from the presumption that , to begin with , **nature , natural resources and land in particular , are owned by no one and can be privately appropriated by the first to claim them , without the prior consent of , or payment to , other members of society** . A left libertarian perspective starts from the premise that nature **Georg**e argued that land was the common inheritance of all , and all should share the rental income derived from it . **He proposed a land rent levy on all private land , with the surplus distributed directly to the public , claiming that this ‘ single tax ’ could replace all other taxes including those on labour and production . Many have since used his reasoning to call for a basic income paid from land taxes .** While George took a left libertarian view on the collective ownership of land , his approach has especially pleased right - wing libertarians because relying on a land tax rather than personal income and consumption taxes is consistent with their idea of freedom . **George recognized that vast wealth was derived from economic rents , not only from possession of land but also from ownership of other natural resources and of ‘ intellectual property ’ such as patents , which he opposed as illegitimate . Rental income from these other sources has exploded in recent decades** . 6 As discussed further in Chapter 7 , **extending George’s argument , a levy on all forms of rent could help finance a basic income .** In that context , **consider the extraordinary wealth , and cumulative income derived from it , of Microsoft’s Bill Gates , consistently one of the richest men in the world , who was worth over $ 80 billion at the end of 2016 . His personal technical contribution built on a stream of inventions and ideas of others , yet he has gained most of the income attributable to those inventions and ideas as well as his own . And that income in turn is based on the lengthy monopoly he enjoys on Microsoft software and other products , thanks to patent and copyright rules that were vastly strengthened globally by the World Trade Organization in 1995** . **He was** **thus helped to gain his fortune by state and international regulations , rather than by his individual endeavour alone . His income is based largely not on ‘ merit ’ or ‘ hard work ’ but on artificial rules privileging a particular way of gaining income** . **More often than not , individual wealth owes more to luck , laws and regulations , inheritance or fortunate timing than to individual brilliance . Leaving aside fortunes criminally obtained , many people have become rich through the commercial plunder of the commons that belong to all , and through rental income derived from the commercialization and privatization of public services and amenities . This is further justification for taxing rental income to give** **everybody a social dividend , a share of socially created wealth .**

#### People don’t “earn” all of the money they have

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, p. location 439

**4 A basic income can thus be conceived as a social dividend paid from the collective wealth of society created and maintained by our ancestors and as a shared return on the commons and natural resources that belong to all** . This reasoning supports basic income as social justice rather than as a response to poverty per se , and contrasts with the system of entitlements based on direct contributions that was to emerge in social insurance schemes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries debate between ‘ right ’ and ‘ left ’ libertarians . Both are based on the argument that every individual has or should have self - ownership , and thus owes no duty of service to others , except through their own voluntary action . However , the two factions differ in their attitude to nature , ‘ natural resources ’ and ‘ property ’ . A right - wing perspective starts from the presumption that , to begin with , **nature , natural resources and land in particular , are owned by no one and can be privately appropriated by the first to claim them , without the prior consent of , or payment to , other members of society** . A left libertarian perspective starts from the premise that nature **Georg**e argued that land was the common inheritance of all , and all should share the rental income derived from it . **He proposed a land rent levy on all private land , with the surplus distributed directly to the public , claiming that this ‘ single tax ’ could replace all other taxes including those on labour and production . Many have since used his reasoning to call for a basic income paid from land taxes .** While George took a left libertarian view on the collective ownership of land , his approach has especially pleased right - wing libertarians because relying on a land tax rather than personal income and consumption taxes is consistent with their idea of freedom . **George recognized that vast wealth was derived from economic rents , not only from possession of land but also from ownership of other natural resources and of ‘ intellectual property ’ such as patents , which he opposed as illegitimate . Rental income from these other sources has exploded in recent decades** . 6 As discussed further in Chapter 7 , **extending George’s argument , a levy on all forms of rent could help finance a basic income .** In that context , **consider the extraordinary wealth , and cumulative income derived from it , of Microsoft’s Bill Gates , consistently one of the richest men in the world , who was worth over $ 80 billion at the end of 2016 . His personal technical contribution built on a stream of inventions and ideas of others , yet he has gained most of the income attributable to those inventions and ideas as well as his own . And that income in turn is based on the lengthy monopoly he enjoys on Microsoft software and other products , thanks to patent and copyright rules that were vastly strengthened globally by the World Trade Organization in 1995** . **He was** **thus helped to gain his fortune by state and international regulations , rather than by his individual endeavour alone . His income is based largely not on ‘ merit ’ or ‘ hard work ’ but on artificial rules privileging a particular way of gaining income** . **More often than not , individual wealth owes more to luck , laws and regulations , inheritance or fortunate timing than to individual brilliance . Leaving aside fortunes criminally obtained , many people have become rich through the commercial plunder of the commons that belong to all , and through rental income derived from the commercialization and privatization of public services and amenities . This is further justification for taxing rental income to give** **everybody a social dividend , a share of socially created wealth .**

**People need basic resources and government regulation to be free**

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, location **p. location 703-5**

Robust republican freedom could be said to exist if everyone in society could avoid or escape from unwanted interference , and also from the rational fear of it . To be free , a person must be free of the will of others . If I fear rationally and reasonably that , were I to offend someone , my freedom would be lost , I am not free . By contrast with libertarianism , which sees all government as compromising freedom , republican freedom requires and depends on government . But it must be government that is democratically accountable and geared to the promotion of full freedom , defined primarily as the ability of the most vulnerable in society to avoid domination . **Republican freedom also requires government to ensure that the choices of the powerful cannot block others from making choices themselves . If everything is based on competition and ‘ competitiveness ’ , then automatically freedom is limited , because there must be losers , and lots of them . It is inconceivable to have a free society if it is based solely on rewards to individual competitiveness . To be free in the republican sense , people must have adequate resources enabling them to make reasonable choices , whatever the preferences and opinions of others . And full freedom requires that others are aware of this freedom and thus cannot look down on someone in pity or contempt . Freedom must mean neutrality towards individual decision making , not a carefully constructed , devious , non - transparent edifice of devices to induce norm - driven behaviour , however benevolent the intention . This clearly justifies a basic income , and combats the pernicious notion of the beggar , a ‘ stigmatized petitioner ’ .**

**Turn – plutocracy undermines freedom and we need to protect the dignity of association**

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, location **p. location 719-20**

**Part of the republican tradition** , associated with Hannah Arendt as well as Aristotle , **also embraces the idea of ‘ associational freedom ’ – the ability and opportunity to act in concert as a group . Associational freedom has been under relentless attack by the neo - liberal state** , for the simple reason that ‘ associations ’ can be portrayed as opposed to market forces and as distorting them . A republic is conceivable only if everybody is in the company of equally self - confident people free of existential fear . This is the position of Katja Kipping , a leading MP in the Die Linke political party in Germany . 14 **In the republican tradition , freedom is disclosed , or even discovered , in the togetherness of people deliberating and acting in concert .** ***This depends vitally on the dignity of possible involvement , the status of equals*** , which Alexis de Tocqueville so memorably depicted as the essence of early American democracy ( sadly lost now ) . For a classical liberal , freedom is essentially domestic in character . It is the liberty of the consumer , choosing between options , buying this rather than that , taking this job rather than that one , choosing this charismatic politician rather than the other . Republican freedom goes beyond this : we are free because we can act together , politically . **This is a good standpoint to combat the excesses of libertarianism** , particularly its modern variant of libertarian paternalism . 15 Both **republican and associational freedom have another dimension which has been given less attention . It is also necessary to curb the power and influence of the powerful . Freedom is jeopardized if a plutocracy or elite can shape public discourses and decisions by manipulative devices over which they have control , including the media** . **Whatever variant of freedom is espoused , a basic income would enhance it . However , in the liberal tradition a basic income would be both necessary and sufficient , if judged high enough to meet basic needs** . In the republican tradition , however , basic income would be necessary but not sufficient ; other institutions and policies would be needed properly to advance freedom . **A basic income would strengthen the following prosaic or day - to - day freedoms : — the freedom to refuse a job that is onerous , boring , low - paying or just nasty ; — the freedom to accept a job that is none of the above but which could not be accepted if financial necessity dictated ; — the freedom to stay in a job that pays less than previously or that has become** more financially insecure ; — the freedom to start a small - scale business venture , which is risky but potentially rewarding ; — the freedom to do care work for a relative or friend , or voluntary work in and for the community , that might not be feasible if financial necessity required long hours of paid labour ; — the freedom to do creative work and activities of all kinds ; — the freedom to risk learning new skills or competences ; — the freedom from bureaucratic interference , prying and coercion ; — the freedom to form relationships and perhaps set up ‘ home ’ with someone , often precluded today by financial insecurity ; — the freedom to leave a relationship that has turned sour or abusive ; — the freedom to have a child ; — the freedom to be lazy once in a while , a vital freedom to which we will return . Would alternative social policies do as well on any of these counts ? At the very least , a social protection policy should be neutral on behavioural freedom , not moralistic , directive , coercive or punitive . The drift to means - tested benefits around the world runs counter to any notion of freedom . A basic income would do the reverse .

**A UBI benefits the actual recipients**

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, location **p. 752-3**

Policy Principles for Freedom Two general principles should be applied to any social policy , especially those pitched as alternatives to an unconditional basic income . The first is : The Paternalism Test Principle . A social policy is unjust if it imposes controls on some groups that are not imposed on the most free groups in society . Policies that dictate what a person can do or that steer people to behave in certain ways rather than other ( legal ) ways clearly violate this principle . Many politicians who proclaim their belief in freedom nevertheless support policies that involve telling the ‘ poor ’ what they may or may not do . The rationalization of libertarian paternalism – undemocratically built into the modern structures of social policy – is that the deliberate steering or nudging of people to take certain options rather than others is ‘ for their own good ’ or in their best interests . This is amoral , since the ‘ nudgers ’ do not put their money where their proverbial mouth is . If they argue that a decision they steer people towards is for the best , then they and not the steered should take responsibility for the outcome if things do not work out . The recipients should be compensated by the state . That does not happen . The second general freedom and social justice principle is slightly more complex : **The Rights - not - Charity Principle . A social policy is just only if it advances the rights or freedom of the recipient or target person rather than the discretion or power of the provider . A basic income passes such a test , whereas any social benefit that requires actual or potential recipients to satisfy behavioural conditions does not .** **All the conditions for entitlement invented by politicians or civil servants are partly arbitrary , and most are capable of several interpretations** . Too often discretionary power is left to a local - level bureaucrat , and the needy person is left in no doubt that they are a ‘ supplicant ’ .

### United States Example

#### UBI would cost $1.5-$3.2 trillion

Futurism, no date, Universal Basic Income: The answer to Automation? https://futurism.com/images/universal-basic-income-answer-automation/

In a country like the United States, it would cost bout $3.2 trillion to distribute $10,000 UBI to all citizens. If you made exclusions for children, households earning more than $100,000, and retirees receiving Social Security, that number would fall to $1.5 trillion

#### Without ending other entitlement spending, it would cost $2.5 trillion per year

Tony Mecia is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard, February 2, 2018, The Case for Free Money, Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-case-for-free-money/article/2011427

And they don’t share Murray’s views of the corrosive nature of entitlements. In Raising the Floor, for instance, Andy Stern chides Murray for believing that replacing traditional welfare with an annual payment will cause people to take responsibility for their lives. “Murray seems to want to teach poor people a lesson,” he wrote. Yet Stern, former president of the country’s second-largest labor union, the Service Employees International Union, winds up sounding like a free-market economist: “Some people will choose to take more responsibility for their lives, and some will not, which to my mind is just fine, because that’s how people behave when they are allowed to choose freely.” Stern’s proposal is a basic income of $12,000 a year for everybody aged 18 to 64, plus seniors receiving less than $1,000 a month in Social Security. It would be paid for by a host of new taxes and by ending many antipoverty programs, but not Social Security. He estimates his plan would cost about $2.5 trillion a year (essentially doubling present entitlement spending).

#### UBI will cost 13% of US GDP

James Surowiecki is the author of “The Wisdom of Crowds” and writes about economics, business, and finance for the magazine, June 20, 2016, The Case for Free Money, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/20/why-dont-we-have-universal-basic-income

A basic income would not be cheap—depending on how the program was structured, it would likely cost at least twelve to thirteen per cent of G.D.P. And, given the state of American politics, that renders the U.B.I. politically impossible for the time being.

### Work DA

##### Income transfers that do not require work discourage work

Peter Cove is the author of Poor No More and the Founder of America Works and The Work First Foundation, January 8, 2018, City Journal, Poor No More: Against Universal Basic Income, https://www.city-journal.org/html/against-universal-basic-income-15636.html

The fatal flaw of the universal basic income is the same one that hampers most existing anti-poverty programs: a lack of emphasis on encouraging work. Instead, these programs have sought to provide directly whatever poor people happen to lack. The result has been more than 50 years of massive public outlays, with little benefit other than making recipients dependent on government. The ongoing rise in worker’s disability claims follows a long string of recent expansions of welfare programs, such as food stamps, housing assistance, and even free phones to boost the standard of living among poor citizens.

In the long run, this transfer-focused approach to welfare does more than create a disincentive to work. In his book The Welfare Trait, British neurobiologist Adam Perkins argues that dependence on welfare creates work-resistant personalities, which are often passed on from one generation to the next. As one review of Perkins’s work puts it, the welfare state “becomes a production line for damaged kids” and encourages parents in unemployed households to have more children than families led by breadwinners.

More and more men have become absorbed in an entrenched lifestyle of joblessness, with bleak consequences. Male joblessness exceeds 20 percent in six states—Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, and West Virginia—and the number of fatalities from drug overdoses is well above the national average in each. According to economist Allan Kreuger, 44 percent of men who have left the workforce use pain medication—the fastest-growing form of substance abuse in the nation today.

##### Work is the foundation of the social contract

The Economist 6-4-2016 (“Rethinking the welfare state: Basically flawed”, https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21699907-proponents-basic-income-underestimate-how-disruptive-it-would-be-basically-flawed

WORK is one of society’s most important institutions. It is the main mechanism through which spending power is allocated. It provides people with meaning, structure and identity. Yet work is a less generous, and less certain, provider of these benefits than it once was. Since 2000 economic growth across the rich world has failed to generate decent pay increases for most workers. Now there is growing fear of a more fundamental threat to the world of work: the possibility that new technologies, from machine learning to driverless cars, will cause havoc to employment. Such worries have revived interest in an old idea: the payment of a “universal basic income”, an unconditional government payment given to all citizens, as a supplement to or replacement for wages (see article). On June 5th Swiss citizens will decide in a referendum whether to require their government to adopt a basic income. Finland and the Netherlands are planning limited experiments in which some citizens are paid a monthly income of roughly €1,000 ($1,100). People from all points on the ideological spectrum, from trade unionists to libertarians, are supporters. It is an idea whose day may come. But not soon. The basic income is an answer to a problem that has not yet materialised. Worries that technological advance would mean the end of employment have, thus far, always proved misguided; as jobs on the farm were destroyed, work in the factory was created. Today’s angst over robots and artificial intelligence may well turn out to be another in a long line of such scares. A much-quoted study suggesting that 47% of today’s jobs could be automated in the next two decades looks too gloomy, for example (see article). Machines may one day be a match for many workers at most tasks. But that is not a reason to rush to adopt a basic income immediately. If the need for a basic income is unproven, the costs are certain. Its universality is designed to encourage citizens to think of the payment as a basic right. However, universality also means that the policy would be fantastically costly. An economy as rich as America’s could afford to pay citizens a basic income worth about $10,000 a year if it began collecting about as much tax as a share of GDP as Germany (35%, as opposed to the current 26%) and replaced all other welfare programmes (including Social Security, or pensions, but not including health care) with the basic-income payment. Such a big jump in the size of the state should make anyone wary. Even if levied efficiently, on an immovable asset like land, tax rises on this scale would have unpredictable effects on growth and wealth creation. Yet an income of $10,000 is still extremely low: it would leave many poorer people, such as those who rely on the state pension, worse off than they are now—at the same time as billionaires started getting more money from the state. A universal basic income would also destroy the conditionality on which modern welfare states are built. During an experiment with a basic-income-like programme in Manitoba, Canada, most people continued to work. But over time, the stigma against leaving the workforce would surely erode: large segments of society could drift into an alienated idleness. Tensions between those who continue to work and pay taxes and those opting out weaken the current system; under a basic income, they could rip the welfare state apart. Lastly, a basic income would make it almost impossible for countries to have open borders. The right to an income would encourage rich-world governments either to shut the doors to immigrants, or to create second-class citizenries without access to state support. Make no mistake: modern welfare states leave plenty to be desired. Disability benefits are for many people an unsatisfactory version of a basic income, providing those who will no longer work with enough to get by. But rather than upend society with radical welfare reforms premised on a job-killing technological revolution that has not yet happened, governments should make better use of the tools they already have. Labour-market reforms—to crack down on occupational licensing, say—would boost employment growth. More generous wage subsidies, such as an earned-income tax credit, would help people stay out of poverty. Long-overdue public investment in infrastructure would foster demand. Relaxing planning restrictions would create jobs in construction, and homes for workers in places with robust economies. A universal basic income might just make sense in a world of technological upheaval. But before governments begin planning for a world without work, they should strive to make today’s system function better. Actually, we do have a choice — one that goes far beyond safety-net details to reach the very heart of state and society. A UBI would pose severe practical challenges, which will be discussed later in this article. But even if it could work, it should be rejected on principle. A UBI would redefine the relationship between individuals, families, communities, and the state by giving government the role of provider. It would make work optional and render self-reliance moot. An underclass dependent on government handouts would no longer be one of society’s greatest challenges but instead would be recast as one of its proudest achievements.

##### This erosion of the traditional social contract creates marginalization and dependence

Sandra Kilhof 2014 (“Why unconditional basic income is no more than a socialist fairytale”, The New Economy, https://www.theneweconomy.com/strategy/why-unconditional-basic-income-is-no-more-than-a-socialist-fairytale)

Now, while the economic feasibility of basic income already provides significant fodder for debate, there are also arguments related to the social contract that UBI implies. In order for basic income to work, people must live up to the social contract that implies they earn the basic income through work, but two Danish academics studying the implementation of basic income in Denmark have found such contracts may not be fulfilled. “One of the prominent standard arguments in the Danish debate against basic income is that it is simply morally wrong to allow able-bodied people to live on public transfers without doing anything in return,” explain Erik Christensen and Jørn Loftager in their report Ups and Downs of Basic Income in Denmark. Christensen and Loftager also argue basic income could work to keep individuals away from the labour market. “The worry is that basic income would contribute to existing marginalisation forces within society, and create a dependency upon the state that could detract from the individual autonomy of people receiving the money,” they said. An unconditional basic income discourages career progression and innovation, could potentially have detrimental economic effects and relies on a non-binding social contract. This leaves many questions unanswered on the possible effects of UBI, suggesting a basic income is not so much a solution to all our problems, but a utopian nightmare we’d do best to wake up from soon.

## Progressive Taxes Bad

### Progressive Taxes Hurt The Economy

#### Progressive taxes are economically destructive – they crush productivity and entrepreneurship

David Marotta 12, president of Marotta Wealth Management, "A Progressive Tax Code is Economically Destructive," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmarotta/2012/09/10/a-progressive-tax-code-is-economically-destructive/#d1f30b65fb3d

Most Americans assume a progressive tax code is needed to promote equality and remove some of the burden of other taxes on those with the lowest income. But the progressive nature of the tax code changes behavior in many ways. As a result a progressive tax code is economically destructive. To start with an obvious example, let's assume the tax rates on a business start at 10% and after a certain point reach 100%. How much money would be collected at the 100% rate? The answer, of course, is zero. No business would bother earning more money only to be obligated to give it all to the government. Many statistics would hide this change of behavior. The average tax rate on businesses would seem a low 10%. But decisions are not made at the average. They are made at the marginal rate. When your hand first touches a hot stove, your average body temperature is still normal. Nevertheless you recoil quickly. Increasing marginal rates are like a hot stove to additional productivity. Businesses are like rich people. They can decide how much income they want to realize each year. Capping the income of otherwise productive companies is economically destructive. Not only does it restrict productivity and the creation of wealth, but it also limits employment and taxes paid. Imagine there is a proposal for a flat 20% tax. Liberals rage that would mean doubling the tax on the poor businesses while giving Big Greed an 80% tax cut. But what is the effect? Businesses that would have truncated their earnings no longer hold back. Productivity jumps and unemployment drops. All this while the tax collected could more than double. A Progressive Tax Code is Economically Destructive Now that an obvious case has established the concept, let's look at smaller tax progressions. Remember that all economic decisions are made at the margin. There has to be a decision, and we have to look at the marginal tax change. One such decision is how much money you should convert from a traditional IRA to a Roth IRA each year. The more you convert in one year, the higher the tax bracket you get pushed into. Waiting until next year to convert the money is always an option, especially because you can decide to unconvert, or recharacterize, the money any time before you file your taxes. Getting pushed into a higher tax bracket sets up a hurdle that the conversion account must appreciate before keeping the conversion makes financial sense. Some of the hurdles are extremely high, even at very low incomes. Suppose you earn less than $17,400 and are in the lowest tax bracket of 10%. If you convert $100 from a traditional IRA to a Roth IRA, you will owe $10 more in federal tax. But if another $100 pushes you into the 15% tax bracket, you would owe $15 in tax. If you could wait until next year to convert at the 10% rate again, when would it be advantageous to convert this year even if it pushes you into the 15% bracket? In other words, what is the hurdle of added productivity you must surpass to overcome this minor increase in the marginal tax rate? It turns out the hurdle is a 50% annual return on your money. Unless your $100 grows to $150, you would pay less tax waiting until next year and converting at the lower rate. Ten percent of $150 next year is equivalent to 15% of $100 this year. Those who favor a progressive tax system do not realize that a small increment of 10% to 15% can truncate any decision to be more productive unless you have a good chance of earning more than 50% over the next year. If you think the poor can't or don't make such decisions, you are mostly wrong. The poor fear dropping off entitlement cliffs more than they do hitting the wall of higher taxes. And a vague perception of the effects causes most to err on the side of avoiding paying taxes or jeopardizing their benefits. There are places where it can cost you multiple dollars of benefit for every additional dollar you earn. The middle class and wealthy have even more discretion over the timing and amount of their income. We encountered such a case recently: clients with a base income of about $69,000 for whom we were considering a Roth conversion. Our federal Roth calculator computed they should convert up to the top of the 28% tax bracket, an additional $143,000 so long as their Roth account had not lost money. This would have resulted in the federal government receiving an additional $38,000 in tax revenue. The hitch was that these clients live in California. Virginia state taxes reach their maximum after only $17,000 of income. Beyond that point the rate is a flat 5.75%. But California tax rates are highly progressive, with rates from 1% all the way up to 10.3% for income over $1 million. In our clients' case, realizing this additional income would push them from the 6% state bracket to 9.3%. The hurdle for this marginal tax increase is a 55% annual return. A hundred dollars taxed at 9.3% this year is equivalent to $155 taxed at 6% next year. The effect is that neither the federal government nor California will be collecting that additional tax this year or ever. A progressive tax code discourages productivity, actually rewarding you for producing less. This system destroys much growth in the economy that would flourish otherwise. Purposefully doing this simply so the rich have less is evil, and it hurts society as a whole. Listen in political debates when the term "rich" is used with emotions that make it almost an economic slur. Our current system is complex enough to create many entitlement cliffs and marginal tax walls throughout the income spectrum. Tax simplification would eliminate many of these barriers to economic mobility and encourage greater productivity across the board. And one of these changes is a flatter tax and fewer deductions.

#### Impact is multiple hotspots

**Lieberthal 12**, Brookings John L. Thornton China Center director (Kenneth, “The Real National Security Threat: America's Debt”, 7-10, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/07/10-economy-foreign-policy-lieberthal-ohanlon)

Alas, globalization and automation trends of the last generation have increasingly called the American dream into question for the working classes. Another decade of underinvestment in what is required to remedy this situation will make an isolationist or populist president far more likely because much of the country will question whether an internationalist role makes sense for America — especially if it costs us well over half a trillion dollars in defense spending annually yet seems correlated with more job losses. Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purport 7ed decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of [and] nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

#### And – no offense – progressive taxes cause high earners to flee – no chance of a sustainable revenue source

Antony Davies 14, associate professor of economics at Duquesne University, “Progressive taxation's mischief”, http://triblive.com/opinion/featuredcommentary/7052115-74/tax-progressive-pay

Unfortunately, progressive taxes are political gold for politicians. Initially, a progressive income tax will generate more tax revenue. But this is only because it takes people time to respond. As successful entrepreneurs wise up and leave for more hospitable climes, our tax revenues will decline, and politicians will then have to lean even more heavily on the remaining rich, accelerating the entrepreneurial exodus. Of course, by the time this happens, today's political candidates will have moved on, leaving the fiscal and economic mess for someone else to clean up.

## Makes Economy less productive

### UBI Funds less productive people and enterprises

#### UBI punishes the creation of real wealth and value in order to subsidize less productive activities

Tyler Durden 2017 (“The Dangers Of A "Universal Basic Income", http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-01-17/dangers-universal-basic-income)

Where UBI Proponents Go Wrong A universal basic income is not the god-sent welfare policy that it initially seems to be. It does not create incentive to work. It won’t help solve unemployment, and it will not alleviate poverty. The truth is that a UBI will exaggerate all of these factors in comparison to what would exist in a more unhampered market. There is even reason to think that it would be worse in the long run than traditional, means-tested welfare systems. First, UBI does not eliminate the disincentives to work that are inherent in welfare programs; it simply moves them around. This program must be financed after all, and any welfare system, including the UBI, is necessarily a wealth redistribution scheme. Wealth must be forced from those who have it to those who do not. This means that at some point on the income ladder, people must go from being net receivers of benefits to being net payers of benefits. The progressive taxation that is necessary to finance a UBI means that the more a person earns, the higher percentage of their wealth will be taken from them. The work disincentives are therefore still very much present in the tax system. They’ve simply been transferred onto different, higher income groups of people. The universal basic income shares another problem with traditional welfare systems. Far from promoting the unemployed from searching for work the market rewards, it actually subsidizes non-productive activities. The struggling entrepreneurs and artists mentioned earlier are struggling for a reason. For whatever reason, the market has deemed the goods they are providing to be insufficiently valuable. Their work simply isn’t productive according to those who would potentially consume the goods or services in question. In a functioning marketplace, producers of goods the consumers don't want would quickly have to abandon such endeavors and focus their efforts into productive areas of the economy. The universal basic income, however, allows them to continue their less-valued endeavors with the money of those who have actually produced value, which gets to the ultimate problem of all government welfare programs. In the marketplace, wealth is earned by generating value. When someone buys a good, they’ve earned the money they are spending by having produced something else. This is not so with welfare programs like a universal basic income. Money is forcibly taken from those who have produced enough to earn it, and given to those who haven’t. This allows for people who aren’t producing wealth to continue to consume scarce goods. Eventually, all government welfare leads to the consumption of wealth, or, at the very least, a reduction in the amount of wealth that would have been accumulated otherwise. When entrepreneurs have less need to respond to the needs and desires of their customers, consumers will find themselves with fewer choices and with lower-quality choices. This means that overall welfare makes everyone poorer than they would have been in a free market.

#### These perverse incentives and negative externalities mean that UBI simply magnifies the problems with welfare

Vanessa Brown Calder 2017 (Policy analyst at the Cato Institute, “Universal Basic Income — Disease or Cure?”, https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/universal-basic-income-disease-or-cure)

Although UBI is a departure from traditional welfare, the idea isn’t truly devoid of welfare’s pitfalls. On some fronts, UBI seems not only unable to avoid traditional welfare’s problems, but also likely to exacerbate them. Many of the utopian qualities that recommend UBI to its supporters are strained in the real world. To begin with, the numbers for UBI don’t seem very feasible — at least not without large tax increases. According to Michael Tanner’s calculations, if the government provided just $12,316 for every individual in the United States, or enough to bring them to the non-elderly federal poverty line, the cost of UBI in the U.S. would be nearly $4.4 trillion, more than the entire U.S. federal budget. In his paper on the topic, he notes that “even if the guaranteed national income replaced every existing anti-poverty program, we would still be some $3.4 trillion short.” In order to make ends meet in this scenario, the tax liabilities of high-income individuals would likely be substantially impacted. The practical realities of budget constraints inevitably lead advocates — at least in the real world — to consider whether to limit the eligible population to strictly low-income individuals. However, this leaves UBI looking a lot less “universal” and a lot more like your average cash transfer welfare program, which fell out of favor in the U.S. in the 1990s. Outside of the cost of the program, providing every U.S. citizen with a cash grant is likely to have a large and negative behavioral effect. Economists agree that welfare programs create labor supply disincentives, meaning that individuals reduce work because of government benefits. As the Congressional Research Service has noted, an “increase in [the value of welfare benefits] is expected to cause people to reduce work hours.” While this is true of all welfare programs, only around 1/5th of the current U.S. population is currently impacted. If UBI were instituted, labor supply disincentives would touch 100 percent of the population, rather than a subgroup of eligible applicants. Finally, whether UBI’s promised transparency/efficiency would actually materialize is an open question. The ability to deconstruct programs which benefit legions of special interest groups seems dubious at best. In place of that, the ability to amend the U.S. constitution to direct all redistributive spending through a UBI system, as Charles Murray suggests, seems ever more unattainable.

#### Increasing taxes to fund a basic income is inconsistent with libertarianism

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, location p. location 694

Some other libertarians object to a basic income on the grounds that , to be at a level high enough to replace all welfare schemes , provide for a person’s most basic needs and protect the freedom of the vulnerable , it would have to involve much higher taxes , which , in their view , would infringe the freedom of taxpaying citizens . In arguing for what he called a ‘ consequential ’ libertarian case for basic income , Zwolinski recognized this trade - off : ‘ The idea is that a basic income can help protect the freedom of certain vulnerable people . But I recognize that a basic income that’s large and broad enough to do that might have to be funded by taxes that violate the freedom of others . So we are trading off freedom for freedom . ’ 10 Although this line of reasoning can be rebutted in various ways , the simplest retort is that unless the state protects the basi freedoms of its most vulnerable members , they will be inclined to hit back by violating the freedoms of those intensifying their vulnerability . If libertarians succeeded in creating such a minimalist social state that the vulnerable were left bereft of hope , they should not be surprised if the resentment led to some retributive justice .

#### Adding basic income to the welfare state is inconsistent with libertarianism

**Guy Standing, August 2017,** Professorial Research Associate at SOAS University of London and a founder member and honorary co-president of the Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN), Basic Income: A Guide for the Open-Minded, location p. 629

Another avowed libertarian , Matt Zwolinski , advocating what he called a basic income guarantee ( BIG ) , noted that US federal welfare programmes cost over $ 668 billion annually , spread over at least 126 programmes . To that must be added state and local welfare spending of $ 284 billion , totalling almost $ 1 trillion every year or over $ 20,000 for every poor person . 9 Meanwhile , benefit phase - out rules , varying from programme to programme , implied high marginal tax rates for those trying to move from benefits to low - paying jobs . Zwolinski asserted , ‘ **No libertarian would wish for a BIG as an addition to the currently existing welfare state** .  **This** is probably unfair to left libertarians , but **captures the essence of the right libertarian position** , ***that basic income would be a freedom - enhancing alternative to the intrusive government - driven welfare state .***

## Inequality Isn’t Bad

#### Inequality doesn’t impact consumer demand in developed countries—their studies are based on developing countries

Scott Winship 13, fellow in economic studies at the Brookings Institution., Spring, "Overstating the Costs of Inequality," Natioanl Affairs, https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/overstating-the-costs-of-inequality

Inequality has been accused of having all of these effects. But does it in fact reduce growth? There is no clear evidence that it does. In a long paper purporting to show how inequality reduces economic growth, Heather Boushey and Adam Hersh of the Center for American Progress concede early on that the literature that directly examines this question is inconclusive and largely inapplicable to America's circumstances: There is, of course, a rich literature on the relationship between inequality and growth....Although there are many conflicting views, there is ample evidence that inequality can, in fact, hurt growth under many circumstances. But this literature focuses mostly on the experience of developing countries, and its applicability to the challenges currently facing the United States is not entirely clear. Indeed, one of the most widely cited papers in the inequality debates — a 2011 study by IMF economists Andrew Berg and Jonathan Ostry showing that inequality hurts growth — suffers from this very problem of focusing primarily on developing countries. Even putting aside the applicability of these studies, Boushey and Hersh conclude from their review that, "Ultimately, data and methodological issues mean that analyses are too imprecise to deliver definitive answers to this old and central question in economics research." But the problem is not simply that evidence of inequality's alleged harm to growth is inconclusive or imprecise. There is also significant evidence to the contrary, which throws the left's conclusions about inequality into doubt. Recent work by Harvard's Christopher Jencks (with Dan Andrews and Andrew Leigh) shows that, over the course of the 20th century, within the United States and across developed countries, there was no relationship between changes in inequality and economic growth. In fact, between 1960 and 2000, rising inequality coincided with higher growth across these countries. In forthcoming work, University of Arizona sociologist Lane Kenworthy also finds that, since 1979, higher growth in the share of income held by the top 1% of earners has been associated with stronger economic growth across several countries. If there is scant evidence of a link between inequality and poor economic growth, what of the link between growing inequality and stagnating wages? The belief that such a connection exists is, after all, at the core of the left's nostalgia for the golden age that followed World War II, when the economy boomed and distributed its benefits broadly across the American population. New Republic senior editor Timothy Noah spoke for many on the left when he wrote in his recent book The Great Divergence that "there probably was no better time to hold membership in America's middle class" than the 1950s and '60s. This widely held view is a function of muddling the difference between people's well-being and the rate at which that well-being improves. The fact is that the median family today has nearly twice the purchasing power of its counterpart in 1960. The basic well-being of today's family is significantly better than that of a family living in the supposed golden age. The issue is that this modern family's income is growing more slowly than that of its 1960 counterpart, while the incomes of Americans at the top of the income scale are growing far faster. For Noah and others, it could not be more obvious that the latter development accounts for the former — that inequality is holding back middle-class income growth. In this view, even if the middle class is not actually worse off than it used to be, it is being hurt by the growing fortunes of society's richest.

Lewis Milford et al 14, president of Clean Energy Group and a nonresident senior fellow at the Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings, “Clean Energy Finance Through the Bond Market: A New Option for Progress”, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/cleanenergyfunds-1.pdf

The financing of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects to reduce carbon emissions and grow the American economy has not gotten easier. The massive infusion of clean energy investments embedded in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 has almost entirely wound down.2 Additionally, commercial bank lending for clean energy projects is down, and many American banks have opted out of loans with long repayment schedules and for smaller renewable energy projects.3 The clean energy sector’s ability to secure either equity or debt financing for projects has also ebbed following the Great Recession.4 As a result, the sector’s growth has been tied to the vagaries of on again-off again federal incentives like the production tax credit and investment tax credit, as well as the market fortunes of a limited set of 15 to 20 tax equity investors, primarily financial institutions such as Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, U.S. Bank, Wells Fargo and Citi.5 Observes Richard Kauffman, former senior advisor to the U.S. energy secretary and now the energy and finance chairman for the state of New York: Projects in the [United States] rely upon an old fashioned and anachronistic form of financing that is different than how other parts of the U.S. economy are financed. Rather than use bond or stock markets, projects depend on non-capital market sources of so called tax equity, bank debt, and private equity where rates of return can approach typical private equity rates of return of 12–15 percent. [New strategies]… don’t require going to the lab; they involve applying financing techniques that have already been invented and are used widely in other parts of the economy, but have not yet been applied to this sector.6 The implication: Either with or without federal support, different types of financing are going to be required to scale up the clean energy industry as it weathers a period of inconsistent policy support, insufficient tax equity approaches, and the challenges posed by low natural gas prices. All of which raises the critical question: Given that billions of dollars are needed in clean energy investment, how will clean energy development across the nation be financed in a period of federal paralysis? Fortunately, part of the answer may be hiding in plain sight—in the realm of the state and local agencies that have used conventional public finance for years to fund the nation’s non-energy infrastructure.7 For more than a decade states and regions have been experimenting with a series of creative clean energy financing strategies. State clean energy funds (CEFs), for example, have been a critical source of much-needed public capital driving market growth and leading to the creation of a vibrant clean energy sector in the country. Since 1998, state CEFs have invested over $3.4 billion in state dollars to support renewable energy markets while leveraging another $12.5 billion in federal and private sector investment. And now, some of these funds have begun to experiment with a smarter industry development focus as opposed to simple project development.8 Similarly, several states are working to create so-called “green” banks.9 State green banks leverage limited public-sector funds with private-sector capital to provide low-cost and long-term loans to clean energy projects. First created in Connecticut, New York followed suit in 2013 with the launch of an ambitious $1 billion green bank while a few other states like California, Maryland, and Washington are considering it.10 And now, the next step in this progression appears to be bond financing. Bond finance holds tremendous potential for future clean energy investment, perhaps at levels in the tens of billions of dollars in the next several years.11 Bonds, as the bedrock of infrastructure finance, have long funded the nation’s bridges, roads, airports, public libraries, hospitals, and university expansions. Using bonds in new ways, states and regions can lead the way in a new era of clean energy finance that reduces the cost of capital and financial risk. Development finance agencies—encompassing over 50,000 state, county, and municipal agencies and authorities—will be key players. These entities have successfully leveraged private investment to deploy new technologies and public improvements for decades. They have helped support and finance economic development using a variety of tools including tax-exempt and taxable bonds, credit enhancement programs, and direct debt and equity investments. The $3 trillion tax-exempt bond market has alone financed three-quarters of U.S. infrastructure, including 4 million miles of roadways, 500,000 bridges, 1,000 mass transit systems, 16,000 airports, 25,000 miles of intercoastal waterways, 70,000 dams, 900,000 miles of pipe in water systems, and 15,000 waste water treatment plants.12 Already, development finance through the issuance of bonds has started to bring new capital into the clean energy sector.13 The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) has raised $24.3 million in its first ever issuance of revenue bonds that will be used to finance loans to make energy efficiency improvements.14 For its part, Hawaii earlier this year enacted legislation allowing it to issue green infrastructure bonds—backed in part by a utility surcharge—that will provide low-cost financing for clean energy generation projects like solar and for energy efficiency upgrades to buildings. The bond proceeds will be used to fund an on-bill program being developed by the Hawaii Public Utilities Commission. And the so-called “Morris Model,” operating in Morris County, New Jersey since 2009, has been financing solar installations in public facilities through a unique combination of low-interest bonds and power purchase agreements (PPAs).15 Elsewhere entities in Delaware and Ohio have issued their own bonds for energy purposes.16 This growing number of state and regional finance innovations suggests that the financing of clean energy projects via capital raised through public markets (public capital) offers the potential to substantially increase the availability, and lower the cost, of investment that is critical to continued industry growth.

#### Growth and income distribution are endogenous to particular economic systems---income inequality isn’t a structural feature---it’s a necessary pre-condition for growth---Kaldor’s hypothesis, investment indivisibilities, and incentive considerations

Semih Barış Karakuş 13, Graduated from the Department of Economics of Ege University and graduated from the Department of Business Administration, Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, "Income Inequality And Economic Growth: Enhancing Or Retarding Impact", Paranormist, July 22 2013, https://www.paranomist.com/income-inequality-and-economic-growth-enhancing-or-retarding-impact.html

A main aspect of the debate concerns causation, particularly, how does the distribution of income and wealth among agents determine aggregate growth in countries with different levels of development? However, an economy‘s growth rate and its income distribution are both endogenous outcomes of the economic system. So the impact of growth on inequality will be concerned on theoretical basis. Growth and inequality are subject to common influences both with respect to structural changes as well as macroeconomic policies. Structural changes that affect the rewards to different factors will almost certainly affect agents differentially, thereby influencing the distribution of income. Likewise, policies aimed at achieving distributional objectives are likely to impact the aggregate economy‘s productive performance. Being between endogenous variables, the income inequality-growth relationship -whether positive or negative – will reflect the underlying common forces to which they are both reacting as well as the direct impacts that one may have on the other. This paper attempts to empirically investigate the effect of income inequality on growth level of an economy, by comparing two groups of countries consisting of developed and developing ones2. The group of developed countries includes Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America and Germany. These countries exhibit stable growth rates along with relatively low levels of income inequality except for the USA during the time period under consideration ( on condition that worldwide economic crises and national economic downturns or recessions are not taken into account). The developing countries group consists of Argentina, Brazil, China and Turkey. Argentina and Brazil represent ―Latin American effect‖, that is, this region had historically suffered from high inequality rates, which may have potential influence on the growth level of countries in question. China has shown quite good performance in growth levels along with relatively moderate level of inequality during last three decades. The reason for China`s low inequality could result from a social revolution and resistance to the Japanese invasion, which resulted in Communist takeover in 1949, which promulgates populist policies. Besides, thoroughgoing land reform was implemented that had far-reaching effects on inequality (Todaro, 2009). Turkey has different experience compared with abovementioned developing countries, which will be discussed in more detail later. The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical bases of concepts used in the analysis, in particular measures of inequality and its relation with growth. We then examine the previous literature and empirical tests relating inequality and growth. Section 3 looks at the historical performance of Turkey growth and inequality because this country is taken with special attitude. Section 4 considers the econometric model and states the results of the empirical investigation. The next section will discuss the results, gives The definition between developed and developing countries was made based on OECD country classification by income levels. theoretical explanations for found relationships and make proposals concerning necessary policies. The last section concludes. 2. INEQUALITY AND GROWTH: INSEPARABLE TWINS IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS? Before proceeding to the examination of the relationship between the variables involved, we would provide information about the concepts. 2.1 INEQUALITY: HOW IS IT MEASURED? A) Lorenz Curve A Lorenz Curve is commonly used to analyze personal income statistics: essentially it is the curve that shows the relationship between the proportion (or percentage) of population receiving percentage of income in an economy. 1 The horizontal axis shows the percentage of income recipients. The vertical axis shows the share of total income received by each percentage of population, which is also cumulative up to 100 percent3. In order to draw a Lorenz Curve, both the income recipients on the horizontal axis and percentage of income on the vertical axis must be ranked from the lowest to the highest. The line of perfect equality, which is the diagonal (45 degree line), represents a perfectly equal income distribution in an economy where every household has the same income. On the contrary, the line of perfect inequality, which coincides with the horizontal and vertical axes, represents a perfectly unequal income distribution in an economy where one household has all the income and everyone else has none. In other words, the inequality of the distribution of income is more serious if the actual line bends further away from the 45 degree line. It should be noted that the Lorenz curve must lie below the line of perfect equality (the 45 degree line), because if Lorenz curve lies above the 45 degree line, ―this would imply that the poorer half of the population earned more than half of total income, which therefore is more than the richer half could earn.‖ (G. Clarke, 1992) B) Gini coefficient Gini coefficient, which is another measure of inequality in income distribution is also derived from the Lorenz Curve shown in the Figure 1. Gini coefficient is named after the Italian statistician Corrado Gini, who first formulated it in 19124. In the Lorenz diagram, the area between perfect equality line and Lorenz curve equals to ―A‖, the area between Lorenz curve and perfect inequality line equals to ―B‖. The Gini coefficient is then a ratio of ―A‖ to (A+B). Gini Coefficient can vary anywhere from 0 (perfect income equality) to 1 (perfect income inequality). The bigger the area covered by ―A‖, the higher the Gini Coefficient and thus higher income inequality. According to the international standard, the Gini Coefficient below 0.3 means the ―optimal state‖; the figure between 0.3 and 0.4 refers to the ―normal state‖, the one above 0.4 refers to the ―warning state‖ and the one reaching 0.6 means the ―dangerous state‖ and a social turmoil is about to happen at any moment5. Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality of income distribution or wealth distribution is used commonly in many studies on inequality. A low Gini coefficient indicates a comparatively equal income distribution, while, a high Gini coefficients indicates a comparatively unequal income distribution. 2.2 KUZNETS INVERTED-U HYPOTHESİS The research of Simon Kuznets named ―Economic Growth and Income Inequality‖ published on The American Economic Review in 1955 laid foundation of studying the relationship between economic growth and income inequality. He was the first person to introduce the idea of a link between inequality and development. Kuznets pointed out that development involves the shift of population from traditional to modern activities. This process of population shift from participating in agricultural productions to industrial productions allowed Kuznets to predict the behavioural of inequality during the course of development: “An invariable accompaniment of growth in the developed countries is the shift away from agriculture, a process usually referred to as an industrialization and urbanization. The income distribution of the total population, in the simplest model, may therefore be viewed as a combination of income distributions or the rural and of the urban populations. What little we know of the structures of two component income distribution reveals that: (a) the average per capita income of the rural population is usually lower than that of the urban; (b) inequality in the percentage shares within the distribution for the rural population is somewhat narrower than in that for the urban population…. Operating with this simple model, what conclusion do we meet? First, all other conditions being equal, the increasing weight of urban populations does not necessarily drift downward in the process of economic growth: indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that it is stable at best, and tends to widen because per capita productivity in urban pursuits increases more rapidly than in agriculture. If this is so, inequality of the total income distribution should increase.” (Kuznets, 1955, pp.7– 8) The main idea of his study is that the relationship between economic growth level and income inequality is likely to show an inverted U-shape, which is known in economic literature as Kuznets` Hypothesis. This hypothesis suggests that, at low levels of per capita income, inequality increases with rising per capita income and decreases only in the later stages of development with industrialization — resulting in an inverted U-shaped relationship between per capita income and income inequality — based on a model where individuals migrate from a low-wage rural sector with little inequality to an urban sector characterized by high income inequality and high average income. (Deininger and Squire; 1996). 2 2.3 HOW DOES INCOME INEQUALITY AFFECT GROWTH? A) Arguments for Positive Impact The traditional view that inequality should be growth-enhancing is based on three arguments. First comes Kaldor‘s hypothesis, formalized by Stiglitz (1969), that the marginal propensity to save of the rich is higher than that of the poor. If the growth rate of GDP is directly related to the proportion of national income that is saved, more unequal economies are bound to grow faster than economies characterized by a more equitable distribution of income. Therefore, income redistribution from rich people to poor people by the means of more progressive taxation reduces the saving rate of the economy as a whole. As according to the Neoclassical Growth Theory saving is the main factor of capital formation, the reduction in savings would lead to a decline in economic growth. Moreover, income redistribution could lower the incentive for the rich to work hard, and that could also lead to an economic growth decline. A second reason why inequality may enhance growth has to do with investment indivisibilities: investment projects, in particular the setting up of new industries or the implementation of innovations, often involve large sunk costs. In the absence of a broad and well-functioning market for shares, wealth obviously needs to be sufficiently concentrated in order for an individual (or a family) to be able to cover such large sunk costs and thereby initiate a new industrial activity. Hence a sufficiently concentrated distribution of wealth is a pre-requisite for growth. Lastly, the idea that there is necessarily a trade-off between productive efficiency and equality is based on incentive considerations, first formalized by Mirrlees (1971). Namely, when individual output depends on the unobservable effort borne by agents, rewarding them with a constant wage independent from output performance will obviously discourage them from investing any effort.

#### All their inequality internal links are conjecture with no empirical backing.

Brad Plumer 13, reporter covering climate change, energy policy and other environmental issues for The New York Times, 12-5-2013, "Is inequality bad for economic growth?," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/12/05/is-inequality-bad-for-economic-growth/

Perhaps the most interesting paper here is economist Jared Bernstein's exploration (pdf) of whether rising income inequality in the United States is bad for economic growth. His conclusion: There are compelling reasons to believe that inequality can harm growth, but it's surprisingly difficult to prove this is happening. That doesn't mean that rising inequality is benign or that there isn't a link — it's just hard to establish empirically, perhaps because of how many other factors are at play. "When you’re trying to figure out the relationship between two extremely complex variables, it’s always going to be tricky," says Bernstein, the former chief economist to Vice President Biden. Economists used to think that income inequality was a necessary condition for growth, at least in emerging economies — the famous Kuznets curve suggests that inequality should rise sharply at first, and then the benefits of productivity become more widely shared over time. But this doesn't appear to describe the United States since the 1970s. Income inequality has soared, but the benefits of productivity growth haven't flowed as widely. So in recent years, some economists — and even groups like the International Monetary Fund — have started wondering if high levels of inequality might even be detrimental to growth. The theories are often elegant. But, as Bernstein details in his paper, empirical support remains difficult to tease out, particularly in the case of the United States. Here's a rundown: Theory #1: High inequality leads to under-investments in education. This was an idea put forward by economist Joseph Stiglitz. Inequality of income leads to inequality of education. Lower-income kids end up in lower-quality schools and are less able to go on to college. The result: The workforce as a whole ends up less productive overall than it would be in a more equitable economy. But how do you prove this? It's true that wealthier families tend to spend more on educational materials — books, tutors, art and music lessons. And the gap in college completion rates between students in the top and bottom income brackets in the United States has grown over time (see chart). Growing inequality of income does seem to be leading to more inequality of education. The trouble comes in establishing a connection between this and economic productivity. As Bernstein notes, citing an index from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, the quality of the U.S. workforce actually appears to have improved since 1979. This could be for unrelated reasons — the workforce is getting older and more experienced and overall educational opportunities are growing. So we can't disprove theory #1. But we can't yet prove it, either. Theory #2: High inequality leads to policies that hurt growth. This is mainly a theory about politics. As income inequality grows, more and more resources are concentrated in the hands of the wealthiest. So, the idea goes, the wealthiest are better able to steer policies in directions that protect inequality at the expense of growth. (Say, high-income tax cuts instead of investments in infrastructure and R&D.) This obviously needs to be fleshed out a bit more, however — we'll return to it in a bit. Theory #3: High inequality leads to lower levels of consumer spending. Consumer spending makes up about 70 percent of the U.S. economy. And lower-income people have a greater propensity to spend their income than wealthier people do. So, if more and more of the nation's income is concentrated at the very top, that could depress overall demand and weaken economic growth. Simple, right? But at first glance, this doesn't hold up well, either. As the chart on the right shows, real per capita spending in the United States has continued to rise even as income inequality has gone up since 1979. And, Bernstein notes, it's hard to find a relationship even after running simple regressions or accounting for time lags. On the other hand, there may be more to this story. Since 2000, inequality has grown, middle-class incomes have stagnated, and poverty has stayed stubbornly high. Yet consumption kept growing — in part because there was a surge of borrowing and a housing bubble. So that brings us to a fourth theory... Theory #4: Inequality can lead to credit bubbles and financial crises. It's also possible to combine theories #2 and #3 above and tell a story about how inequality can lead to destructive financial crises such as the one we had in 2008. It goes like this: Incomes at the top grow. Incomes at the bottom stagnate. That creates a lot of demand for cheap credit — people at the lower end borrow more to keep afloat, while those at the top end have plenty to lend. At the same time, income inequality begins to warp politics. One example: The University of Chicago's Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse have found that members of Congress in districts with higher levels of income inequality were more likely to vote for a 1992 bill that greatly expanded credit for housing. That was true even after controlling for ideology. Put it all together — a surging demand for credit, a push for looser financial rules — and it's relatively easy to imagine how a nation could end up with asset bubbles and financial crises. This was a theory floated by the International Monetary Fund in 2011, which suggested that when income inequality runs rampant, people on the lower end tend to borrow more. That excess debt, in turn, increases the odds of a major financial crisis. Bernstein notes that there's a lot of circumstantial evidence that supports this story — including a recent paper by Barry Cynamon and Steven Fazzari establishing many of the details. "But the empirical problem, and it's a [is] big one," Bernstein tells me, "is that you can also see many of these trends evolving in periods where there isn't as much inequality. So I'm not sure we have this one completely nailed down."

#### Income inequality fosters growth---it helps developed countries

Semih Barış Karakuş 13, Graduated from the Department of Economics of Ege University and graduated from the Department of Business Administration, Stockholm School of Economics in Riga, "Income Inequality And Economic Growth: Enhancing Or Retarding Impact", Paranormist, July 22 2013, https://www.paranomist.com/income-inequality-and-economic-growth-enhancing-or-retarding-impact.html

In this paper, we constructed an empiric model to analyze the relationship between income inequality and economic growth. We used Gini coefficient as a well-known measure to indicate income inequality and gross national income per capita is used to exhibit economic performance. We firstly applied unit root tests at aim of ensuring us to be able to have health results, and we see that both of two series are stationary at I(1) stage. Next, with the help of reaching same degree stationary series, we applied co-integration test whether to figure out we can have and trust any long term relation in the data. Results indicate series are co-integrated, so that there is a relation for long term between economic growth and gini. Finally, we used random effects model to see and interpret the overall result as well as individually effects on countries can be interpreted. Our findings are consistent with the researches of Barro, who also argues that inequality is enhancing economic performance in developed countries, while reverse situation exists in developing economies. Referring to the conceptual graph mentioned above (Figure 3) there is no unique relationship between the Gini coefficient and economic growth rate. Two relationships appear: one is the upward sloping that belongs to the high income countries and the other is the downward-sloping reflecting the case of low income countries (Shin, 2008). A negative relationship of two variables in developing countries can result from negative opportunity-creation effect operating through the constraints on human capital investment that it imposes on poor individuals, imperfect capital markets, unsuitable and risky conditions for investors and unstable political environment in some cases. The situation in developed countries differs, as they have higher marginal productivity of capital, higher marginal propensity to save in general and a weaker preference for leisure. (García-Peñalosa, 2008) These factors encourage the accumulation of physical capital and hence foster growth.

#### Deficit spending is awesome and there is no disadvantage to it

Lohr 16 (John Lohr is a Pension fund analyst, Securities Lawyer, Fiduciary expert, counseling major wall street investment companies. “The Deficit Doesn't Matter.” 2016. https://seekingalpha.com/article/4029681-deficit-matter) BW

How does the government pay for the deficit? Two ways: (1) Print more money - a bad thing-causing inflation that makes our money worth less. (2) Sell Treasury bonds, notes and bills, on which the government must make interest payments (like we do on our credit cards). The deficit is a bad thing. No. Most economists recommend deficit spending as the best way to stop and keep at bay a recession. In times of high unemployment unlike now, deficit spending stimulates an increase in consumer spending, which creates an increase in the demand for business products, thus raising the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and stimulating employment. Economists believe that if the government's deficit is spent on things such as infrastructure, public health, and education, the business output will increase. If the government borrows money to stave off a severe recession, and pays for public health, infrastructure like roads (like my unimproved private road uphill to the ranch, where all the snow blows down from Montana and drifts), or better schools, the vast majority of economists agree that the deficit is beneficial. Paying down on the deficit is a desirable thing. No. Operating at a surplus or paying off a deficit reduces consumer and business spending and raises unemployment. Although the inflation rate may decline, we would generally have less disposable income. Deficit spending creates higher inflation. Not entirely. During periods of low unemployment (3%, not like today) deficits may encourage inflation, but so will oil crises, inadequate money supply and high inflation in other major countries.

## Replacing Welfare Bad

### Libertarianism Bad

#### Replacing social welfare with UBI guts the welfare state in favor of libertarianism

Alyssa Battistoni is a PhD candidate in political science at Yale University and an editor at Jacobin magazine, Spring 2017, Dissent, The False Promoise of Universal Basic Income, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/false-promise-universal-basic-income-andy-stern-ruger-bregman

The right-wing version of basic income, by contrast, wherein paltry lumps of cash replace public services and goods, is a UBI not worth having. This version of basic income is a mechanism to streamline—a more accurate word might be “gut”—the welfare state in the name of libertarian ideas of freedom. People know what they need better than the state does, the argument goes; how people will be able to afford healthcare on $12,000 a year is less often addressed.

### UBI Replaces Welfare

#### Murray’s proposal eliminates all welfare

Peter Cove is the author of Poor No More and the Founder of America Works and The Work First Foundation, January 8, 2018, City Journal, Poor No More: Against Universal Basic Income, https://www.city-journal.org/html/against-universal-basic-income-15636.html

Murray’s version of the UBI would eliminate all government transfer programs, including those involving cash, food, and health care, and replace them with an annual $10,000 grant to everyone 21 or older—whether they’re poor or not.

Tony Mecia is a senior writer at The Weekly Standard, February 2, 2018, The Case for Free Money, Weekly Standard, http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-case-for-free-money/article/2011427

Murray has long been an intellectual hero to the right, but this idea of a basic income for all would seem to ask a lot of conservatives. It sounds a lot like a big-government redistribution scheme, a fulfillment of a socialist dream to take money from those who are successful and spread it around equally. Murray argues that conservatives should support a basic income because the trend lines of the current system are financially unsustainable. The numbers would work, he estimates, if the government eliminates $2.2 trillion worth of annual benefits—including Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, welfare programs, and other transfer payments—and replaces them with his plan, which he estimates at $2.6 trillion (using 2014 numbers). Entitlements are projected to grow faster than the projections of his plan, so in time it would save money. (The government currently spends about $4 trillion a year.)

### Replacing Welfare Bad

#### Replacing pubic benefits with UBI will increase poverty

Elizabet Schulze, December 27, 2017, CNBC, Why Some Countries are seriously considering Handing Out Free Money https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/28/universal-basic-income-why-some-countries-are-seriously-considering-handing-out-free-money.html

There is plenty of debate over the costs of universal basic income. The 560 euros per month payment in Finland is roughly in line with the amount of unemployment assistance recipients would already receive from the government. Researchers in Finland said other benefits would need to be reduced to pay for a universal basic income across the country. Yet, in a 2017 report, the OECD found that reducing existing benefits to pay for basic income could actually have a negative impact on poverty levels. "Overall poverty rates (and gaps) can in fact increase significantly in countries that currently have tightly targeted systems of income support," the report said. Instead of replacing existing programs, some advocates say universal basic income should be an added benefit. "The better way is to see basic income as a transformation of what's already there," said Louise Haagh, chair of the advocacy group Basic Income Earth Network. Other basic income experiments are underway in the Netherlands, Kenya, Canada, and the United States.

#### Eliminating other income transfer programs will increase poverty

Frances Coppola, October 15, 2017, Forbes, The IMF gives a cautious welcome to UBI, https://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2017/10/15/the-imf-gives-a-cautious-welcome-to-universal-basic-income/2/#6c91e72e98f2

Conversely, for countries in **Group 2**, the IMF says that replacing existing transfer systems with UBI could mean large losses for some groups, resulting in higher poverty – precisely the opposite of the effect it is intended to have. For these countries, the IMF recommends improving existing transfer programs rather than replacing them with UBI.

## UBI increases Taxes

#### UBI would require massive increases in taxes

Sandra Kilhof 2014 (“Why unconditional basic income is no more than a socialist fairytale”, The New Economy, https://www.theneweconomy.com/strategy/why-unconditional-basic-income-is-no-more-than-a-socialist-fairytale)

More importantly, the case for UBI fails most financial feasibility tests. It would have to apply to everyone in order to replace social welfare benefits, and an amount high enough to support people at an adequate standard of living. If this were to be implemented in the debt-ridden eurozone or the US, it would also require a major increase in taxes. This is not something most voters are willing to support, as the increase in average and marginal tax rates would have a disincentivising effect on a large bulk of earners because they would retain far less of any additional money they earned. In addition, higher taxes are discouraging to innovation and businesses, which may be prompted to move elsewhere, outside a UBI zone. Alternatively, if a UBI payment were to be small enough to be financed by existing tax rates, it could lead to mass starvation and poverty increases in conjunction with payments going to those in no need of assistance. A compromise would increase poverty and reduce incentives to work, all in one package. This is a cure that seems worse than the disease. It’s also worth questioning the overall effect UBI would have on a regional or national economy. Countries would be implementing a type of subsidy that might make welfare obsolete, but which would cost billions. Few supporters of basic income have been able to prove it would be less costly for states to implement than existing welfare offerings, and, in a time of economic recovery, it seems utopian to suggest states have the economic capacity to implement a system that requires broad-based, constant funding. What’s more, a basic income could have a detrimental impact on inflation. When guaranteeing jobs, the effect tends to be deflationary, because it depresses wages. Conversely, a universal basic income free of sanctions and restrictions would push wages upwards, and have an inflationary effect.

#### Funding would come from increased taxes, including carbon taxes, and cuts to military spending

Futurism, no date, Universal Basic Income: The answer to Automation? https://futurism.com/images/universal-basic-income-answer-automation/

Due to the inherent scale of a universal income, funding would likely come from a variety of sources. Carbon taxes, income taxes, VAT, negative interest rates, earnings from investments, decreases in military spending, sovereign wealth funds, and resourced-based revenues are all being explored [What the future of work will mean for jobs, skills, and wages](https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/future-of-organizations-and-work/what-the-future-of-work-will-mean-for-jobs-skills-and-wages). The results reveal a rich mosaic of potential shifts in occupations in the years ahead, with important implications for workforce skills and wages. Our key finding is that while there may be enough work to maintain full employment to 2030 under most scenarios, the transitions will be very challenging—matching or even exceeding the scale of shifts out of agriculture and manufacturing we have seen in the past.

#### Fully funding a UBI would require a tax increase

David Morris, September 3, 2017, Universal Basic Income Could Grow the U.S. Economy by an Extra 12.5%, http://fortune.com/2017/09/03/universal-basic-income-economy-study/

And the study’s conclusions would surely be rejected by more conservative economists, including those who believe rising taxes or government debt can slow the economy. The idea of a redistributive UBI is also anathema to conservative political thought, which regards increased taxes as unjust government overreach. The report concludes that fully funding a $1,000 a month UBI would require tax increases from 21% to 35% for the top 10% of American earners. The study, which is based on a consumption-driven economic model, also does not address one of the biggest controversies surrounding UBI: Whether it would make workers less likely to seek jobs, or increase their freedom to take innovative risks.

#### High taxes on the wealthy needed to support a UBI

The Merkle, January 8, 2018, <https://themerkle.com/elon-musk-makes-case-for-universal-basic-income-again/>, Elon Musk Makes the Case (Again) for Universal Basic Income

Musk and other influencers may feel that i) Universal Basic Income should happen, and ii) that it will happen, but we do have to remember that there are always two sides to a coin. Universal income will likely mean a tax overhaul, where robots are taxed (since workers won’t be) as well as higher taxes on wealthier individuals. We may also see higher taxes on income earned outside of universal income. After all, the latter would have to be paid for somehow.

### Taxes Generally Hurt the Economy

#### Taxes crush the economy

Romer and Romer 10 (June 2010, Christina Romer is the Garff B. Wilson Professor of Economics at UC Berkeley, David H. Romer is the Herman Royer Professor of Political Economy at UC Berkeley, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks,” American Economic Review, Volume 100, Pages 763-801, Accessed through EconLit via GALILEO @ UGA)

VII. Conclusions This paper investigates the causes and consequences of changes in the level of taxation in the postwar United States. We find that despite the complexity of the legislative process, most significant tax changes have a dominant motivation that fits fairly clearly into one of four categories: counteracting other influences on the economy, paying for increases in government spending (or lowering taxes in response to reductions in spending), addressing an inherited budget deficit, and promoting long-run growth. The last two motivations are essentially unrelated to other factors influencing output, and so policy actions taken because of them can be used to estimate the effects of tax changes on output. Our results indicate that tax changes have very large effects on output. Our baseline specification implies that an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP lowers real GDP by almost three percent. Our many robustness checks for the most part point to a slightly smaller decline, but one that is still typically over 2.5 percent. In addition, we find that the output effects of tax changes are much more closely tied to the actual changes in taxes than to news about future changes, and that investment falls sharply in response to exogenous tax increases We also examine the behavior of output following changes in other measures of taxes. The estimated output effects obtained using broader measures of tax changes, such as the change in cyclically adjusted revenues or all legislated tax changes, are substantially smaller than those obtained using our measure of exogenous tax changes. Thus, failing to account for the reasons for tax changes can lead to substantially biased estimates of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal actions. Finally, we find suggestive evidence that tax increases to reduce an inherited budget deficit do not have the large output costs associated with other exogenous tax increases. Our results are largely silent concerning whether the output effects operate through incentives and supply behavior or through disposable income and demand stimulus. The persistence of the effects is suggestive of supply effects. But other studies have found that monetary policy, which necessarily works through demand, also has highly persistent output effects (for example, Ben S. Bernanke and Ilian Mihov 1998; and Romer and Romer 2004). The speed of the effects is suggestive of demand effects. But rapid supply responses are not out of the question.34

## Capitalism bad

#### UBI promotes capitalism, it is a capitulation to neoliberalism

Tristan Green, November 2017, The Next Web, We could fund a universal basic income with the data we give away to Facebook and Google, https://thenextweb.com/artificial-intelligence/2017/12/05/we-could-fund-a-universal-basic-income-with-the-

data-we-give-away-to-facebook-and-google/

Paradoxically, then, UBI seems to be a crisis demand, brandished in moments of social retreat and **austerity. As politics moves to the right and social movements go on the defensive, UBI gains ground. The more social gains seem unreachable, the more UBI makes sense. It’s what botanists would call a “bioindicator”: it indexes neoliberalism’s progress**. Support for basic incomes proliferates where neoliberal reforms have been the most devastating. *I****n this sense, UBI isn’t an alternative to neoliberalism, but an ideological capitulation to it***. In fact, **the most viable forms of basic income would universalize precarious labor and extend the sphere of the market — just as the gurus of Silicon Valley hope**.

#### UBI sustains the capitalism gig economy

Alyssa Battistoni is a PhD candidate in political science at Yale University and an editor at Jacobin magazine, Spring 2017, Dissent, The False Prooise of Universal Basic Income, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/false-promise-universal-basic-income-andy-stern-ruger-bregman

Given that, why do bosses—at least the ones in Silicon Valley—seem to like UBI so much? Some of their enthusiasm may simply be well-meaning naiveté: as Sam Altman of Y Combinator says, “50 years from now, I think it will seem ridiculous that we used fear of not being able to eat as a way to motivate people”—as if this hasn’t been one of the defining features of capitalism all along. Presumably freedom from the need to earn a living will unleash people’s entrepreneurial spirit, their inner innovator—rather than simply give us the chance to fish, hunt, and criticize just as we please. **The view of UBI as the foundation of the gig economy**, meanwhile, **is a tacit acknowledgement that capitalism can’t pay its full costs—a transfer of responsibility for a living wage from private employers to the public**

## Nationalism bad

#### Providing UBI to citizens blocks out global responsibilities to others, and embraces an America First nationalism that excludes others

Alyssa Battistoni is a PhD candidate in political science at Yale University and an editor at Jacobin magazine, Spring 2017, Dissent, The False Promoise of Universal Basic Income, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/false-promise-universal-basic-income-andy-stern-ruger-bregman

Who exactly should get a basic income is another question. It’s sometimes called a “citizen’s dividend,” explicitly limiting recipients by nationality. More generally the “universal” is aspirational: basic income programs have only seriously been proposed at the national or local levels. So, as with other welfare programs, debates over basic income will undoubtedly be bound up with questions about nationality and migration. In the European context, we should be wary of the deployment of basic income to solidify Fortress Europe as the refugee crisis intensifies. In the debates over the Swiss program, for example, Luzi Stamm, a member of parliament for the right-wing Swiss People’s Party, said he could imagine supporting UBI—but only for the Swiss. “Theoretically, if Switzerland were an island, the answer is yes,” he said at the time. “But with open borders, it’s a total impossibility, especially for Switzerland, with a high living standard.”

In the United States, meanwhile, the combination of nativism and libertarianism that makes up the Trump coalition is particularly dangerous: it’s hard to imagine any way a basic income program implemented in the Trump era would be anything but a vehicle for dismantling the remains of the welfare state while simultaneously reinforcing nationalism by excluding non-citizens from shared prosperity. That said, basic income doesn’t seem likely to be on the agenda of the Trump administration anytime soon. Instead of inventing the future, Trump’s move is to borrow from the past via boondoggles like the Carrier deal, which give public money to private companies in an attempt to revive a mid-century imaginary where men had real factory jobs. Welfare programs, meanwhile, are likely to come under renewed attack from a Republican administration ready to slash government spending.

# CON answer to PRO

### Failed in The United States

#### Experiments in the United States showed that UBI doesn’t work

<https://www.heritage.org/welfare/report/universal-basic-income-harms-recipients-and-increases-dependence-government> **02/14/2018**

The premise of universal basic income has a known track record of failure that hurts recipients and increases dependence on government, based on test experiments on the closely related negative income tax policy. The negative income tax is a policy idea similar to the idea of a universal basic income. In a negative income tax system, everyone is guaranteed a minimum income that is phased out as earnings increase. For the purposes of evaluating work disincentives through these experiments, the difference between the two policies is not relevant. The experiments showed that the major reduction in employment was not due to the phaseout of benefits. In four controlled random assignment experiments across six states between 1968 and 1980, the comparable policy was shown to reduce yearly hours worked among recipients significantly. For each $1,000 in added benefits, there was an average $660 reduction in earnings, meaning that $3,000 in government benefits was required for a net increase of $1,000 in family income. The results of these studies led policymakers to shift their focus to work-based welfare benefit programs.

### Answers to: Automation

#### Work is valuable beyond just the income it generates

<https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/06/universal-basic-income-ubi-terrible-idea/> **Oren Cass 06/15/2016**

Certainly, as has happened before, technological change poses both great opportunity and great challenges for the labor market. But work itself remains both necessary and valuable. Undermining it because it might hypothetically someday end would be a senseless act of preemptive self-sabotage.

### Answers to: Poverty Reduction

#### Poverty is not just about income. Social conditions matter too. Which UBI makes worse.

<https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/06/universal-basic-income-ubi-terrible-idea/> **Oren Cass 06/15/2016**

What about poverty? Proponents say a UBI would end it, because each American would receive a check lifting him above the poverty line. But poverty is not only, or even primarily, a matter of material well-being. If it were, the $20,000 in safety-net spending per person below the poverty line, the presence of air conditioning and cable television and cell phones in the majority of such households, even the obesity epidemic ravaging low-income communities would all be signs that the war on poverty is nearly won. But we care about social as well as material conditions, and we care about upward mobility. By these measures, a UBI makes things worse.

The greatest crisis facing less educated and lower-income Americans is social, not economic. As Charles Murray’s Coming Apart (2012) documents in harrowing detail, measures of social health that once looked roughly equal across economic classes now show gaping disparities, from family formation to employment to civic engagement to basic levels of trust. In 1960, Murray reports, more than 95 percent of white children were living with both biological parents when the mother turned 40, regardless of class. By the 2000s, the upper-class figure was 90 percent but the lower-class figure had declined to barely 30 percent, a level “so low that it calls into question the viability of white working-class communities as a place for socializing the next generation.” The story for other races is similar.

Appreciating the status of work in these communities is critical to understanding their decline. Work gives not only meaning but also structure and stability to life. It provides both socialization and a source of social capital. It helps establish for the next generation virtues such as responsibility, perseverance, and industriousness. Yet of the lower-class households Murray studied, the share with a full-time worker declined from 81 percent in 1960 to 53 percent in 2010.

Facing that trend, society cannot afford to withdraw its remaining expectation that able-bodied people try to make ends meet and its remaining respect for those who do. Yes, a UBI might flood these communities with additional resources. But a similar flood has already occurred over the past 40 years, with safety-net spending increasing eightfold. The result has been ever greater social erosion.

### Answers to: Inequality

#### UBI is bad for the sick and disabled

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/dec/10/finland-universal-basic-income-ubi-social-security> **Declan Gaffney 12/10/2015**

Finally, equality of payments becomes much less attractive once long-term sickness and disability are brought into the picture. If all involuntary interruptions to employment were short-term in nature, a subsistence level income might be enough to tide people over with the help of savings and borrowing. When people are going to be out of the labour market for months or years, with savings exhausted and no access to credit markets, the proposition is much less attractive. Hence benefits for long-term sickness have historically been higher than for short-term unemployment. But paying a higher rate of UBI to people who can’t work because of disability brings us back to some form of work-capability assessment.

1. 1BIEN, ”What is basic income?,” http://basicincome.org/basic-income/, accessed 2-12-2018 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-political/ [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)